{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00015240","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Electron: Context isolation bypass via Function.prototype.bind hijack","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-h7rp-cf8h-j98x","CVE-2026-70601"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for electron, electron, electron, electron. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-56130730ddcf8b3958449c02f778d702"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-05T15:46:10.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-47bd8b2b47ca5a8623a8bf97f7119f34"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-08T13:54:09.117Z","value":"7.5 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-56130730ddcf8b3958449c02f778d702"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-47bd8b2b47ca5a8623a8bf97f7119f34","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h7rp-cf8h-j98x","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-h7rp-cf8h-j98x","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:09.980Z"},{"id":"sr-56130730ddcf8b3958449c02f778d702","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-70601","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-70601","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-08T15:07:54.921Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-47bd8b2b47ca5a8623a8bf97f7119f34"],"technology":"electron","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nApps that expose Promise-returning functions to web content via `contextBridge` may be vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. Untrusted web content could obtain access to the isolated preload world and, through it, every capability the preload script has. In renderers without a sandbox, or with `nodeIntegration` enabled, this may escalate to Node.js access.\n\nApps are affected if they expose Promise-returning functions via `contextBridge` — the standard pattern for wrapping `ipcRenderer.invoke` — in windows that load untrusted content. Apps that never load untrusted content in those windows are not affected.\n\n### Workarounds\nThere are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron.\n\n### Fixed Versions\n* `42.0.0-beta.5`\n* `41.2.2`\n* `40.9.2`\n* `39.8.9`\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email Electron at security@electronjs.org","public_affected_ranges":["< 39.8.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-47bd8b2b47ca5a8623a8bf97f7119f34"],"technology":"electron","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nApps that expose Promise-returning functions to web content via `contextBridge` may be vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. Untrusted web content could obtain access to the isolated preload world and, through it, every capability the preload script has. In renderers without a sandbox, or with `nodeIntegration` enabled, this may escalate to Node.js access.\n\nApps are affected if they expose Promise-returning functions via `contextBridge` — the standard pattern for wrapping `ipcRenderer.invoke` — in windows that load untrusted content. Apps that never load untrusted content in those windows are not affected.\n\n### Workarounds\nThere are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron.\n\n### Fixed Versions\n* `42.0.0-beta.5`\n* `41.2.2`\n* `40.9.2`\n* `39.8.9`\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email Electron at security@electronjs.org","public_affected_ranges":[">= 40.0.0-alpha.1, < 40.9.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-47bd8b2b47ca5a8623a8bf97f7119f34"],"technology":"electron","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nApps that expose Promise-returning functions to web content via `contextBridge` may be vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. Untrusted web content could obtain access to the isolated preload world and, through it, every capability the preload script has. In renderers without a sandbox, or with `nodeIntegration` enabled, this may escalate to Node.js access.\n\nApps are affected if they expose Promise-returning functions via `contextBridge` — the standard pattern for wrapping `ipcRenderer.invoke` — in windows that load untrusted content. Apps that never load untrusted content in those windows are not affected.\n\n### Workarounds\nThere are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron.\n\n### Fixed Versions\n* `42.0.0-beta.5`\n* `41.2.2`\n* `40.9.2`\n* `39.8.9`\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email Electron at security@electronjs.org","public_affected_ranges":[">= 41.0.0-alpha.1, < 41.2.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-47bd8b2b47ca5a8623a8bf97f7119f34"],"technology":"electron","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nApps that expose Promise-returning functions to web content via `contextBridge` may be vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. Untrusted web content could obtain access to the isolated preload world and, through it, every capability the preload script has. In renderers without a sandbox, or with `nodeIntegration` enabled, this may escalate to Node.js access.\n\nApps are affected if they expose Promise-returning functions via `contextBridge` — the standard pattern for wrapping `ipcRenderer.invoke` — in windows that load untrusted content. Apps that never load untrusted content in those windows are not affected.\n\n### Workarounds\nThere are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron.\n\n### Fixed Versions\n* `42.0.0-beta.5`\n* `41.2.2`\n* `40.9.2`\n* `39.8.9`\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email Electron at security@electronjs.org","public_affected_ranges":[">= 42.0.0-alpha.1, < 42.0.0-beta.5"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:44.058Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-05T15:46:10.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-05T15:46:08.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:09.980Z"},{"id":"NVI-00015240","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Electron: Context isolation bypass via Function.prototype.bind hijack","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-h7rp-cf8h-j98x","CVE-2026-70601"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for electron, electron, electron, electron. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-47bd8b2b47ca5a8623a8bf97f7119f34"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-05T15:46:10.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-47bd8b2b47ca5a8623a8bf97f7119f34"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-47bd8b2b47ca5a8623a8bf97f7119f34","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h7rp-cf8h-j98x","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-h7rp-cf8h-j98x","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:09.980Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-47bd8b2b47ca5a8623a8bf97f7119f34"],"technology":"electron","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nApps that expose Promise-returning functions to web content via `contextBridge` may be vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. Untrusted web content could obtain access to the isolated preload world and, through it, every capability the preload script has. In renderers without a sandbox, or with `nodeIntegration` enabled, this may escalate to Node.js access.\n\nApps are affected if they expose Promise-returning functions via `contextBridge` — the standard pattern for wrapping `ipcRenderer.invoke` — in windows that load untrusted content. Apps that never load untrusted content in those windows are not affected.\n\n### Workarounds\nThere are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron.\n\n### Fixed Versions\n* `42.0.0-beta.5`\n* `41.2.2`\n* `40.9.2`\n* `39.8.9`\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email Electron at security@electronjs.org","public_affected_ranges":["< 39.8.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-47bd8b2b47ca5a8623a8bf97f7119f34"],"technology":"electron","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nApps that expose Promise-returning functions to web content via `contextBridge` may be vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. Untrusted web content could obtain access to the isolated preload world and, through it, every capability the preload script has. In renderers without a sandbox, or with `nodeIntegration` enabled, this may escalate to Node.js access.\n\nApps are affected if they expose Promise-returning functions via `contextBridge` — the standard pattern for wrapping `ipcRenderer.invoke` — in windows that load untrusted content. Apps that never load untrusted content in those windows are not affected.\n\n### Workarounds\nThere are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron.\n\n### Fixed Versions\n* `42.0.0-beta.5`\n* `41.2.2`\n* `40.9.2`\n* `39.8.9`\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email Electron at security@electronjs.org","public_affected_ranges":[">= 40.0.0-alpha.1, < 40.9.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-47bd8b2b47ca5a8623a8bf97f7119f34"],"technology":"electron","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nApps that expose Promise-returning functions to web content via `contextBridge` may be vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. Untrusted web content could obtain access to the isolated preload world and, through it, every capability the preload script has. In renderers without a sandbox, or with `nodeIntegration` enabled, this may escalate to Node.js access.\n\nApps are affected if they expose Promise-returning functions via `contextBridge` — the standard pattern for wrapping `ipcRenderer.invoke` — in windows that load untrusted content. Apps that never load untrusted content in those windows are not affected.\n\n### Workarounds\nThere are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron.\n\n### Fixed Versions\n* `42.0.0-beta.5`\n* `41.2.2`\n* `40.9.2`\n* `39.8.9`\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email Electron at security@electronjs.org","public_affected_ranges":[">= 41.0.0-alpha.1, < 41.2.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-47bd8b2b47ca5a8623a8bf97f7119f34"],"technology":"electron","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nApps that expose Promise-returning functions to web content via `contextBridge` may be vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. Untrusted web content could obtain access to the isolated preload world and, through it, every capability the preload script has. In renderers without a sandbox, or with `nodeIntegration` enabled, this may escalate to Node.js access.\n\nApps are affected if they expose Promise-returning functions via `contextBridge` — the standard pattern for wrapping `ipcRenderer.invoke` — in windows that load untrusted content. Apps that never load untrusted content in those windows are not affected.\n\n### Workarounds\nThere are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron.\n\n### Fixed Versions\n* `42.0.0-beta.5`\n* `41.2.2`\n* `40.9.2`\n* `39.8.9`\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email Electron at security@electronjs.org","public_affected_ranges":[">= 42.0.0-alpha.1, < 42.0.0-beta.5"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.564Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-05T15:46:10.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-05T15:46:08.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:09.980Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}