{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00016056","kind":"vulnerability","title":"@angular/platform-server: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-hqr9-c56f-3x7f","CVE-2026-50555"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @angular/platform-server, @angular/platform-server, @angular/platform-server, @angular/platform-server, @angular/platform-server. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-10e8ddabae052a006b22d248265a2bc0"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-15T22:05:59.000Z","value":"6.1 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-10e8ddabae052a006b22d248265a2bc0"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-10e8ddabae052a006b22d248265a2bc0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hqr9-c56f-3x7f","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-hqr9-c56f-3x7f","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T09:59:43.724Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-10e8ddabae052a006b22d248265a2bc0"],"technology":"@angular/platform-server","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in `@angular/platform-server`'s DOM emulation dependency (`domino`) when serializing the content of raw-text elements (such as ``, ``, and ``).\n\n`domino` supports escaping raw-text elements during serialization to prevent closing-tag breakout. However, a **Unicode index alignment bug** existed in this escaping logic.\n\nIn JavaScript, string lengths and character indices are calculated based on UTF-16 code units (where astral characters—such as emojis—occupy 2 code units / 4 bytes). If the bound dynamic text contained astral Unicode characters _before_ the closing tag (e.g. ``, ``, or ``), the index offset calculation in `domino`'s replacement logic shifted.\n\nThis misalignment caused `domino` to fail to replace or escape the closing tag, leaving it raw and unescaped in the output HTML.\n\nAn attacker who controls the dynamic text can supply a payload containing both an astral Unicode character and a closing tag (e.g., `😀alert(1)`). When serialized on the server during SSR, the browser parses the unescaped closing tag, exits the raw-text context early, and execut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 22.0.0-next.0, < 22.0.0-rc.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-10e8ddabae052a006b22d248265a2bc0"],"technology":"@angular/platform-server","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in `@angular/platform-server`'s DOM emulation dependency (`domino`) when serializing the content of raw-text elements (such as ``, ``, and ``).\n\n`domino` supports escaping raw-text elements during serialization to prevent closing-tag breakout. However, a **Unicode index alignment bug** existed in this escaping logic.\n\nIn JavaScript, string lengths and character indices are calculated based on UTF-16 code units (where astral characters—such as emojis—occupy 2 code units / 4 bytes). If the bound dynamic text contained astral Unicode characters _before_ the closing tag (e.g. ``, ``, or ``), the index offset calculation in `domino`'s replacement logic shifted.\n\nThis misalignment caused `domino` to fail to replace or escape the closing tag, leaving it raw and unescaped in the output HTML.\n\nAn attacker who controls the dynamic text can supply a payload containing both an astral Unicode character and a closing tag (e.g., `😀alert(1)`). When serialized on the server during SSR, the browser parses the unescaped closing tag, exits the raw-text context early, and execut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 21.0.0-next.0, < 21.2.16"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-10e8ddabae052a006b22d248265a2bc0"],"technology":"@angular/platform-server","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in `@angular/platform-server`'s DOM emulation dependency (`domino`) when serializing the content of raw-text elements (such as ``, ``, and ``).\n\n`domino` supports escaping raw-text elements during serialization to prevent closing-tag breakout. However, a **Unicode index alignment bug** existed in this escaping logic.\n\nIn JavaScript, string lengths and character indices are calculated based on UTF-16 code units (where astral characters—such as emojis—occupy 2 code units / 4 bytes). If the bound dynamic text contained astral Unicode characters _before_ the closing tag (e.g. ``, ``, or ``), the index offset calculation in `domino`'s replacement logic shifted.\n\nThis misalignment caused `domino` to fail to replace or escape the closing tag, leaving it raw and unescaped in the output HTML.\n\nAn attacker who controls the dynamic text can supply a payload containing both an astral Unicode character and a closing tag (e.g., `😀alert(1)`). When serialized on the server during SSR, the browser parses the unescaped closing tag, exits the raw-text context early, and execut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 20.0.0-next.0, < 20.3.24"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-10e8ddabae052a006b22d248265a2bc0"],"technology":"@angular/platform-server","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in `@angular/platform-server`'s DOM emulation dependency (`domino`) when serializing the content of raw-text elements (such as ``, ``, and ``).\n\n`domino` supports escaping raw-text elements during serialization to prevent closing-tag breakout. However, a **Unicode index alignment bug** existed in this escaping logic.\n\nIn JavaScript, string lengths and character indices are calculated based on UTF-16 code units (where astral characters—such as emojis—occupy 2 code units / 4 bytes). If the bound dynamic text contained astral Unicode characters _before_ the closing tag (e.g. ``, ``, or ``), the index offset calculation in `domino`'s replacement logic shifted.\n\nThis misalignment caused `domino` to fail to replace or escape the closing tag, leaving it raw and unescaped in the output HTML.\n\nAn attacker who controls the dynamic text can supply a payload containing both an astral Unicode character and a closing tag (e.g., `😀alert(1)`). When serialized on the server during SSR, the browser parses the unescaped closing tag, exits the raw-text context early, and execut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 19.0.0-next.0, < 19.2.25"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-10e8ddabae052a006b22d248265a2bc0"],"technology":"@angular/platform-server","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in `@angular/platform-server`'s DOM emulation dependency (`domino`) when serializing the content of raw-text elements (such as ``, ``, and ``).\n\n`domino` supports escaping raw-text elements during serialization to prevent closing-tag breakout. However, a **Unicode index alignment bug** existed in this escaping logic.\n\nIn JavaScript, string lengths and character indices are calculated based on UTF-16 code units (where astral characters—such as emojis—occupy 2 code units / 4 bytes). If the bound dynamic text contained astral Unicode characters _before_ the closing tag (e.g. ``, ``, or ``), the index offset calculation in `domino`'s replacement logic shifted.\n\nThis misalignment caused `domino` to fail to replace or escape the closing tag, leaving it raw and unescaped in the output HTML.\n\nAn attacker who controls the dynamic text can supply a payload containing both an astral Unicode character and a closing tag (e.g., `😀alert(1)`). When serialized on the server during SSR, the browser parses the unescaped closing tag, exits the raw-text context early, and execut","public_affected_ranges":["<= 18.2.14"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:27.871Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-15T22:05:59.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-15T17:20:30.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-04T09:59:43.724Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}