{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00015196","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Cloudreve: Information Exposure in `GET /api/v4/user/search`: `SearchActive` omits the active-status predicate, leaking inactive/banned account emails","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8r7f-r8hj-r3rv","CVE-2026-55496"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4, github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v3. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-3af6b433f490a784295135e862567bed"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-24T20:46:50.000Z","value":"4.3 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-3af6b433f490a784295135e862567bed"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-3af6b433f490a784295135e862567bed","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8r7f-r8hj-r3rv","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-8r7f-r8hj-r3rv","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:59:13.529Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3af6b433f490a784295135e862567bed"],"technology":"github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n \n`GET /api/v4/user/search` is available to any logged-in user. The service calls `userClient.SearchActive`, but despite its name that method filters only by email/nickname keyword and **never adds a `StatusActive` predicate** — while the sibling lookups `GetActiveByID` and `GetActiveByDavAccount`, defined a few lines above it, do. Search hits are serialized at `RedactLevelUser`, which includes the email address.\n \nA normal logged-in user can therefore enumerate and retrieve the email (plus nickname, avatar, creation time, redacted group, profile share-visibility) of **inactive and banned** accounts that an active-user directory is supposed to suppress. No global status interceptor compensates — the only User query interceptor is soft-delete, and inactive/banned rows are not soft-deleted.\n\n### Details\n## Root cause (verified at `26b6b10`)\n \n**1. Route — logged-in + `UserInfo.Read` scope** (`routers/router.go`):\n```go\nuser := v4.Group(\"user\")            // protected user group (login required)\nuser.GET(\"search\",\n    middleware.RequiredScopes(types.ScopeUserInfoRead),\n    controllers.FromQueryusersvc.SearchUserService, controllers.UserSearch)\n```\nThe `RequiredScopes","public_affected_ranges":["< 4.0.0-20260613023921-7e1289d55279"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3af6b433f490a784295135e862567bed"],"technology":"github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n \n`GET /api/v4/user/search` is available to any logged-in user. The service calls `userClient.SearchActive`, but despite its name that method filters only by email/nickname keyword and **never adds a `StatusActive` predicate** — while the sibling lookups `GetActiveByID` and `GetActiveByDavAccount`, defined a few lines above it, do. Search hits are serialized at `RedactLevelUser`, which includes the email address.\n \nA normal logged-in user can therefore enumerate and retrieve the email (plus nickname, avatar, creation time, redacted group, profile share-visibility) of **inactive and banned** accounts that an active-user directory is supposed to suppress. No global status interceptor compensates — the only User query interceptor is soft-delete, and inactive/banned rows are not soft-deleted.\n\n### Details\n## Root cause (verified at `26b6b10`)\n \n**1. Route — logged-in + `UserInfo.Read` scope** (`routers/router.go`):\n```go\nuser := v4.Group(\"user\")            // protected user group (login required)\nuser.GET(\"search\",\n    middleware.RequiredScopes(types.ScopeUserInfoRead),\n    controllers.FromQueryusersvc.SearchUserService, controllers.UserSearch)\n```\nThe `RequiredScopes","public_affected_ranges":["<= 3.0.0-20250225100611-da4e44b77af4"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.559Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-24T20:46:50.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-24T20:46:49.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:59:13.529Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}