{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00016125","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Angular: Template and Attribute Namespace Sanitization Bypass (XSS)","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-f3m7-gqxr-g87x","CVE-2026-50557"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @angular/core, @angular/core, @angular/core, @angular/core, @angular/core. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-33cb6ad3b1e8906bcf99664dabd80c59"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-15T22:03:40.000Z","value":"6.1 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-09T15:40:45.797Z","value":"6.1 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-33cb6ad3b1e8906bcf99664dabd80c59"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-09T15:40:45.797Z","value":"5.3 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-33cb6ad3b1e8906bcf99664dabd80c59"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f3m7-gqxr-g87x","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-f3m7-gqxr-g87x","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T09:59:43.724Z"},{"id":"sr-33cb6ad3b1e8906bcf99664dabd80c59","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50557","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-50557","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-08T01:47:57.993Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"],"technology":"@angular/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/compiler` and `@angular/core` packages allows bypassing element and attribute sanitization/validation through specific namespace workarounds.\n\nSpecifically, namespaced script elements (e.g., `` or ``) were not properly identified as script elements by the Angular template preparser, allowing them to pass through template compilation without being stripped.\n\nFurthermore, security context schema mappings for element attributes did not consistently handle attributes within namespaced elements (like SVG and MathML), opening up gaps where malicious namespaced attributes could bypass runtime and compile-time sanitizers.\n\nCombined, these flaws enable an attacker who can inject or supply a template/tag structure with custom namespaces to bypass Angular's script-stripping logic and attribute sanitizers, leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n### Impact\nAny Angular application that compiles user-controlled templates at runtime, or relies on sanitization of namespaced elements/attributes, is vulnerable to this security bypass.\n\nOnce exploited, this allows a malicious actor to inject a namespaced script element or dynamic attribut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 21.0.0-next.0, < 21.2.15"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"],"technology":"@angular/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/compiler` and `@angular/core` packages allows bypassing element and attribute sanitization/validation through specific namespace workarounds.\n\nSpecifically, namespaced script elements (e.g., `` or ``) were not properly identified as script elements by the Angular template preparser, allowing them to pass through template compilation without being stripped.\n\nFurthermore, security context schema mappings for element attributes did not consistently handle attributes within namespaced elements (like SVG and MathML), opening up gaps where malicious namespaced attributes could bypass runtime and compile-time sanitizers.\n\nCombined, these flaws enable an attacker who can inject or supply a template/tag structure with custom namespaces to bypass Angular's script-stripping logic and attribute sanitizers, leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n### Impact\nAny Angular application that compiles user-controlled templates at runtime, or relies on sanitization of namespaced elements/attributes, is vulnerable to this security bypass.\n\nOnce exploited, this allows a malicious actor to inject a namespaced script element or dynamic attribut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 22.0.0-next.0, < 22.0.0-rc.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"],"technology":"@angular/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/compiler` and `@angular/core` packages allows bypassing element and attribute sanitization/validation through specific namespace workarounds.\n\nSpecifically, namespaced script elements (e.g., `` or ``) were not properly identified as script elements by the Angular template preparser, allowing them to pass through template compilation without being stripped.\n\nFurthermore, security context schema mappings for element attributes did not consistently handle attributes within namespaced elements (like SVG and MathML), opening up gaps where malicious namespaced attributes could bypass runtime and compile-time sanitizers.\n\nCombined, these flaws enable an attacker who can inject or supply a template/tag structure with custom namespaces to bypass Angular's script-stripping logic and attribute sanitizers, leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n### Impact\nAny Angular application that compiles user-controlled templates at runtime, or relies on sanitization of namespaced elements/attributes, is vulnerable to this security bypass.\n\nOnce exploited, this allows a malicious actor to inject a namespaced script element or dynamic attribut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 20.0.0-next.0, < 20.3.22"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"],"technology":"@angular/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/compiler` and `@angular/core` packages allows bypassing element and attribute sanitization/validation through specific namespace workarounds.\n\nSpecifically, namespaced script elements (e.g., `` or ``) were not properly identified as script elements by the Angular template preparser, allowing them to pass through template compilation without being stripped.\n\nFurthermore, security context schema mappings for element attributes did not consistently handle attributes within namespaced elements (like SVG and MathML), opening up gaps where malicious namespaced attributes could bypass runtime and compile-time sanitizers.\n\nCombined, these flaws enable an attacker who can inject or supply a template/tag structure with custom namespaces to bypass Angular's script-stripping logic and attribute sanitizers, leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n### Impact\nAny Angular application that compiles user-controlled templates at runtime, or relies on sanitization of namespaced elements/attributes, is vulnerable to this security bypass.\n\nOnce exploited, this allows a malicious actor to inject a namespaced script element or dynamic attribut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 19.0.0-next.0, < 19.2.22"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"],"technology":"@angular/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/compiler` and `@angular/core` packages allows bypassing element and attribute sanitization/validation through specific namespace workarounds.\n\nSpecifically, namespaced script elements (e.g., `` or ``) were not properly identified as script elements by the Angular template preparser, allowing them to pass through template compilation without being stripped.\n\nFurthermore, security context schema mappings for element attributes did not consistently handle attributes within namespaced elements (like SVG and MathML), opening up gaps where malicious namespaced attributes could bypass runtime and compile-time sanitizers.\n\nCombined, these flaws enable an attacker who can inject or supply a template/tag structure with custom namespaces to bypass Angular's script-stripping logic and attribute sanitizers, leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n### Impact\nAny Angular application that compiles user-controlled templates at runtime, or relies on sanitization of namespaced elements/attributes, is vulnerable to this security bypass.\n\nOnce exploited, this allows a malicious actor to inject a namespaced script element or dynamic attribut","public_affected_ranges":["<= 18.2.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"],"technology":"@angular/compiler","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/compiler` and `@angular/core` packages allows bypassing element and attribute sanitization/validation through specific namespace workarounds.\n\nSpecifically, namespaced script elements (e.g., `` or ``) were not properly identified as script elements by the Angular template preparser, allowing them to pass through template compilation without being stripped.\n\nFurthermore, security context schema mappings for element attributes did not consistently handle attributes within namespaced elements (like SVG and MathML), opening up gaps where malicious namespaced attributes could bypass runtime and compile-time sanitizers.\n\nCombined, these flaws enable an attacker who can inject or supply a template/tag structure with custom namespaces to bypass Angular's script-stripping logic and attribute sanitizers, leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n### Impact\nAny Angular application that compiles user-controlled templates at runtime, or relies on sanitization of namespaced elements/attributes, is vulnerable to this security bypass.\n\nOnce exploited, this allows a malicious actor to inject a namespaced script element or dynamic attribut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 21.0.0-next.0, < 21.2.15"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"],"technology":"@angular/compiler","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/compiler` and `@angular/core` packages allows bypassing element and attribute sanitization/validation through specific namespace workarounds.\n\nSpecifically, namespaced script elements (e.g., `` or ``) were not properly identified as script elements by the Angular template preparser, allowing them to pass through template compilation without being stripped.\n\nFurthermore, security context schema mappings for element attributes did not consistently handle attributes within namespaced elements (like SVG and MathML), opening up gaps where malicious namespaced attributes could bypass runtime and compile-time sanitizers.\n\nCombined, these flaws enable an attacker who can inject or supply a template/tag structure with custom namespaces to bypass Angular's script-stripping logic and attribute sanitizers, leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n### Impact\nAny Angular application that compiles user-controlled templates at runtime, or relies on sanitization of namespaced elements/attributes, is vulnerable to this security bypass.\n\nOnce exploited, this allows a malicious actor to inject a namespaced script element or dynamic attribut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 22.0.0-next.0, < 22.0.0-rc.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"],"technology":"@angular/compiler","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/compiler` and `@angular/core` packages allows bypassing element and attribute sanitization/validation through specific namespace workarounds.\n\nSpecifically, namespaced script elements (e.g., `` or ``) were not properly identified as script elements by the Angular template preparser, allowing them to pass through template compilation without being stripped.\n\nFurthermore, security context schema mappings for element attributes did not consistently handle attributes within namespaced elements (like SVG and MathML), opening up gaps where malicious namespaced attributes could bypass runtime and compile-time sanitizers.\n\nCombined, these flaws enable an attacker who can inject or supply a template/tag structure with custom namespaces to bypass Angular's script-stripping logic and attribute sanitizers, leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n### Impact\nAny Angular application that compiles user-controlled templates at runtime, or relies on sanitization of namespaced elements/attributes, is vulnerable to this security bypass.\n\nOnce exploited, this allows a malicious actor to inject a namespaced script element or dynamic attribut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 20.0.0-next.0, < 20.3.22"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"],"technology":"@angular/compiler","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/compiler` and `@angular/core` packages allows bypassing element and attribute sanitization/validation through specific namespace workarounds.\n\nSpecifically, namespaced script elements (e.g., `` or ``) were not properly identified as script elements by the Angular template preparser, allowing them to pass through template compilation without being stripped.\n\nFurthermore, security context schema mappings for element attributes did not consistently handle attributes within namespaced elements (like SVG and MathML), opening up gaps where malicious namespaced attributes could bypass runtime and compile-time sanitizers.\n\nCombined, these flaws enable an attacker who can inject or supply a template/tag structure with custom namespaces to bypass Angular's script-stripping logic and attribute sanitizers, leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n### Impact\nAny Angular application that compiles user-controlled templates at runtime, or relies on sanitization of namespaced elements/attributes, is vulnerable to this security bypass.\n\nOnce exploited, this allows a malicious actor to inject a namespaced script element or dynamic attribut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 19.0.0-next.0, < 19.2.22"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"],"technology":"@angular/compiler","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/compiler` and `@angular/core` packages allows bypassing element and attribute sanitization/validation through specific namespace workarounds.\n\nSpecifically, namespaced script elements (e.g., `` or ``) were not properly identified as script elements by the Angular template preparser, allowing them to pass through template compilation without being stripped.\n\nFurthermore, security context schema mappings for element attributes did not consistently handle attributes within namespaced elements (like SVG and MathML), opening up gaps where malicious namespaced attributes could bypass runtime and compile-time sanitizers.\n\nCombined, these flaws enable an attacker who can inject or supply a template/tag structure with custom namespaces to bypass Angular's script-stripping logic and attribute sanitizers, leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n### Impact\nAny Angular application that compiles user-controlled templates at runtime, or relies on sanitization of namespaced elements/attributes, is vulnerable to this security bypass.\n\nOnce exploited, this allows a malicious actor to inject a namespaced script element or dynamic attribut","public_affected_ranges":["<= 18.2.14"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:44.048Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-15T22:03:40.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-15T17:21:58.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-04T09:59:43.724Z"},{"id":"NVI-00016125","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Angular: Template and Attribute Namespace Sanitization Bypass (XSS)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-f3m7-gqxr-g87x","CVE-2026-50557"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @angular/core, @angular/core, @angular/core, @angular/core, @angular/core. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-15T22:03:40.000Z","value":"6.1 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f3m7-gqxr-g87x","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-f3m7-gqxr-g87x","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T09:59:43.724Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"],"technology":"@angular/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/compiler` and `@angular/core` packages allows bypassing element and attribute sanitization/validation through specific namespace workarounds.\n\nSpecifically, namespaced script elements (e.g., `` or ``) were not properly identified as script elements by the Angular template preparser, allowing them to pass through template compilation without being stripped.\n\nFurthermore, security context schema mappings for element attributes did not consistently handle attributes within namespaced elements (like SVG and MathML), opening up gaps where malicious namespaced attributes could bypass runtime and compile-time sanitizers.\n\nCombined, these flaws enable an attacker who can inject or supply a template/tag structure with custom namespaces to bypass Angular's script-stripping logic and attribute sanitizers, leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n### Impact\nAny Angular application that compiles user-controlled templates at runtime, or relies on sanitization of namespaced elements/attributes, is vulnerable to this security bypass.\n\nOnce exploited, this allows a malicious actor to inject a namespaced script element or dynamic attribut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 21.0.0-next.0, < 21.2.15"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"],"technology":"@angular/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/compiler` and `@angular/core` packages allows bypassing element and attribute sanitization/validation through specific namespace workarounds.\n\nSpecifically, namespaced script elements (e.g., `` or ``) were not properly identified as script elements by the Angular template preparser, allowing them to pass through template compilation without being stripped.\n\nFurthermore, security context schema mappings for element attributes did not consistently handle attributes within namespaced elements (like SVG and MathML), opening up gaps where malicious namespaced attributes could bypass runtime and compile-time sanitizers.\n\nCombined, these flaws enable an attacker who can inject or supply a template/tag structure with custom namespaces to bypass Angular's script-stripping logic and attribute sanitizers, leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n### Impact\nAny Angular application that compiles user-controlled templates at runtime, or relies on sanitization of namespaced elements/attributes, is vulnerable to this security bypass.\n\nOnce exploited, this allows a malicious actor to inject a namespaced script element or dynamic attribut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 22.0.0-next.0, < 22.0.0-rc.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"],"technology":"@angular/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/compiler` and `@angular/core` packages allows bypassing element and attribute sanitization/validation through specific namespace workarounds.\n\nSpecifically, namespaced script elements (e.g., `` or ``) were not properly identified as script elements by the Angular template preparser, allowing them to pass through template compilation without being stripped.\n\nFurthermore, security context schema mappings for element attributes did not consistently handle attributes within namespaced elements (like SVG and MathML), opening up gaps where malicious namespaced attributes could bypass runtime and compile-time sanitizers.\n\nCombined, these flaws enable an attacker who can inject or supply a template/tag structure with custom namespaces to bypass Angular's script-stripping logic and attribute sanitizers, leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n### Impact\nAny Angular application that compiles user-controlled templates at runtime, or relies on sanitization of namespaced elements/attributes, is vulnerable to this security bypass.\n\nOnce exploited, this allows a malicious actor to inject a namespaced script element or dynamic attribut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 20.0.0-next.0, < 20.3.22"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"],"technology":"@angular/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/compiler` and `@angular/core` packages allows bypassing element and attribute sanitization/validation through specific namespace workarounds.\n\nSpecifically, namespaced script elements (e.g., `` or ``) were not properly identified as script elements by the Angular template preparser, allowing them to pass through template compilation without being stripped.\n\nFurthermore, security context schema mappings for element attributes did not consistently handle attributes within namespaced elements (like SVG and MathML), opening up gaps where malicious namespaced attributes could bypass runtime and compile-time sanitizers.\n\nCombined, these flaws enable an attacker who can inject or supply a template/tag structure with custom namespaces to bypass Angular's script-stripping logic and attribute sanitizers, leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n### Impact\nAny Angular application that compiles user-controlled templates at runtime, or relies on sanitization of namespaced elements/attributes, is vulnerable to this security bypass.\n\nOnce exploited, this allows a malicious actor to inject a namespaced script element or dynamic attribut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 19.0.0-next.0, < 19.2.22"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"],"technology":"@angular/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/compiler` and `@angular/core` packages allows bypassing element and attribute sanitization/validation through specific namespace workarounds.\n\nSpecifically, namespaced script elements (e.g., `` or ``) were not properly identified as script elements by the Angular template preparser, allowing them to pass through template compilation without being stripped.\n\nFurthermore, security context schema mappings for element attributes did not consistently handle attributes within namespaced elements (like SVG and MathML), opening up gaps where malicious namespaced attributes could bypass runtime and compile-time sanitizers.\n\nCombined, these flaws enable an attacker who can inject or supply a template/tag structure with custom namespaces to bypass Angular's script-stripping logic and attribute sanitizers, leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n### Impact\nAny Angular application that compiles user-controlled templates at runtime, or relies on sanitization of namespaced elements/attributes, is vulnerable to this security bypass.\n\nOnce exploited, this allows a malicious actor to inject a namespaced script element or dynamic attribut","public_affected_ranges":["<= 18.2.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"],"technology":"@angular/compiler","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/compiler` and `@angular/core` packages allows bypassing element and attribute sanitization/validation through specific namespace workarounds.\n\nSpecifically, namespaced script elements (e.g., `` or ``) were not properly identified as script elements by the Angular template preparser, allowing them to pass through template compilation without being stripped.\n\nFurthermore, security context schema mappings for element attributes did not consistently handle attributes within namespaced elements (like SVG and MathML), opening up gaps where malicious namespaced attributes could bypass runtime and compile-time sanitizers.\n\nCombined, these flaws enable an attacker who can inject or supply a template/tag structure with custom namespaces to bypass Angular's script-stripping logic and attribute sanitizers, leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n### Impact\nAny Angular application that compiles user-controlled templates at runtime, or relies on sanitization of namespaced elements/attributes, is vulnerable to this security bypass.\n\nOnce exploited, this allows a malicious actor to inject a namespaced script element or dynamic attribut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 21.0.0-next.0, < 21.2.15"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"],"technology":"@angular/compiler","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/compiler` and `@angular/core` packages allows bypassing element and attribute sanitization/validation through specific namespace workarounds.\n\nSpecifically, namespaced script elements (e.g., `` or ``) were not properly identified as script elements by the Angular template preparser, allowing them to pass through template compilation without being stripped.\n\nFurthermore, security context schema mappings for element attributes did not consistently handle attributes within namespaced elements (like SVG and MathML), opening up gaps where malicious namespaced attributes could bypass runtime and compile-time sanitizers.\n\nCombined, these flaws enable an attacker who can inject or supply a template/tag structure with custom namespaces to bypass Angular's script-stripping logic and attribute sanitizers, leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n### Impact\nAny Angular application that compiles user-controlled templates at runtime, or relies on sanitization of namespaced elements/attributes, is vulnerable to this security bypass.\n\nOnce exploited, this allows a malicious actor to inject a namespaced script element or dynamic attribut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 22.0.0-next.0, < 22.0.0-rc.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"],"technology":"@angular/compiler","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/compiler` and `@angular/core` packages allows bypassing element and attribute sanitization/validation through specific namespace workarounds.\n\nSpecifically, namespaced script elements (e.g., `` or ``) were not properly identified as script elements by the Angular template preparser, allowing them to pass through template compilation without being stripped.\n\nFurthermore, security context schema mappings for element attributes did not consistently handle attributes within namespaced elements (like SVG and MathML), opening up gaps where malicious namespaced attributes could bypass runtime and compile-time sanitizers.\n\nCombined, these flaws enable an attacker who can inject or supply a template/tag structure with custom namespaces to bypass Angular's script-stripping logic and attribute sanitizers, leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n### Impact\nAny Angular application that compiles user-controlled templates at runtime, or relies on sanitization of namespaced elements/attributes, is vulnerable to this security bypass.\n\nOnce exploited, this allows a malicious actor to inject a namespaced script element or dynamic attribut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 20.0.0-next.0, < 20.3.22"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"],"technology":"@angular/compiler","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/compiler` and `@angular/core` packages allows bypassing element and attribute sanitization/validation through specific namespace workarounds.\n\nSpecifically, namespaced script elements (e.g., `` or ``) were not properly identified as script elements by the Angular template preparser, allowing them to pass through template compilation without being stripped.\n\nFurthermore, security context schema mappings for element attributes did not consistently handle attributes within namespaced elements (like SVG and MathML), opening up gaps where malicious namespaced attributes could bypass runtime and compile-time sanitizers.\n\nCombined, these flaws enable an attacker who can inject or supply a template/tag structure with custom namespaces to bypass Angular's script-stripping logic and attribute sanitizers, leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n### Impact\nAny Angular application that compiles user-controlled templates at runtime, or relies on sanitization of namespaced elements/attributes, is vulnerable to this security bypass.\n\nOnce exploited, this allows a malicious actor to inject a namespaced script element or dynamic attribut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 19.0.0-next.0, < 19.2.22"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28570f9629c0d84ff272fd892d7e6be0"],"technology":"@angular/compiler","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/compiler` and `@angular/core` packages allows bypassing element and attribute sanitization/validation through specific namespace workarounds.\n\nSpecifically, namespaced script elements (e.g., `` or ``) were not properly identified as script elements by the Angular template preparser, allowing them to pass through template compilation without being stripped.\n\nFurthermore, security context schema mappings for element attributes did not consistently handle attributes within namespaced elements (like SVG and MathML), opening up gaps where malicious namespaced attributes could bypass runtime and compile-time sanitizers.\n\nCombined, these flaws enable an attacker who can inject or supply a template/tag structure with custom namespaces to bypass Angular's script-stripping logic and attribute sanitizers, leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n### Impact\nAny Angular application that compiles user-controlled templates at runtime, or relies on sanitization of namespaced elements/attributes, is vulnerable to this security bypass.\n\nOnce exploited, this allows a malicious actor to inject a namespaced script element or dynamic attribut","public_affected_ranges":["<= 18.2.14"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:27.895Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-15T22:03:40.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-15T17:21:58.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-04T09:59:43.724Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}