{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00015320","kind":"vulnerability","title":"cryptography: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle through distinguishable errors and timing","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5","CVE-2026-69247"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for cryptography. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-5b05a2d5e75326a914f7290c52d2c66e"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5b05a2d5e75326a914f7290c52d2c66e","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:33.950Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5b05a2d5e75326a914f7290c52d2c66e"],"technology":"cryptography","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`pkcs7_decrypt_der`, `pkcs7_decrypt_pem`, and `pkcs7_decrypt_smime` reported the\noutcome of decrypting a `RecipientInfo`'s `encryptedKey` in several\ndistinguishable ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the\nRSA operation. The same distinction was also observable by timing. An\napplication that decrypts attacker-supplied `EnvelopedData` and reflects the\noutcome gives the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the\ncontent-encryption key.\n\nIntroduced in 44.0.0. Fixed in 50.0.0.\n\n### Details\n\nDecryption ran as: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt of `encryptedKey` → build an AES\ncipher from the result → AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Each stage failed\ndifferently, with no RFC 3218 mitigation:\n\n1. invalid RSA padding → `Decryption failed`\n2. valid padding, bad key length → `Invalid key size (N) for AES.`, disclosing `N`\n3. correct length, wrong key → `Invalid padding bytes.`\n4. the real key → plaintext\n\nCase 1 is reachable only where the linked library lacks implicit rejection:\nOpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL, and BoringSSL. On OpenSSL 3.2+, used in our wheels,\ninvalid padding instead returns a synthetic plaintext of\npseudorandom length, so the error channel do","public_affected_ranges":[">= 44.0.0, < 50.0.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.569Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-03T21:18:17.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-03T21:17:00.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:33.950Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}