{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00015317","kind":"vulnerability","title":"psd-tools vulnerable to arbitrary file write via smart-object filename","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-2rmg-vrx8-9j2f","CVE-2026-49836"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for psd-tools. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-22e741c00dec5056866ffd08cdee26cb"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-30T19:57:08.043Z","value":"4.6 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-22e741c00dec5056866ffd08cdee26cb"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5ad76efd0ce81dc75559ae988cd446f9","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2rmg-vrx8-9j2f","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-2rmg-vrx8-9j2f","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T22:54:05.264Z"},{"id":"sr-22e741c00dec5056866ffd08cdee26cb","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49836","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-49836","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-08T01:47:50.916Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5ad76efd0ce81dc75559ae988cd446f9"],"technology":"psd-tools","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"# psd-tools: arbitrary file write/read via smart-object path traversal\n\n## Summary\n\nIn `psd-tools` (all releases exposing the `SmartObject` API through **v1.17.0**), `SmartObject.save()` writes an embedded smart object to a path taken verbatim from the PSD file. Because that name is attacker-controlled and unsanitised, a tool that extracts embedded objects from an untrusted `.psd` can be made to write attacker-chosen bytes to an attacker-chosen path (absolute or `../`-traversing), outside its intended output directory.\n\nA secondary issue in `SmartObject.open()` for external-kind smart objects allows the attacker-controlled `fullPath` descriptor to be used as an arbitrary file **read** path, enabling exfiltration of the read content to the controlled write destination. Both issues are fixed in **v1.17.1**.\n\n## Details\n\n### Write path — `SmartObject.save()` (primary)\n\n`src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py:170-179` (tag `v1.17.0`):\n\n```python\ndef save(self, filename: str | None = None) -> None:\n    if filename is None:\n        filename = self.filename          # untrusted, straight from the file\n    with open(filename, \"wb\") as f:\n        f.write(self.data)                # attacker-cont","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.17.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:44.039Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T21:47:13.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-09T23:20:47.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T22:54:05.264Z"},{"id":"NVI-00015317","kind":"vulnerability","title":"psd-tools vulnerable to arbitrary file write via smart-object filename","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-2rmg-vrx8-9j2f","CVE-2026-49836"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for psd-tools. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-5ad76efd0ce81dc75559ae988cd446f9"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5ad76efd0ce81dc75559ae988cd446f9","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2rmg-vrx8-9j2f","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-2rmg-vrx8-9j2f","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T22:54:05.264Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5ad76efd0ce81dc75559ae988cd446f9"],"technology":"psd-tools","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"# psd-tools: arbitrary file write/read via smart-object path traversal\n\n## Summary\n\nIn `psd-tools` (all releases exposing the `SmartObject` API through **v1.17.0**), `SmartObject.save()` writes an embedded smart object to a path taken verbatim from the PSD file. Because that name is attacker-controlled and unsanitised, a tool that extracts embedded objects from an untrusted `.psd` can be made to write attacker-chosen bytes to an attacker-chosen path (absolute or `../`-traversing), outside its intended output directory.\n\nA secondary issue in `SmartObject.open()` for external-kind smart objects allows the attacker-controlled `fullPath` descriptor to be used as an arbitrary file **read** path, enabling exfiltration of the read content to the controlled write destination. Both issues are fixed in **v1.17.1**.\n\n## Details\n\n### Write path — `SmartObject.save()` (primary)\n\n`src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py:170-179` (tag `v1.17.0`):\n\n```python\ndef save(self, filename: str | None = None) -> None:\n    if filename is None:\n        filename = self.filename          # untrusted, straight from the file\n    with open(filename, \"wb\") as f:\n        f.write(self.data)                # attacker-cont","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.17.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.569Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T21:47:13.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-09T23:20:47.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T22:54:05.264Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}