{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00016046","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Netty: Missing CertificateID Validation in OCSP Response Allows Replay Attacks","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-272m-gcwp-mpwg","CVE-2026-56820"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp, io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-45299e8b3621833db9dda3dbffb05a0c"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-22T21:43:33.000Z","value":"7.4 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-0dfaf7abf00a5f9dd177bdcd1e9ea1c5"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-30T14:48:49.323Z","value":"7.4 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-45299e8b3621833db9dda3dbffb05a0c"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-30T14:48:49.323Z","value":"9.1 CRITICAL (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-45299e8b3621833db9dda3dbffb05a0c"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-0dfaf7abf00a5f9dd177bdcd1e9ea1c5","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-272m-gcwp-mpwg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-272m-gcwp-mpwg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T22:34:39.734Z"},{"id":"sr-45299e8b3621833db9dda3dbffb05a0c","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56820","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-56820","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-08T01:48:33.286Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0dfaf7abf00a5f9dd177bdcd1e9ea1c5"],"technology":"io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nNetty's OcspClient does not validate that the CertificateID in an OCSP response matches the requested CertificateID. A bad actor can replay a `GOOD` status response issued for an unrelated certificate (by the same CA) to bypass revocation checks for any certificate.\n\n### Details\n`io.netty.handler.ssl.ocsp.OcspClient#validateResponse` fails to assert that the CertificateID within the returned `BasicOCSPResp` matches the original certificate being validated.\n\nWhen `OcspClient.query(...)` executes, it builds an OCSP request using the victim certificate's serial number and issuer hash. It then sends this request and receives a response. While the client verifies the signature of the response against the trusted issuer (or a valid responder chain), it never checks the CertificateID inside the response payload.\n\nA bad actor who has access to any other valid, non-revoked certificate issued by the same CA can obtain a legitimately signed OCSP response indicating that the unrelated certificate is `GOOD`. The bad actor can then return this valid response to the Netty client when it queries the status of any other certificate (e.g., a revoked certificate) issued by the same CA. Be","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.2.0.Final, < 4.2.16.Final"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0dfaf7abf00a5f9dd177bdcd1e9ea1c5"],"technology":"io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nNetty's OcspClient does not validate that the CertificateID in an OCSP response matches the requested CertificateID. A bad actor can replay a `GOOD` status response issued for an unrelated certificate (by the same CA) to bypass revocation checks for any certificate.\n\n### Details\n`io.netty.handler.ssl.ocsp.OcspClient#validateResponse` fails to assert that the CertificateID within the returned `BasicOCSPResp` matches the original certificate being validated.\n\nWhen `OcspClient.query(...)` executes, it builds an OCSP request using the victim certificate's serial number and issuer hash. It then sends this request and receives a response. While the client verifies the signature of the response against the trusted issuer (or a valid responder chain), it never checks the CertificateID inside the response payload.\n\nA bad actor who has access to any other valid, non-revoked certificate issued by the same CA can obtain a legitimately signed OCSP response indicating that the unrelated certificate is `GOOD`. The bad actor can then return this valid response to the Netty client when it queries the status of any other certificate (e.g., a revoked certificate) issued by the same CA. Be","public_affected_ranges":["< 4.1.136.Final"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:44.053Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-22T21:43:33.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-22T21:43:31.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-03T22:34:39.734Z"},{"id":"NVI-00016046","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Netty: Missing CertificateID Validation in OCSP Response Allows Replay Attacks","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-272m-gcwp-mpwg","CVE-2026-56820"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp, io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0dfaf7abf00a5f9dd177bdcd1e9ea1c5"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-22T21:43:33.000Z","value":"7.4 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-0dfaf7abf00a5f9dd177bdcd1e9ea1c5"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-0dfaf7abf00a5f9dd177bdcd1e9ea1c5","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-272m-gcwp-mpwg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-272m-gcwp-mpwg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T22:34:39.734Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0dfaf7abf00a5f9dd177bdcd1e9ea1c5"],"technology":"io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nNetty's OcspClient does not validate that the CertificateID in an OCSP response matches the requested CertificateID. A bad actor can replay a `GOOD` status response issued for an unrelated certificate (by the same CA) to bypass revocation checks for any certificate.\n\n### Details\n`io.netty.handler.ssl.ocsp.OcspClient#validateResponse` fails to assert that the CertificateID within the returned `BasicOCSPResp` matches the original certificate being validated.\n\nWhen `OcspClient.query(...)` executes, it builds an OCSP request using the victim certificate's serial number and issuer hash. It then sends this request and receives a response. While the client verifies the signature of the response against the trusted issuer (or a valid responder chain), it never checks the CertificateID inside the response payload.\n\nA bad actor who has access to any other valid, non-revoked certificate issued by the same CA can obtain a legitimately signed OCSP response indicating that the unrelated certificate is `GOOD`. The bad actor can then return this valid response to the Netty client when it queries the status of any other certificate (e.g., a revoked certificate) issued by the same CA. Be","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.2.0.Final, < 4.2.16.Final"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0dfaf7abf00a5f9dd177bdcd1e9ea1c5"],"technology":"io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nNetty's OcspClient does not validate that the CertificateID in an OCSP response matches the requested CertificateID. A bad actor can replay a `GOOD` status response issued for an unrelated certificate (by the same CA) to bypass revocation checks for any certificate.\n\n### Details\n`io.netty.handler.ssl.ocsp.OcspClient#validateResponse` fails to assert that the CertificateID within the returned `BasicOCSPResp` matches the original certificate being validated.\n\nWhen `OcspClient.query(...)` executes, it builds an OCSP request using the victim certificate's serial number and issuer hash. It then sends this request and receives a response. While the client verifies the signature of the response against the trusted issuer (or a valid responder chain), it never checks the CertificateID inside the response payload.\n\nA bad actor who has access to any other valid, non-revoked certificate issued by the same CA can obtain a legitimately signed OCSP response indicating that the unrelated certificate is `GOOD`. The bad actor can then return this valid response to the Netty client when it queries the status of any other certificate (e.g., a revoked certificate) issued by the same CA. Be","public_affected_ranges":["< 4.1.136.Final"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:27.869Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-22T21:43:33.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-22T21:43:31.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-03T22:34:39.734Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}