{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00015325","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Http4s Ember HTTP/2: unbounded inbound body buffering","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-6m4x-pp6q-5jmm","CVE-2026-69202"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-063750bc9ecdb1d38366f6b5c9d1e537"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-15T19:52:59.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-5b3b6015716c7c0953021f2bc996557d"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-16T20:38:04.943Z","value":"7.5 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-063750bc9ecdb1d38366f6b5c9d1e537"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5b3b6015716c7c0953021f2bc996557d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6m4x-pp6q-5jmm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-6m4x-pp6q-5jmm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T19:09:30.244Z"},{"id":"sr-063750bc9ecdb1d38366f6b5c9d1e537","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69202","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-69202","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-08T15:07:54.921Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5b3b6015716c7c0953021f2bc996557d"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Ember's HTTP/2 stack replenishes the inbound flow-control window based on bytes\nreceived off the wire, not bytes consumed by the application.  Received DATA is buffered in an unbounded per-stream channel.  Flow control therefore\nprovides no backpressure: a peer can stream a large or unbounded body faster than the application drains it and the connection retains every payload in heap.\n\nThis is the read-path mirror of the outbound queue issue.\n\nThis affects an Ember receiving a request body and an Ember client receiving a response body from a hostile server.\n\n### Impact\n\nUnauthenticated remote denial of service (OOM) against any Ember server built\n`.withHttp2` for a non-draining or slow-draining route, and against an Ember client consuming from a hostile or compromised server.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Disable HTTP/2 to remove the vector entirely.\n- Apply an aggregate request-entity size limit (e.g. `EntityLimiter` middleware) on routes that consume the body.\n- Ensure handlers fully drain request bodies with aggressive idle timeouts.","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5b3b6015716c7c0953021f2bc996557d"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Ember's HTTP/2 stack replenishes the inbound flow-control window based on bytes\nreceived off the wire, not bytes consumed by the application.  Received DATA is buffered in an unbounded per-stream channel.  Flow control therefore\nprovides no backpressure: a peer can stream a large or unbounded body faster than the application drains it and the connection retains every payload in heap.\n\nThis is the read-path mirror of the outbound queue issue.\n\nThis affects an Ember receiving a request body and an Ember client receiving a response body from a hostile server.\n\n### Impact\n\nUnauthenticated remote denial of service (OOM) against any Ember server built\n`.withHttp2` for a non-draining or slow-draining route, and against an Ember client consuming from a hostile or compromised server.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Disable HTTP/2 to remove the vector entirely.\n- Apply an aggregate request-entity size limit (e.g. `EntityLimiter` middleware) on routes that consume the body.\n- Ensure handlers fully drain request bodies with aggressive idle timeouts.","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5b3b6015716c7c0953021f2bc996557d"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Ember's HTTP/2 stack replenishes the inbound flow-control window based on bytes\nreceived off the wire, not bytes consumed by the application.  Received DATA is buffered in an unbounded per-stream channel.  Flow control therefore\nprovides no backpressure: a peer can stream a large or unbounded body faster than the application drains it and the connection retains every payload in heap.\n\nThis is the read-path mirror of the outbound queue issue.\n\nThis affects an Ember receiving a request body and an Ember client receiving a response body from a hostile server.\n\n### Impact\n\nUnauthenticated remote denial of service (OOM) against any Ember server built\n`.withHttp2` for a non-draining or slow-draining route, and against an Ember client consuming from a hostile or compromised server.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Disable HTTP/2 to remove the vector entirely.\n- Apply an aggregate request-entity size limit (e.g. `EntityLimiter` middleware) on routes that consume the body.\n- Ensure handlers fully drain request bodies with aggressive idle timeouts.","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5b3b6015716c7c0953021f2bc996557d"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Ember's HTTP/2 stack replenishes the inbound flow-control window based on bytes\nreceived off the wire, not bytes consumed by the application.  Received DATA is buffered in an unbounded per-stream channel.  Flow control therefore\nprovides no backpressure: a peer can stream a large or unbounded body faster than the application drains it and the connection retains every payload in heap.\n\nThis is the read-path mirror of the outbound queue issue.\n\nThis affects an Ember receiving a request body and an Ember client receiving a response body from a hostile server.\n\n### Impact\n\nUnauthenticated remote denial of service (OOM) against any Ember server built\n`.withHttp2` for a non-draining or slow-draining route, and against an Ember client consuming from a hostile or compromised server.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Disable HTTP/2 to remove the vector entirely.\n- Apply an aggregate request-entity size limit (e.g. `EntityLimiter` middleware) on routes that consume the body.\n- Ensure handlers fully drain request bodies with aggressive idle timeouts.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5b3b6015716c7c0953021f2bc996557d"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Ember's HTTP/2 stack replenishes the inbound flow-control window based on bytes\nreceived off the wire, not bytes consumed by the application.  Received DATA is buffered in an unbounded per-stream channel.  Flow control therefore\nprovides no backpressure: a peer can stream a large or unbounded body faster than the application drains it and the connection retains every payload in heap.\n\nThis is the read-path mirror of the outbound queue issue.\n\nThis affects an Ember receiving a request body and an Ember client receiving a response body from a hostile server.\n\n### Impact\n\nUnauthenticated remote denial of service (OOM) against any Ember server built\n`.withHttp2` for a non-draining or slow-draining route, and against an Ember client consuming from a hostile or compromised server.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Disable HTTP/2 to remove the vector entirely.\n- Apply an aggregate request-entity size limit (e.g. `EntityLimiter` middleware) on routes that consume the body.\n- Ensure handlers fully drain request bodies with aggressive idle timeouts.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:44.018Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-15T19:52:59.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-15T19:52:58.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T19:09:30.244Z"},{"id":"NVI-00015325","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Http4s Ember HTTP/2: unbounded inbound body buffering","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-6m4x-pp6q-5jmm","CVE-2026-69202"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-5b3b6015716c7c0953021f2bc996557d"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-15T19:52:59.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-5b3b6015716c7c0953021f2bc996557d"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5b3b6015716c7c0953021f2bc996557d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6m4x-pp6q-5jmm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-6m4x-pp6q-5jmm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T19:09:30.244Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5b3b6015716c7c0953021f2bc996557d"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Ember's HTTP/2 stack replenishes the inbound flow-control window based on bytes\nreceived off the wire, not bytes consumed by the application.  Received DATA is buffered in an unbounded per-stream channel.  Flow control therefore\nprovides no backpressure: a peer can stream a large or unbounded body faster than the application drains it and the connection retains every payload in heap.\n\nThis is the read-path mirror of the outbound queue issue.\n\nThis affects an Ember receiving a request body and an Ember client receiving a response body from a hostile server.\n\n### Impact\n\nUnauthenticated remote denial of service (OOM) against any Ember server built\n`.withHttp2` for a non-draining or slow-draining route, and against an Ember client consuming from a hostile or compromised server.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Disable HTTP/2 to remove the vector entirely.\n- Apply an aggregate request-entity size limit (e.g. `EntityLimiter` middleware) on routes that consume the body.\n- Ensure handlers fully drain request bodies with aggressive idle timeouts.","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5b3b6015716c7c0953021f2bc996557d"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Ember's HTTP/2 stack replenishes the inbound flow-control window based on bytes\nreceived off the wire, not bytes consumed by the application.  Received DATA is buffered in an unbounded per-stream channel.  Flow control therefore\nprovides no backpressure: a peer can stream a large or unbounded body faster than the application drains it and the connection retains every payload in heap.\n\nThis is the read-path mirror of the outbound queue issue.\n\nThis affects an Ember receiving a request body and an Ember client receiving a response body from a hostile server.\n\n### Impact\n\nUnauthenticated remote denial of service (OOM) against any Ember server built\n`.withHttp2` for a non-draining or slow-draining route, and against an Ember client consuming from a hostile or compromised server.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Disable HTTP/2 to remove the vector entirely.\n- Apply an aggregate request-entity size limit (e.g. `EntityLimiter` middleware) on routes that consume the body.\n- Ensure handlers fully drain request bodies with aggressive idle timeouts.","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5b3b6015716c7c0953021f2bc996557d"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Ember's HTTP/2 stack replenishes the inbound flow-control window based on bytes\nreceived off the wire, not bytes consumed by the application.  Received DATA is buffered in an unbounded per-stream channel.  Flow control therefore\nprovides no backpressure: a peer can stream a large or unbounded body faster than the application drains it and the connection retains every payload in heap.\n\nThis is the read-path mirror of the outbound queue issue.\n\nThis affects an Ember receiving a request body and an Ember client receiving a response body from a hostile server.\n\n### Impact\n\nUnauthenticated remote denial of service (OOM) against any Ember server built\n`.withHttp2` for a non-draining or slow-draining route, and against an Ember client consuming from a hostile or compromised server.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Disable HTTP/2 to remove the vector entirely.\n- Apply an aggregate request-entity size limit (e.g. `EntityLimiter` middleware) on routes that consume the body.\n- Ensure handlers fully drain request bodies with aggressive idle timeouts.","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5b3b6015716c7c0953021f2bc996557d"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Ember's HTTP/2 stack replenishes the inbound flow-control window based on bytes\nreceived off the wire, not bytes consumed by the application.  Received DATA is buffered in an unbounded per-stream channel.  Flow control therefore\nprovides no backpressure: a peer can stream a large or unbounded body faster than the application drains it and the connection retains every payload in heap.\n\nThis is the read-path mirror of the outbound queue issue.\n\nThis affects an Ember receiving a request body and an Ember client receiving a response body from a hostile server.\n\n### Impact\n\nUnauthenticated remote denial of service (OOM) against any Ember server built\n`.withHttp2` for a non-draining or slow-draining route, and against an Ember client consuming from a hostile or compromised server.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Disable HTTP/2 to remove the vector entirely.\n- Apply an aggregate request-entity size limit (e.g. `EntityLimiter` middleware) on routes that consume the body.\n- Ensure handlers fully drain request bodies with aggressive idle timeouts.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5b3b6015716c7c0953021f2bc996557d"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Ember's HTTP/2 stack replenishes the inbound flow-control window based on bytes\nreceived off the wire, not bytes consumed by the application.  Received DATA is buffered in an unbounded per-stream channel.  Flow control therefore\nprovides no backpressure: a peer can stream a large or unbounded body faster than the application drains it and the connection retains every payload in heap.\n\nThis is the read-path mirror of the outbound queue issue.\n\nThis affects an Ember receiving a request body and an Ember client receiving a response body from a hostile server.\n\n### Impact\n\nUnauthenticated remote denial of service (OOM) against any Ember server built\n`.withHttp2` for a non-draining or slow-draining route, and against an Ember client consuming from a hostile or compromised server.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Disable HTTP/2 to remove the vector entirely.\n- Apply an aggregate request-entity size limit (e.g. `EntityLimiter` middleware) on routes that consume the body.\n- Ensure handlers fully drain request bodies with aggressive idle timeouts.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.570Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-15T19:52:59.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-15T19:52:58.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T19:09:30.244Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}