{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00016166","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Tekton Pipeline: Git Resolver Unsanitized Revision Parameter Enables git Argument Injection Leading to RCE","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-94jr-7pqp-xhcq","CVE-2026-40938"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/tektoncd/pipeline, github.com/tektoncd/pipeline, github.com/tektoncd/pipeline, github.com/tektoncd/pipeline, github.com/tektoncd/pipeline. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-36a9d82b108321be7c3a2fbf42cb5894"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-21T13:56:57.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-36a9d82b108321be7c3a2fbf42cb5894"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-36a9d82b108321be7c3a2fbf42cb5894","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-94jr-7pqp-xhcq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-94jr-7pqp-xhcq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T22:34:49.300Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-36a9d82b108321be7c3a2fbf42cb5894"],"technology":"github.com/tektoncd/pipeline","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe git resolver's `revision` parameter is passed directly as a positional argument to `git fetch` without any validation that it does not begin with a `-` character. Because git parses flags from mixed positional arguments, an attacker can inject arbitrary `git fetch` flags such as `--upload-pack=`. Combined with the `validateRepoURL` function explicitly permitting URLs that begin with `/` (local filesystem paths), a tenant who can submit `ResolutionRequest` objects can chain these two behaviors to execute an arbitrary binary on the resolver pod. The `tekton-pipelines-resolvers` ServiceAccount holds cluster-wide `get/list/watch` on all Secrets, so code execution on the resolver pod enables full cluster-wide secret exfiltration.\n\n## Details\n\n### Root Cause 1 — Unvalidated `revision` parameter passed to `git fetch`\n\n`pkg/resolution/resolver/git/repository.go:85`:\n\n```go\n// pkg/resolution/resolver/git/repository.go lines 84-96\n// 'revision' is the raw user-supplied string from the ResolutionRequest param.\n// It is passed verbatim as a positional argument to git fetch:\nfunc (repo *repository) checkout(ctx context.Context, revision string) error {\n    _, err := repo","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.10.0, < 1.11.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-36a9d82b108321be7c3a2fbf42cb5894"],"technology":"github.com/tektoncd/pipeline","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe git resolver's `revision` parameter is passed directly as a positional argument to `git fetch` without any validation that it does not begin with a `-` character. Because git parses flags from mixed positional arguments, an attacker can inject arbitrary `git fetch` flags such as `--upload-pack=`. Combined with the `validateRepoURL` function explicitly permitting URLs that begin with `/` (local filesystem paths), a tenant who can submit `ResolutionRequest` objects can chain these two behaviors to execute an arbitrary binary on the resolver pod. The `tekton-pipelines-resolvers` ServiceAccount holds cluster-wide `get/list/watch` on all Secrets, so code execution on the resolver pod enables full cluster-wide secret exfiltration.\n\n## Details\n\n### Root Cause 1 — Unvalidated `revision` parameter passed to `git fetch`\n\n`pkg/resolution/resolver/git/repository.go:85`:\n\n```go\n// pkg/resolution/resolver/git/repository.go lines 84-96\n// 'revision' is the raw user-supplied string from the ResolutionRequest param.\n// It is passed verbatim as a positional argument to git fetch:\nfunc (repo *repository) checkout(ctx context.Context, revision string) error {\n    _, err := repo","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.7.0, < 1.9.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-36a9d82b108321be7c3a2fbf42cb5894"],"technology":"github.com/tektoncd/pipeline","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe git resolver's `revision` parameter is passed directly as a positional argument to `git fetch` without any validation that it does not begin with a `-` character. Because git parses flags from mixed positional arguments, an attacker can inject arbitrary `git fetch` flags such as `--upload-pack=`. Combined with the `validateRepoURL` function explicitly permitting URLs that begin with `/` (local filesystem paths), a tenant who can submit `ResolutionRequest` objects can chain these two behaviors to execute an arbitrary binary on the resolver pod. The `tekton-pipelines-resolvers` ServiceAccount holds cluster-wide `get/list/watch` on all Secrets, so code execution on the resolver pod enables full cluster-wide secret exfiltration.\n\n## Details\n\n### Root Cause 1 — Unvalidated `revision` parameter passed to `git fetch`\n\n`pkg/resolution/resolver/git/repository.go:85`:\n\n```go\n// pkg/resolution/resolver/git/repository.go lines 84-96\n// 'revision' is the raw user-supplied string from the ResolutionRequest param.\n// It is passed verbatim as a positional argument to git fetch:\nfunc (repo *repository) checkout(ctx context.Context, revision string) error {\n    _, err := repo","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.4.0, < 1.6.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-36a9d82b108321be7c3a2fbf42cb5894"],"technology":"github.com/tektoncd/pipeline","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe git resolver's `revision` parameter is passed directly as a positional argument to `git fetch` without any validation that it does not begin with a `-` character. Because git parses flags from mixed positional arguments, an attacker can inject arbitrary `git fetch` flags such as `--upload-pack=`. Combined with the `validateRepoURL` function explicitly permitting URLs that begin with `/` (local filesystem paths), a tenant who can submit `ResolutionRequest` objects can chain these two behaviors to execute an arbitrary binary on the resolver pod. The `tekton-pipelines-resolvers` ServiceAccount holds cluster-wide `get/list/watch` on all Secrets, so code execution on the resolver pod enables full cluster-wide secret exfiltration.\n\n## Details\n\n### Root Cause 1 — Unvalidated `revision` parameter passed to `git fetch`\n\n`pkg/resolution/resolver/git/repository.go:85`:\n\n```go\n// pkg/resolution/resolver/git/repository.go lines 84-96\n// 'revision' is the raw user-supplied string from the ResolutionRequest param.\n// It is passed verbatim as a positional argument to git fetch:\nfunc (repo *repository) checkout(ctx context.Context, revision string) error {\n    _, err := repo","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.2.0, < 1.3.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-36a9d82b108321be7c3a2fbf42cb5894"],"technology":"github.com/tektoncd/pipeline","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe git resolver's `revision` parameter is passed directly as a positional argument to `git fetch` without any validation that it does not begin with a `-` character. Because git parses flags from mixed positional arguments, an attacker can inject arbitrary `git fetch` flags such as `--upload-pack=`. Combined with the `validateRepoURL` function explicitly permitting URLs that begin with `/` (local filesystem paths), a tenant who can submit `ResolutionRequest` objects can chain these two behaviors to execute an arbitrary binary on the resolver pod. The `tekton-pipelines-resolvers` ServiceAccount holds cluster-wide `get/list/watch` on all Secrets, so code execution on the resolver pod enables full cluster-wide secret exfiltration.\n\n## Details\n\n### Root Cause 1 — Unvalidated `revision` parameter passed to `git fetch`\n\n`pkg/resolution/resolver/git/repository.go:85`:\n\n```go\n// pkg/resolution/resolver/git/repository.go lines 84-96\n// 'revision' is the raw user-supplied string from the ResolutionRequest param.\n// It is passed verbatim as a positional argument to git fetch:\nfunc (repo *repository) checkout(ctx context.Context, revision string) error {\n    _, err := repo","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0, < 1.0.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:27.900Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-21T13:56:57.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-04-21T20:28:36.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-03T22:34:49.300Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}