{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00015221","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Better Auth: Account takeover via pre-account hijacking on magic-link and email-OTP sign-in","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-qq9h-g4jm-xgf3"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for better-auth, better-auth. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-4359dfee3ebef67b4a9862fa3ff7f0d8"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-24T15:44:02.000Z","value":"8.3 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-4359dfee3ebef67b4a9862fa3ff7f0d8"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4359dfee3ebef67b4a9862fa3ff7f0d8","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qq9h-g4jm-xgf3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-qq9h-g4jm-xgf3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:59:13.529Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4359dfee3ebef67b4a9862fa3ff7f0d8"],"technology":"better-auth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Am I affected\n\nYou are affected if all of the following hold:\n\n- You run a `better-auth` version below 1.6.22, or a `1.7.0-beta` below `1.7.0-beta.10`.\n- You enable the magic-link plugin or the email-OTP plugin.\n- You also enable email and password sign-up with open registration.\n- An account can exist at an address before its owner first signs in with the passwordless flow.\n\n### Summary\n\nAn attacker can keep password access to a victim's account after the victim starts using it. The attack runs in three steps. First, with open registration, the attacker signs up using the victim's email and a password the attacker picks. The account stays unverified, so the attacker cannot use it yet. Later the real owner signs in with a magic link or an email OTP. That step marks the account verified, and the attacker's password now works on it.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen an account already exists for an address, magic-link verification and email-OTP sign-in both sign in to that account. They mark it verified and issue a session. Before the fix, neither one removed a password set while the account was still unverified. Neither one revoked existing sessions. So a password set before anyone proved cont","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.1.3, < 1.6.22"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4359dfee3ebef67b4a9862fa3ff7f0d8"],"technology":"better-auth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Am I affected\n\nYou are affected if all of the following hold:\n\n- You run a `better-auth` version below 1.6.22, or a `1.7.0-beta` below `1.7.0-beta.10`.\n- You enable the magic-link plugin or the email-OTP plugin.\n- You also enable email and password sign-up with open registration.\n- An account can exist at an address before its owner first signs in with the passwordless flow.\n\n### Summary\n\nAn attacker can keep password access to a victim's account after the victim starts using it. The attack runs in three steps. First, with open registration, the attacker signs up using the victim's email and a password the attacker picks. The account stays unverified, so the attacker cannot use it yet. Later the real owner signs in with a magic link or an email OTP. That step marks the account verified, and the attacker's password now works on it.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen an account already exists for an address, magic-link verification and email-OTP sign-in both sign in to that account. They mark it verified and issue a session. Before the fix, neither one removed a password set while the account was still unverified. Neither one revoked existing sessions. So a password set before anyone proved cont","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.7.0-beta.0, < 1.7.0-beta.10"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.562Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-24T15:44:02.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-24T15:44:01.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:59:13.529Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}