{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00016115","kind":"vulnerability","title":"kuma-dp connects to control plane without verifying TLS certificate when no CA is configured","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-wvmp-6r4v-j6cv","CVE-2026-52724"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/kumahq/kuma/v2, github.com/kumahq/kuma/v2, github.com/kumahq/kuma/v2, github.com/kumahq/kuma/v2, github.com/kumahq/kuma/v2. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0a11b60755ce6a211926e7a0287ff29a"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-30T17:43:24.057Z","value":"5.8 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-0a11b60755ce6a211926e7a0287ff29a"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-2615cbd506075a478f13dda4866c758b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wvmp-6r4v-j6cv","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-wvmp-6r4v-j6cv","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T09:59:26.779Z"},{"id":"sr-0a11b60755ce6a211926e7a0287ff29a","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52724","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-52724","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-08T01:47:57.993Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2615cbd506075a478f13dda4866c758b"],"technology":"github.com/kumahq/kuma/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When kuma-dp is started against an HTTPS control plane and the operator did not pass a CA certificate, the data plane connects with TLS peer verification disabled. The dataplane authentication token is sent over this unverified connection\n\n## Impact\n\nAn on-path attacker can intercept the dataplane authentication token and impersonate the control plane to the data plane, allowing them to inject a forged bootstrap configuration and take over the proxy\n\n## Affected configurations\n\n- Universal mode `kuma-dp` started against an HTTPS control plane without `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` unset)\n\n## Not affected\n\n- Kubernetes installs done through the standard installers (`kumactl install control-plane` or the official Helm chart). In both cases the control plane's mutating admission webhook injects `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` into every sidecar at pod admission, so each `kuma-dp` starts with the CA already configured\n\n## Workarounds\n\nSet `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT`) on every Universal mode data plane and point it at the control plane's serving CA. Alternatively, terminate the control plane behind a publicly trusted certificate; the patched release","public_affected_ranges":["< 2.7.26"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2615cbd506075a478f13dda4866c758b"],"technology":"github.com/kumahq/kuma/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When kuma-dp is started against an HTTPS control plane and the operator did not pass a CA certificate, the data plane connects with TLS peer verification disabled. The dataplane authentication token is sent over this unverified connection\n\n## Impact\n\nAn on-path attacker can intercept the dataplane authentication token and impersonate the control plane to the data plane, allowing them to inject a forged bootstrap configuration and take over the proxy\n\n## Affected configurations\n\n- Universal mode `kuma-dp` started against an HTTPS control plane without `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` unset)\n\n## Not affected\n\n- Kubernetes installs done through the standard installers (`kumactl install control-plane` or the official Helm chart). In both cases the control plane's mutating admission webhook injects `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` into every sidecar at pod admission, so each `kuma-dp` starts with the CA already configured\n\n## Workarounds\n\nSet `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT`) on every Universal mode data plane and point it at the control plane's serving CA. Alternatively, terminate the control plane behind a publicly trusted certificate; the patched release","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.8.0, < 2.9.16"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2615cbd506075a478f13dda4866c758b"],"technology":"github.com/kumahq/kuma/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When kuma-dp is started against an HTTPS control plane and the operator did not pass a CA certificate, the data plane connects with TLS peer verification disabled. The dataplane authentication token is sent over this unverified connection\n\n## Impact\n\nAn on-path attacker can intercept the dataplane authentication token and impersonate the control plane to the data plane, allowing them to inject a forged bootstrap configuration and take over the proxy\n\n## Affected configurations\n\n- Universal mode `kuma-dp` started against an HTTPS control plane without `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` unset)\n\n## Not affected\n\n- Kubernetes installs done through the standard installers (`kumactl install control-plane` or the official Helm chart). In both cases the control plane's mutating admission webhook injects `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` into every sidecar at pod admission, so each `kuma-dp` starts with the CA already configured\n\n## Workarounds\n\nSet `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT`) on every Universal mode data plane and point it at the control plane's serving CA. Alternatively, terminate the control plane behind a publicly trusted certificate; the patched release","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.10.0, < 2.11.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2615cbd506075a478f13dda4866c758b"],"technology":"github.com/kumahq/kuma/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When kuma-dp is started against an HTTPS control plane and the operator did not pass a CA certificate, the data plane connects with TLS peer verification disabled. The dataplane authentication token is sent over this unverified connection\n\n## Impact\n\nAn on-path attacker can intercept the dataplane authentication token and impersonate the control plane to the data plane, allowing them to inject a forged bootstrap configuration and take over the proxy\n\n## Affected configurations\n\n- Universal mode `kuma-dp` started against an HTTPS control plane without `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` unset)\n\n## Not affected\n\n- Kubernetes installs done through the standard installers (`kumactl install control-plane` or the official Helm chart). In both cases the control plane's mutating admission webhook injects `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` into every sidecar at pod admission, so each `kuma-dp` starts with the CA already configured\n\n## Workarounds\n\nSet `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT`) on every Universal mode data plane and point it at the control plane's serving CA. Alternatively, terminate the control plane behind a publicly trusted certificate; the patched release","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.12.0, < 2.12.11"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2615cbd506075a478f13dda4866c758b"],"technology":"github.com/kumahq/kuma/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When kuma-dp is started against an HTTPS control plane and the operator did not pass a CA certificate, the data plane connects with TLS peer verification disabled. The dataplane authentication token is sent over this unverified connection\n\n## Impact\n\nAn on-path attacker can intercept the dataplane authentication token and impersonate the control plane to the data plane, allowing them to inject a forged bootstrap configuration and take over the proxy\n\n## Affected configurations\n\n- Universal mode `kuma-dp` started against an HTTPS control plane without `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` unset)\n\n## Not affected\n\n- Kubernetes installs done through the standard installers (`kumactl install control-plane` or the official Helm chart). In both cases the control plane's mutating admission webhook injects `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` into every sidecar at pod admission, so each `kuma-dp` starts with the CA already configured\n\n## Workarounds\n\nSet `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT`) on every Universal mode data plane and point it at the control plane's serving CA. Alternatively, terminate the control plane behind a publicly trusted certificate; the patched release","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.13.0, < 2.13.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2615cbd506075a478f13dda4866c758b"],"technology":"github.com/kumahq/kuma","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When kuma-dp is started against an HTTPS control plane and the operator did not pass a CA certificate, the data plane connects with TLS peer verification disabled. The dataplane authentication token is sent over this unverified connection\n\n## Impact\n\nAn on-path attacker can intercept the dataplane authentication token and impersonate the control plane to the data plane, allowing them to inject a forged bootstrap configuration and take over the proxy\n\n## Affected configurations\n\n- Universal mode `kuma-dp` started against an HTTPS control plane without `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` unset)\n\n## Not affected\n\n- Kubernetes installs done through the standard installers (`kumactl install control-plane` or the official Helm chart). In both cases the control plane's mutating admission webhook injects `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` into every sidecar at pod admission, so each `kuma-dp` starts with the CA already configured\n\n## Workarounds\n\nSet `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT`) on every Universal mode data plane and point it at the control plane's serving CA. Alternatively, terminate the control plane behind a publicly trusted certificate; the patched release","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.8.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:44.021Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-16T20:09:13.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-16T20:09:12.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-04T09:59:26.779Z"},{"id":"NVI-00016115","kind":"vulnerability","title":"kuma-dp connects to control plane without verifying TLS certificate when no CA is configured","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-wvmp-6r4v-j6cv","CVE-2026-52724"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/kumahq/kuma/v2, github.com/kumahq/kuma/v2, github.com/kumahq/kuma/v2, github.com/kumahq/kuma/v2, github.com/kumahq/kuma/v2. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-2615cbd506075a478f13dda4866c758b"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-2615cbd506075a478f13dda4866c758b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wvmp-6r4v-j6cv","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-wvmp-6r4v-j6cv","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T09:59:26.779Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2615cbd506075a478f13dda4866c758b"],"technology":"github.com/kumahq/kuma/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When kuma-dp is started against an HTTPS control plane and the operator did not pass a CA certificate, the data plane connects with TLS peer verification disabled. The dataplane authentication token is sent over this unverified connection\n\n## Impact\n\nAn on-path attacker can intercept the dataplane authentication token and impersonate the control plane to the data plane, allowing them to inject a forged bootstrap configuration and take over the proxy\n\n## Affected configurations\n\n- Universal mode `kuma-dp` started against an HTTPS control plane without `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` unset)\n\n## Not affected\n\n- Kubernetes installs done through the standard installers (`kumactl install control-plane` or the official Helm chart). In both cases the control plane's mutating admission webhook injects `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` into every sidecar at pod admission, so each `kuma-dp` starts with the CA already configured\n\n## Workarounds\n\nSet `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT`) on every Universal mode data plane and point it at the control plane's serving CA. Alternatively, terminate the control plane behind a publicly trusted certificate; the patched release","public_affected_ranges":["< 2.7.26"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2615cbd506075a478f13dda4866c758b"],"technology":"github.com/kumahq/kuma/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When kuma-dp is started against an HTTPS control plane and the operator did not pass a CA certificate, the data plane connects with TLS peer verification disabled. The dataplane authentication token is sent over this unverified connection\n\n## Impact\n\nAn on-path attacker can intercept the dataplane authentication token and impersonate the control plane to the data plane, allowing them to inject a forged bootstrap configuration and take over the proxy\n\n## Affected configurations\n\n- Universal mode `kuma-dp` started against an HTTPS control plane without `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` unset)\n\n## Not affected\n\n- Kubernetes installs done through the standard installers (`kumactl install control-plane` or the official Helm chart). In both cases the control plane's mutating admission webhook injects `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` into every sidecar at pod admission, so each `kuma-dp` starts with the CA already configured\n\n## Workarounds\n\nSet `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT`) on every Universal mode data plane and point it at the control plane's serving CA. Alternatively, terminate the control plane behind a publicly trusted certificate; the patched release","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.8.0, < 2.9.16"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2615cbd506075a478f13dda4866c758b"],"technology":"github.com/kumahq/kuma/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When kuma-dp is started against an HTTPS control plane and the operator did not pass a CA certificate, the data plane connects with TLS peer verification disabled. The dataplane authentication token is sent over this unverified connection\n\n## Impact\n\nAn on-path attacker can intercept the dataplane authentication token and impersonate the control plane to the data plane, allowing them to inject a forged bootstrap configuration and take over the proxy\n\n## Affected configurations\n\n- Universal mode `kuma-dp` started against an HTTPS control plane without `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` unset)\n\n## Not affected\n\n- Kubernetes installs done through the standard installers (`kumactl install control-plane` or the official Helm chart). In both cases the control plane's mutating admission webhook injects `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` into every sidecar at pod admission, so each `kuma-dp` starts with the CA already configured\n\n## Workarounds\n\nSet `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT`) on every Universal mode data plane and point it at the control plane's serving CA. Alternatively, terminate the control plane behind a publicly trusted certificate; the patched release","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.10.0, < 2.11.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2615cbd506075a478f13dda4866c758b"],"technology":"github.com/kumahq/kuma/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When kuma-dp is started against an HTTPS control plane and the operator did not pass a CA certificate, the data plane connects with TLS peer verification disabled. The dataplane authentication token is sent over this unverified connection\n\n## Impact\n\nAn on-path attacker can intercept the dataplane authentication token and impersonate the control plane to the data plane, allowing them to inject a forged bootstrap configuration and take over the proxy\n\n## Affected configurations\n\n- Universal mode `kuma-dp` started against an HTTPS control plane without `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` unset)\n\n## Not affected\n\n- Kubernetes installs done through the standard installers (`kumactl install control-plane` or the official Helm chart). In both cases the control plane's mutating admission webhook injects `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` into every sidecar at pod admission, so each `kuma-dp` starts with the CA already configured\n\n## Workarounds\n\nSet `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT`) on every Universal mode data plane and point it at the control plane's serving CA. Alternatively, terminate the control plane behind a publicly trusted certificate; the patched release","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.12.0, < 2.12.11"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2615cbd506075a478f13dda4866c758b"],"technology":"github.com/kumahq/kuma/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When kuma-dp is started against an HTTPS control plane and the operator did not pass a CA certificate, the data plane connects with TLS peer verification disabled. The dataplane authentication token is sent over this unverified connection\n\n## Impact\n\nAn on-path attacker can intercept the dataplane authentication token and impersonate the control plane to the data plane, allowing them to inject a forged bootstrap configuration and take over the proxy\n\n## Affected configurations\n\n- Universal mode `kuma-dp` started against an HTTPS control plane without `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` unset)\n\n## Not affected\n\n- Kubernetes installs done through the standard installers (`kumactl install control-plane` or the official Helm chart). In both cases the control plane's mutating admission webhook injects `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` into every sidecar at pod admission, so each `kuma-dp` starts with the CA already configured\n\n## Workarounds\n\nSet `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT`) on every Universal mode data plane and point it at the control plane's serving CA. Alternatively, terminate the control plane behind a publicly trusted certificate; the patched release","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.13.0, < 2.13.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2615cbd506075a478f13dda4866c758b"],"technology":"github.com/kumahq/kuma","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When kuma-dp is started against an HTTPS control plane and the operator did not pass a CA certificate, the data plane connects with TLS peer verification disabled. The dataplane authentication token is sent over this unverified connection\n\n## Impact\n\nAn on-path attacker can intercept the dataplane authentication token and impersonate the control plane to the data plane, allowing them to inject a forged bootstrap configuration and take over the proxy\n\n## Affected configurations\n\n- Universal mode `kuma-dp` started against an HTTPS control plane without `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` unset)\n\n## Not affected\n\n- Kubernetes installs done through the standard installers (`kumactl install control-plane` or the official Helm chart). In both cases the control plane's mutating admission webhook injects `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` into every sidecar at pod admission, so each `kuma-dp` starts with the CA already configured\n\n## Workarounds\n\nSet `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT`) on every Universal mode data plane and point it at the control plane's serving CA. Alternatively, terminate the control plane behind a publicly trusted certificate; the patched release","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.8.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:27.894Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-16T20:09:13.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-16T20:09:12.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-04T09:59:26.779Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}