{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00015384","kind":"vulnerability","title":" Budibase: Privilege escalation via public role assignment API missing app-level authorization","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-j9fc-w3mr-x6mv","CVE-2026-73305"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @budibase/server. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-62cd059e99062cbd1f1dc5f35fadcf7a"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-12T18:57:18.000Z","value":"8.8 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-62cd059e99062cbd1f1dc5f35fadcf7a"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-62cd059e99062cbd1f1dc5f35fadcf7a","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j9fc-w3mr-x6mv","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-j9fc-w3mr-x6mv","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:17:12.848Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-62cd059e99062cbd1f1dc5f35fadcf7a"],"technology":"@budibase/server","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nBudibase `3.39.19` (commit `03fbabae4`) is affected by a privilege-escalation / missing-authorization flaw in the public role-assignment API. An **app-scoped builder** (a user who builds only specific apps — `user.builder.apps = [appA]`, not a global builder or admin) can grant **themselves builder access to ANY other app in the tenant**, or assign themselves/any user an arbitrary data-plane role (e.g. `ADMIN`) in any app, by calling `POST /api/public/v1/roles/assign`. The endpoint only authorizes the two *global* flags (`admin`, `builder`); the per-app `appBuilder` and `role:{appId,roleId}` grant vectors are passed to the backend **without any authorization check that the caller controls the target app**. Reproduced in a local authorized lab using the verbatim authorization-gate and SDK logic.\n\nThis is an incomplete fix of the role-assignment hardening in commit `d63d1d9054` (\"Inline public user global role validation\"), which only ever validated the global flags.\n\n### Details\n\nThe issue is caused by authorization being implemented as a **flag-level allowlist** (`admin`/`builder`) instead of validating the *scope* the caller is granting.\n\nRelevant code paths:\n\n- `pack","public_affected_ranges":["<= 3.38.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:31.362Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-12T18:57:18.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-24T21:12:40.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:17:12.848Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}