{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00015244","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Fission: SanitizeFilePath lexical HasPrefix bypass permits sibling-directory escape","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-r5jh-q2mw-gcx4","CVE-2026-50568"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/fission/fission. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-484d4155a8453e833ec95678093e7884"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-28T20:18:31.000Z","value":"3.6 low","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-484d4155a8453e833ec95678093e7884"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-484d4155a8453e833ec95678093e7884","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r5jh-q2mw-gcx4","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-r5jh-q2mw-gcx4","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:59:04.660Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-484d4155a8453e833ec95678093e7884"],"technology":"github.com/fission/fission","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`SanitizeFilePath` in `pkg/utils/utils.go` validated that a path stayed under a safe directory by calling `strings.HasPrefix(path, safedir)`. This is a lexical check, not a directory boundary check: `/packages-extra/evil` starts with\n`/packages`, so it passed. The function did not enforce a path-separator boundary, so any sibling directory whose name began with the safe-directory string was accepted.\n\nCallers included the builder's `Clean` handler (`pkg/builder/builder.go:208`) and the fetcher's `Fetch` / `Upload` handlers (`pkg/fetcher/fetcher.go`). A tenant who could pre-create or control a sibling directory under the fetcher /\nbuilder's shared volume could induce a write or read outside the intended safe directory.\n\n### Affected\n\n- Project: `github.com/fission/fission`\n- Versions: all versions through v1.24.0 with `SanitizeFilePath` in the tree\n- Audited commit: `647c141`\n- Component: `pkg/utils/utils.go:SanitizeFilePath`\n- Callers: `pkg/builder/builder.go:157,164,208`, `pkg/fetcher/fetcher.go:296,311,450,496,565,571`\n- Configuration: default; requires a sibling directory to the safe dir to exist on the filesystem\n\n\nFix section (paste into the Fix / Patches field)\n\nFixed in [v1.","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.24.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.564Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-28T20:18:31.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-28T20:18:30.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:59:04.660Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}