{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00015357","kind":"vulnerability","title":"veraPDF Validation XXE via Rich Text","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-3jh7-wm29-q568","CVE-2026-54078"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.verapdf:validation-model, org.verapdf:validation-model, org.verapdf:validation-model-jakarta, org.verapdf:validation-model-jakarta. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-5d0534e15a3fe95b33ec8aa29d511bbd"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-23T23:10:00.157Z","value":"8.7 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-5d0534e15a3fe95b33ec8aa29d511bbd"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5edd716e247c3f5a9f4506008a28dd9b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3jh7-wm29-q568","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-3jh7-wm29-q568","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:59:04.660Z"},{"id":"sr-5d0534e15a3fe95b33ec8aa29d511bbd","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54078","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-54078","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-08T01:48:12.360Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5edd716e247c3f5a9f4506008a28dd9b"],"technology":"org.verapdf:validation-model","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary  \n  \n**Description**\nAn XML External Entity Injection (CWE-611) vulnerability in veraPDF allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files on the server file system and perform Server-Side Request Forgery by submitting a crafted PDF containing a malicious rich-text (/RC or /RV) entry. This affects all current versions of veraPDF-validation.  \n  \n## Details  \nThe vulnerability resides in veraPDF-validation `validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/tools/DictionaryKeysHelper.java` within the `getRichTextStringOrStreamEntryStringRepresentation()` method. This helper extracts the XHTML rich-text body from a PDF dictionary string or stream and parses it with a DOM parser to return the concatenated text content.  \n  \nThe vulnerability stems from two combined issues:  \n- The DocumentBuilderFactory is instantiated with default settings , no disallow-doctype-decl, no disabling of external general/parameter entities, no FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING, and no secure EntityResolver. The default JAXP/Xerces parser will therefore resolve `` and `` declarations.  \n- After parsing, `getAllNodeText()` recursively concatenates every text n","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.25.73, <= 1.30.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5edd716e247c3f5a9f4506008a28dd9b"],"technology":"org.verapdf:validation-model","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary  \n  \n**Description**\nAn XML External Entity Injection (CWE-611) vulnerability in veraPDF allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files on the server file system and perform Server-Side Request Forgery by submitting a crafted PDF containing a malicious rich-text (/RC or /RV) entry. This affects all current versions of veraPDF-validation.  \n  \n## Details  \nThe vulnerability resides in veraPDF-validation `validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/tools/DictionaryKeysHelper.java` within the `getRichTextStringOrStreamEntryStringRepresentation()` method. This helper extracts the XHTML rich-text body from a PDF dictionary string or stream and parses it with a DOM parser to return the concatenated text content.  \n  \nThe vulnerability stems from two combined issues:  \n- The DocumentBuilderFactory is instantiated with default settings , no disallow-doctype-decl, no disabling of external general/parameter entities, no FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING, and no secure EntityResolver. The default JAXP/Xerces parser will therefore resolve `` and `` declarations.  \n- After parsing, `getAllNodeText()` recursively concatenates every text n","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.31.1, <= 1.31.70"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5edd716e247c3f5a9f4506008a28dd9b"],"technology":"org.verapdf:validation-model-jakarta","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary  \n  \n**Description**\nAn XML External Entity Injection (CWE-611) vulnerability in veraPDF allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files on the server file system and perform Server-Side Request Forgery by submitting a crafted PDF containing a malicious rich-text (/RC or /RV) entry. This affects all current versions of veraPDF-validation.  \n  \n## Details  \nThe vulnerability resides in veraPDF-validation `validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/tools/DictionaryKeysHelper.java` within the `getRichTextStringOrStreamEntryStringRepresentation()` method. This helper extracts the XHTML rich-text body from a PDF dictionary string or stream and parses it with a DOM parser to return the concatenated text content.  \n  \nThe vulnerability stems from two combined issues:  \n- The DocumentBuilderFactory is instantiated with default settings , no disallow-doctype-decl, no disabling of external general/parameter entities, no FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING, and no secure EntityResolver. The default JAXP/Xerces parser will therefore resolve `` and `` declarations.  \n- After parsing, `getAllNodeText()` recursively concatenates every text n","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.25.73, <= 1.30.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5edd716e247c3f5a9f4506008a28dd9b"],"technology":"org.verapdf:validation-model-jakarta","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary  \n  \n**Description**\nAn XML External Entity Injection (CWE-611) vulnerability in veraPDF allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files on the server file system and perform Server-Side Request Forgery by submitting a crafted PDF containing a malicious rich-text (/RC or /RV) entry. This affects all current versions of veraPDF-validation.  \n  \n## Details  \nThe vulnerability resides in veraPDF-validation `validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/tools/DictionaryKeysHelper.java` within the `getRichTextStringOrStreamEntryStringRepresentation()` method. This helper extracts the XHTML rich-text body from a PDF dictionary string or stream and parses it with a DOM parser to return the concatenated text content.  \n  \nThe vulnerability stems from two combined issues:  \n- The DocumentBuilderFactory is instantiated with default settings , no disallow-doctype-decl, no disabling of external general/parameter entities, no FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING, and no secure EntityResolver. The default JAXP/Xerces parser will therefore resolve `` and `` declarations.  \n- After parsing, `getAllNodeText()` recursively concatenates every text n","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.31.1, <= 1.31.70"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:44.060Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-29T15:11:47.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-29T15:11:43.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:59:04.660Z"},{"id":"NVI-00015357","kind":"vulnerability","title":"veraPDF Validation XXE via Rich Text","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-3jh7-wm29-q568","CVE-2026-54078"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.verapdf:validation-model, org.verapdf:validation-model, org.verapdf:validation-model-jakarta, org.verapdf:validation-model-jakarta. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-5edd716e247c3f5a9f4506008a28dd9b"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5edd716e247c3f5a9f4506008a28dd9b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3jh7-wm29-q568","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-3jh7-wm29-q568","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:59:04.660Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5edd716e247c3f5a9f4506008a28dd9b"],"technology":"org.verapdf:validation-model","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary  \n  \n**Description**\nAn XML External Entity Injection (CWE-611) vulnerability in veraPDF allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files on the server file system and perform Server-Side Request Forgery by submitting a crafted PDF containing a malicious rich-text (/RC or /RV) entry. This affects all current versions of veraPDF-validation.  \n  \n## Details  \nThe vulnerability resides in veraPDF-validation `validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/tools/DictionaryKeysHelper.java` within the `getRichTextStringOrStreamEntryStringRepresentation()` method. This helper extracts the XHTML rich-text body from a PDF dictionary string or stream and parses it with a DOM parser to return the concatenated text content.  \n  \nThe vulnerability stems from two combined issues:  \n- The DocumentBuilderFactory is instantiated with default settings , no disallow-doctype-decl, no disabling of external general/parameter entities, no FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING, and no secure EntityResolver. The default JAXP/Xerces parser will therefore resolve `` and `` declarations.  \n- After parsing, `getAllNodeText()` recursively concatenates every text n","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.25.73, <= 1.30.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5edd716e247c3f5a9f4506008a28dd9b"],"technology":"org.verapdf:validation-model","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary  \n  \n**Description**\nAn XML External Entity Injection (CWE-611) vulnerability in veraPDF allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files on the server file system and perform Server-Side Request Forgery by submitting a crafted PDF containing a malicious rich-text (/RC or /RV) entry. This affects all current versions of veraPDF-validation.  \n  \n## Details  \nThe vulnerability resides in veraPDF-validation `validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/tools/DictionaryKeysHelper.java` within the `getRichTextStringOrStreamEntryStringRepresentation()` method. This helper extracts the XHTML rich-text body from a PDF dictionary string or stream and parses it with a DOM parser to return the concatenated text content.  \n  \nThe vulnerability stems from two combined issues:  \n- The DocumentBuilderFactory is instantiated with default settings , no disallow-doctype-decl, no disabling of external general/parameter entities, no FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING, and no secure EntityResolver. The default JAXP/Xerces parser will therefore resolve `` and `` declarations.  \n- After parsing, `getAllNodeText()` recursively concatenates every text n","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.31.1, <= 1.31.70"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5edd716e247c3f5a9f4506008a28dd9b"],"technology":"org.verapdf:validation-model-jakarta","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary  \n  \n**Description**\nAn XML External Entity Injection (CWE-611) vulnerability in veraPDF allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files on the server file system and perform Server-Side Request Forgery by submitting a crafted PDF containing a malicious rich-text (/RC or /RV) entry. This affects all current versions of veraPDF-validation.  \n  \n## Details  \nThe vulnerability resides in veraPDF-validation `validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/tools/DictionaryKeysHelper.java` within the `getRichTextStringOrStreamEntryStringRepresentation()` method. This helper extracts the XHTML rich-text body from a PDF dictionary string or stream and parses it with a DOM parser to return the concatenated text content.  \n  \nThe vulnerability stems from two combined issues:  \n- The DocumentBuilderFactory is instantiated with default settings , no disallow-doctype-decl, no disabling of external general/parameter entities, no FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING, and no secure EntityResolver. The default JAXP/Xerces parser will therefore resolve `` and `` declarations.  \n- After parsing, `getAllNodeText()` recursively concatenates every text n","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.25.73, <= 1.30.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5edd716e247c3f5a9f4506008a28dd9b"],"technology":"org.verapdf:validation-model-jakarta","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary  \n  \n**Description**\nAn XML External Entity Injection (CWE-611) vulnerability in veraPDF allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files on the server file system and perform Server-Side Request Forgery by submitting a crafted PDF containing a malicious rich-text (/RC or /RV) entry. This affects all current versions of veraPDF-validation.  \n  \n## Details  \nThe vulnerability resides in veraPDF-validation `validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/tools/DictionaryKeysHelper.java` within the `getRichTextStringOrStreamEntryStringRepresentation()` method. This helper extracts the XHTML rich-text body from a PDF dictionary string or stream and parses it with a DOM parser to return the concatenated text content.  \n  \nThe vulnerability stems from two combined issues:  \n- The DocumentBuilderFactory is instantiated with default settings , no disallow-doctype-decl, no disabling of external general/parameter entities, no FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING, and no secure EntityResolver. The default JAXP/Xerces parser will therefore resolve `` and `` declarations.  \n- After parsing, `getAllNodeText()` recursively concatenates every text n","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.31.1, <= 1.31.70"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:31.351Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-29T15:11:47.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-29T15:11:43.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:59:04.660Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}