{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00016158","kind":"vulnerability","title":"hono/jsx does not isolate context per request, leading to cross-request data disclosure","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-hvrm-45r6-mjfj","CVE-2026-59896"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for hono. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-2cc4f9f697ea85fc4cbcd211ef1df364"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-21T18:34:20.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-3418eff063309b0d394bc952a6e24f9d"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-25T17:10:00.197Z","value":"6.5 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-2cc4f9f697ea85fc4cbcd211ef1df364"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-3418eff063309b0d394bc952a6e24f9d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hvrm-45r6-mjfj","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-hvrm-45r6-mjfj","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T22:34:49.300Z"},{"id":"sr-2cc4f9f697ea85fc4cbcd211ef1df364","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59896","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-59896","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-08T08:05:01.676Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3418eff063309b0d394bc952a6e24f9d"],"technology":"hono","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`hono/jsx` did not isolate context values per request during server-side rendering. While an async component was suspended on `await`, its provided context value stayed observable to other requests rendering concurrently, so `useContext()` could return a value from a different in-flight request.\n\n### Details\n\nDuring server-side rendering, context values were kept in a process-wide structure rather than scoped to each request's render. While an async component awaited, another request entering the same provider could observe or replace the value; when the first render resumed, it could read the other request's context.\n\nThis affects the usual ways request-scoped data is passed through a server-rendered JSX tree:\n\n- `createContext()` / `useContext()`\n- the `jsxRenderer` middleware and `useRequestContext()`\n\nIt arises only when context is read after an `await` inside an async component while requests render concurrently. Reading context synchronously (before any `await`), purely synchronous rendering, and client-side (DOM) rendering are not affected.\n\n### Impact\n\nUnder concurrent requests, a response could be rendered with another request's context. A user may receive HTM","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.11.8, < 4.12.27"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:44.044Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-21T18:34:20.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-21T18:34:19.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-03T22:34:49.300Z"},{"id":"NVI-00016158","kind":"vulnerability","title":"hono/jsx does not isolate context per request, leading to cross-request data disclosure","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-hvrm-45r6-mjfj","CVE-2026-59896"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for hono. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-3418eff063309b0d394bc952a6e24f9d"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-21T18:34:20.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-3418eff063309b0d394bc952a6e24f9d"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-3418eff063309b0d394bc952a6e24f9d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hvrm-45r6-mjfj","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-hvrm-45r6-mjfj","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T22:34:49.300Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3418eff063309b0d394bc952a6e24f9d"],"technology":"hono","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`hono/jsx` did not isolate context values per request during server-side rendering. While an async component was suspended on `await`, its provided context value stayed observable to other requests rendering concurrently, so `useContext()` could return a value from a different in-flight request.\n\n### Details\n\nDuring server-side rendering, context values were kept in a process-wide structure rather than scoped to each request's render. While an async component awaited, another request entering the same provider could observe or replace the value; when the first render resumed, it could read the other request's context.\n\nThis affects the usual ways request-scoped data is passed through a server-rendered JSX tree:\n\n- `createContext()` / `useContext()`\n- the `jsxRenderer` middleware and `useRequestContext()`\n\nIt arises only when context is read after an `await` inside an async component while requests render concurrently. Reading context synchronously (before any `await`), purely synchronous rendering, and client-side (DOM) rendering are not affected.\n\n### Impact\n\nUnder concurrent requests, a response could be rendered with another request's context. A user may receive HTM","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.11.8, < 4.12.27"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:27.900Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-21T18:34:20.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-21T18:34:19.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-03T22:34:49.300Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}