{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00015359","kind":"vulnerability","title":"n8n: Anonymous Approval-Gate Bypass via Reused resumeToken over the Chat WebSocket","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-35jj-42hp-8gmq","CVE-2026-86077"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for n8n, n8n. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-5f1aca1311a5797e188c4ca8c4dc7f8b"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5f1aca1311a5797e188c4ca8c4dc7f8b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-35jj-42hp-8gmq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-35jj-42hp-8gmq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T22:54:05.264Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5f1aca1311a5797e188c4ca8c4dc7f8b"],"technology":"n8n","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\nThe `/chat` WebSocket route resumed a paused execution from a resume token without checking that the node being resumed was a chat node. n8n hands that token to anonymous form submitters, so a party with no account could present it on the chat route and release an execution waiting at an approval gate, the control an author puts in front of an action considered too consequential to automate. The patch restricts resume over the chat route and Chat Hub to chat-capable node types.\n\n## Patches\n\nThe issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.37.7 and 2.38.2. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:\n- Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only.\n- Avoid workflows that combine a Form Trigger with non-chat approval gates (Send-and-Wait, Telegram/Slack/Gmail HITL, or plain Wait nodes) on publicly accessible instances.\n- Audit recent executions of such workflows for unexpected completion without a corresponding approval callback.\n\nThese workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be use","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.38.0, < 2.38.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5f1aca1311a5797e188c4ca8c4dc7f8b"],"technology":"n8n","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\nThe `/chat` WebSocket route resumed a paused execution from a resume token without checking that the node being resumed was a chat node. n8n hands that token to anonymous form submitters, so a party with no account could present it on the chat route and release an execution waiting at an approval gate, the control an author puts in front of an action considered too consequential to automate. The patch restricts resume over the chat route and Chat Hub to chat-capable node types.\n\n## Patches\n\nThe issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.37.7 and 2.38.2. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:\n- Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only.\n- Avoid workflows that combine a Form Trigger with non-chat approval gates (Send-and-Wait, Telegram/Slack/Gmail HITL, or plain Wait nodes) on publicly accessible instances.\n- Audit recent executions of such workflows for unexpected completion without a corresponding approval callback.\n\nThese workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be use","public_affected_ranges":["< 2.37.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:31.351Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T20:37:01.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-10T20:37:00.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T22:54:05.264Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}