{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00016120","kind":"vulnerability","title":"NocoDB: Refresh Tokens Persist Through Password Recovery","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-r989-7g3j-wjhw","CVE-2026-53928"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for nocodb. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-27b1d9c0ddb95e3169d2ebfaa815c6e6"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-27b1d9c0ddb95e3169d2ebfaa815c6e6","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r989-7g3j-wjhw","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-r989-7g3j-wjhw","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T02:47:44.783Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-27b1d9c0ddb95e3169d2ebfaa815c6e6"],"technology":"nocodb","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nA stolen refresh token survived a password-forgot flow and could be used to mint fresh\nJWTs even after the user reset their password.\n\n### Details\n`passwordChange` and `passwordReset` deleted the user's refresh tokens, but\n`passwordForgot` only rotated `token_version` and revoked OAuth tokens — it did not\ncall `UserRefreshToken.deleteAllUserToken(user.id)`. An attacker holding a captured\nrefresh cookie could still exchange it for a new access token after the victim\ntriggered the recovery flow.\n\n### Impact\nPersistent unauthorized access after password recovery. Once a refresh token leaks, the\ndocumented \"Forgot password\" recovery flow did not in fact revoke the attacker's\nsession.\n\n### Credit\nThis issue was reported by @bugbunny-research.","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.301.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:27.895Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-20T21:20:06.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-17T14:07:33.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-04T02:47:44.783Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}