{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00015192","kind":"vulnerability","title":"blaze: Chunked-body trailer fields promoted into Request.headers in blaze-server (front-end header-sanitization bypass)","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-46q4-43ph-c6fr","CVE-2026-73495"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.http4s:blaze-http_2.13, org.http4s:blaze-http_2.12, org.http4s:blaze-http_3, org.http4s:blaze-http_3, org.http4s:blaze-http_2.13. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-19053c267cf90a94db877a138f909fd2"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-12T21:12:01.000Z","value":"7.4 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-3aaf9a7fdf34c7eee030522a1e7868ea"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-03T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.480%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.41445. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-19053c267cf90a94db877a138f909fd2"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-3aaf9a7fdf34c7eee030522a1e7868ea","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-46q4-43ph-c6fr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-46q4-43ph-c6fr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:16:47.162Z"},{"id":"sr-19053c267cf90a94db877a138f909fd2","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-73495","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:45:16.079Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3aaf9a7fdf34c7eee030522a1e7868ea"],"technology":"org.http4s:blaze-http_2.13","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n  blaze-server can merge HTTP/1.1 chunked-body trailer fields into `Request.headers`. Because trailer fields are attacker-controlled, an unauthenticated remote client can inject arbitrary header names/values (e.g. `X-Forwarded-For`, internal-auth headers) that a fronting proxy sanitized from the request-header section, bypassing header-based trust decisions in the application.\n\n  ### Impact\n  Any http4s application using `BlazeServerBuilder` over HTTP/1.1 whose routes or middleware trust proxy-set headers (e.g., `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`, `X-Forwarded-Host`, org-internal auth headers) is affected. Where a fronting proxy strips/normalizes those headers but forwards chunked bodies with trailers intact, an attacker can spoof client IP for allow-lists/rate-limits/audit, forge the `https` scheme, or inject internal-auth headers. A promoted `Connection: close` trailer is also honored, allowing attacker-controlled termination of pooled backend connections.\n\n  ### Workarounds\n  Deploy behind a proxy that removes trailer fields (or rejects requests that use trailers) before forwarding; until patched, avoid trust decisions based on headers that a proxy is relied upon to sani","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.17"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3aaf9a7fdf34c7eee030522a1e7868ea"],"technology":"org.http4s:blaze-http_2.12","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n  blaze-server can merge HTTP/1.1 chunked-body trailer fields into `Request.headers`. Because trailer fields are attacker-controlled, an unauthenticated remote client can inject arbitrary header names/values (e.g. `X-Forwarded-For`, internal-auth headers) that a fronting proxy sanitized from the request-header section, bypassing header-based trust decisions in the application.\n\n  ### Impact\n  Any http4s application using `BlazeServerBuilder` over HTTP/1.1 whose routes or middleware trust proxy-set headers (e.g., `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`, `X-Forwarded-Host`, org-internal auth headers) is affected. Where a fronting proxy strips/normalizes those headers but forwards chunked bodies with trailers intact, an attacker can spoof client IP for allow-lists/rate-limits/audit, forge the `https` scheme, or inject internal-auth headers. A promoted `Connection: close` trailer is also honored, allowing attacker-controlled termination of pooled backend connections.\n\n  ### Workarounds\n  Deploy behind a proxy that removes trailer fields (or rejects requests that use trailers) before forwarding; until patched, avoid trust decisions based on headers that a proxy is relied upon to sani","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.17"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3aaf9a7fdf34c7eee030522a1e7868ea"],"technology":"org.http4s:blaze-http_3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n  blaze-server can merge HTTP/1.1 chunked-body trailer fields into `Request.headers`. Because trailer fields are attacker-controlled, an unauthenticated remote client can inject arbitrary header names/values (e.g. `X-Forwarded-For`, internal-auth headers) that a fronting proxy sanitized from the request-header section, bypassing header-based trust decisions in the application.\n\n  ### Impact\n  Any http4s application using `BlazeServerBuilder` over HTTP/1.1 whose routes or middleware trust proxy-set headers (e.g., `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`, `X-Forwarded-Host`, org-internal auth headers) is affected. Where a fronting proxy strips/normalizes those headers but forwards chunked bodies with trailers intact, an attacker can spoof client IP for allow-lists/rate-limits/audit, forge the `https` scheme, or inject internal-auth headers. A promoted `Connection: close` trailer is also honored, allowing attacker-controlled termination of pooled backend connections.\n\n  ### Workarounds\n  Deploy behind a proxy that removes trailer fields (or rejects requests that use trailers) before forwarding; until patched, avoid trust decisions based on headers that a proxy is relied upon to sani","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.17"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3aaf9a7fdf34c7eee030522a1e7868ea"],"technology":"org.http4s:blaze-http_3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n  blaze-server can merge HTTP/1.1 chunked-body trailer fields into `Request.headers`. Because trailer fields are attacker-controlled, an unauthenticated remote client can inject arbitrary header names/values (e.g. `X-Forwarded-For`, internal-auth headers) that a fronting proxy sanitized from the request-header section, bypassing header-based trust decisions in the application.\n\n  ### Impact\n  Any http4s application using `BlazeServerBuilder` over HTTP/1.1 whose routes or middleware trust proxy-set headers (e.g., `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`, `X-Forwarded-Host`, org-internal auth headers) is affected. Where a fronting proxy strips/normalizes those headers but forwards chunked bodies with trailers intact, an attacker can spoof client IP for allow-lists/rate-limits/audit, forge the `https` scheme, or inject internal-auth headers. A promoted `Connection: close` trailer is also honored, allowing attacker-controlled termination of pooled backend connections.\n\n  ### Workarounds\n  Deploy behind a proxy that removes trailer fields (or rejects requests that use trailers) before forwarding; until patched, avoid trust decisions based on headers that a proxy is relied upon to sani","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0-M1, < 1.0.0-M42"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3aaf9a7fdf34c7eee030522a1e7868ea"],"technology":"org.http4s:blaze-http_2.13","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n  blaze-server can merge HTTP/1.1 chunked-body trailer fields into `Request.headers`. Because trailer fields are attacker-controlled, an unauthenticated remote client can inject arbitrary header names/values (e.g. `X-Forwarded-For`, internal-auth headers) that a fronting proxy sanitized from the request-header section, bypassing header-based trust decisions in the application.\n\n  ### Impact\n  Any http4s application using `BlazeServerBuilder` over HTTP/1.1 whose routes or middleware trust proxy-set headers (e.g., `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`, `X-Forwarded-Host`, org-internal auth headers) is affected. Where a fronting proxy strips/normalizes those headers but forwards chunked bodies with trailers intact, an attacker can spoof client IP for allow-lists/rate-limits/audit, forge the `https` scheme, or inject internal-auth headers. A promoted `Connection: close` trailer is also honored, allowing attacker-controlled termination of pooled backend connections.\n\n  ### Workarounds\n  Deploy behind a proxy that removes trailer fields (or rejects requests that use trailers) before forwarding; until patched, avoid trust decisions based on headers that a proxy is relied upon to sani","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M41"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T14:01:55.383Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-12T21:12:01.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-24T22:26:48.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:16:47.162Z"},{"id":"NVI-00015192","kind":"vulnerability","title":"blaze: Chunked-body trailer fields promoted into Request.headers in blaze-server (front-end header-sanitization bypass)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-46q4-43ph-c6fr","CVE-2026-73495"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.http4s:blaze-http_2.13, org.http4s:blaze-http_2.12, org.http4s:blaze-http_3, org.http4s:blaze-http_3, org.http4s:blaze-http_2.13. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-3aaf9a7fdf34c7eee030522a1e7868ea"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-12T21:12:01.000Z","value":"7.4 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-3aaf9a7fdf34c7eee030522a1e7868ea"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-3aaf9a7fdf34c7eee030522a1e7868ea","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-46q4-43ph-c6fr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-46q4-43ph-c6fr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:16:47.162Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3aaf9a7fdf34c7eee030522a1e7868ea"],"technology":"org.http4s:blaze-http_2.13","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n  blaze-server can merge HTTP/1.1 chunked-body trailer fields into `Request.headers`. Because trailer fields are attacker-controlled, an unauthenticated remote client can inject arbitrary header names/values (e.g. `X-Forwarded-For`, internal-auth headers) that a fronting proxy sanitized from the request-header section, bypassing header-based trust decisions in the application.\n\n  ### Impact\n  Any http4s application using `BlazeServerBuilder` over HTTP/1.1 whose routes or middleware trust proxy-set headers (e.g., `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`, `X-Forwarded-Host`, org-internal auth headers) is affected. Where a fronting proxy strips/normalizes those headers but forwards chunked bodies with trailers intact, an attacker can spoof client IP for allow-lists/rate-limits/audit, forge the `https` scheme, or inject internal-auth headers. A promoted `Connection: close` trailer is also honored, allowing attacker-controlled termination of pooled backend connections.\n\n  ### Workarounds\n  Deploy behind a proxy that removes trailer fields (or rejects requests that use trailers) before forwarding; until patched, avoid trust decisions based on headers that a proxy is relied upon to sani","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.17"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3aaf9a7fdf34c7eee030522a1e7868ea"],"technology":"org.http4s:blaze-http_2.12","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n  blaze-server can merge HTTP/1.1 chunked-body trailer fields into `Request.headers`. Because trailer fields are attacker-controlled, an unauthenticated remote client can inject arbitrary header names/values (e.g. `X-Forwarded-For`, internal-auth headers) that a fronting proxy sanitized from the request-header section, bypassing header-based trust decisions in the application.\n\n  ### Impact\n  Any http4s application using `BlazeServerBuilder` over HTTP/1.1 whose routes or middleware trust proxy-set headers (e.g., `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`, `X-Forwarded-Host`, org-internal auth headers) is affected. Where a fronting proxy strips/normalizes those headers but forwards chunked bodies with trailers intact, an attacker can spoof client IP for allow-lists/rate-limits/audit, forge the `https` scheme, or inject internal-auth headers. A promoted `Connection: close` trailer is also honored, allowing attacker-controlled termination of pooled backend connections.\n\n  ### Workarounds\n  Deploy behind a proxy that removes trailer fields (or rejects requests that use trailers) before forwarding; until patched, avoid trust decisions based on headers that a proxy is relied upon to sani","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.17"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3aaf9a7fdf34c7eee030522a1e7868ea"],"technology":"org.http4s:blaze-http_3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n  blaze-server can merge HTTP/1.1 chunked-body trailer fields into `Request.headers`. Because trailer fields are attacker-controlled, an unauthenticated remote client can inject arbitrary header names/values (e.g. `X-Forwarded-For`, internal-auth headers) that a fronting proxy sanitized from the request-header section, bypassing header-based trust decisions in the application.\n\n  ### Impact\n  Any http4s application using `BlazeServerBuilder` over HTTP/1.1 whose routes or middleware trust proxy-set headers (e.g., `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`, `X-Forwarded-Host`, org-internal auth headers) is affected. Where a fronting proxy strips/normalizes those headers but forwards chunked bodies with trailers intact, an attacker can spoof client IP for allow-lists/rate-limits/audit, forge the `https` scheme, or inject internal-auth headers. A promoted `Connection: close` trailer is also honored, allowing attacker-controlled termination of pooled backend connections.\n\n  ### Workarounds\n  Deploy behind a proxy that removes trailer fields (or rejects requests that use trailers) before forwarding; until patched, avoid trust decisions based on headers that a proxy is relied upon to sani","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.17"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3aaf9a7fdf34c7eee030522a1e7868ea"],"technology":"org.http4s:blaze-http_3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n  blaze-server can merge HTTP/1.1 chunked-body trailer fields into `Request.headers`. Because trailer fields are attacker-controlled, an unauthenticated remote client can inject arbitrary header names/values (e.g. `X-Forwarded-For`, internal-auth headers) that a fronting proxy sanitized from the request-header section, bypassing header-based trust decisions in the application.\n\n  ### Impact\n  Any http4s application using `BlazeServerBuilder` over HTTP/1.1 whose routes or middleware trust proxy-set headers (e.g., `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`, `X-Forwarded-Host`, org-internal auth headers) is affected. Where a fronting proxy strips/normalizes those headers but forwards chunked bodies with trailers intact, an attacker can spoof client IP for allow-lists/rate-limits/audit, forge the `https` scheme, or inject internal-auth headers. A promoted `Connection: close` trailer is also honored, allowing attacker-controlled termination of pooled backend connections.\n\n  ### Workarounds\n  Deploy behind a proxy that removes trailer fields (or rejects requests that use trailers) before forwarding; until patched, avoid trust decisions based on headers that a proxy is relied upon to sani","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0-M1, < 1.0.0-M42"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3aaf9a7fdf34c7eee030522a1e7868ea"],"technology":"org.http4s:blaze-http_2.13","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n  blaze-server can merge HTTP/1.1 chunked-body trailer fields into `Request.headers`. Because trailer fields are attacker-controlled, an unauthenticated remote client can inject arbitrary header names/values (e.g. `X-Forwarded-For`, internal-auth headers) that a fronting proxy sanitized from the request-header section, bypassing header-based trust decisions in the application.\n\n  ### Impact\n  Any http4s application using `BlazeServerBuilder` over HTTP/1.1 whose routes or middleware trust proxy-set headers (e.g., `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`, `X-Forwarded-Host`, org-internal auth headers) is affected. Where a fronting proxy strips/normalizes those headers but forwards chunked bodies with trailers intact, an attacker can spoof client IP for allow-lists/rate-limits/audit, forge the `https` scheme, or inject internal-auth headers. A promoted `Connection: close` trailer is also honored, allowing attacker-controlled termination of pooled backend connections.\n\n  ### Workarounds\n  Deploy behind a proxy that removes trailer fields (or rejects requests that use trailers) before forwarding; until patched, avoid trust decisions based on headers that a proxy is relied upon to sani","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M41"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.559Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-12T21:12:01.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-24T22:26:48.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:16:47.162Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}