{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00016227","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Angular Service Worker Policy-Bypass & Credential-Stripping Vulnerabilities","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-gv2q-mqqv-365m","CVE-2026-50169"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @angular/service-worker, @angular/service-worker, @angular/service-worker, @angular/service-worker, @angular/service-worker. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0b5989e79ae2d651fc707335206e1ed0"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-15T22:05:04.000Z","value":"6.1 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-4db19ffd976f91b7e0964770bafc2c69"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-09T15:31:31.800Z","value":"6.1 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-0b5989e79ae2d651fc707335206e1ed0"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-09T15:31:31.800Z","value":"5.7 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-0b5989e79ae2d651fc707335206e1ed0"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4db19ffd976f91b7e0964770bafc2c69","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gv2q-mqqv-365m","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-gv2q-mqqv-365m","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T09:59:43.724Z"},{"id":"sr-0b5989e79ae2d651fc707335206e1ed0","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50169","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-50169","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-08T01:47:50.916Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4db19ffd976f91b7e0964770bafc2c69"],"technology":"@angular/service-worker","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/service-worker` package compromises the integrity of request-policy enforcement during request reconstruction. When the Angular Service Worker intercepts network requests for matched assets, it reconstructs a new `Request` object using an internal helper function. \n\nDuring this reconstruction process, the helper function strips the strict, client-defined request redirect policy configuration (such as `redirect: 'error'`), falling back to the browser's default `'follow'` strategy.\n\nIf the target web application makes client-side requests with a strict policy (e.g., expecting a network error instead of automatically following redirects), the service worker will bypass this instruction and automatically follow HTTP 3xx redirects to other destinations. This acts as an unintended proxy/intermediary (\"Confused Deputy\") and can result in cookie/credential exposure or same-origin session-restricted data leakage if public dynamic routes redirect to sensitive routes.\n\n### Impact\nWeb applications registering the `@angular/service-worker` package are vulnerable to this redirect-policy bypass if they make safe client-side fetch calls (such as `{ redirect: 'error' }`) t","public_affected_ranges":[">= 22.0.0-next.0, < 22.0.0-rc.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4db19ffd976f91b7e0964770bafc2c69"],"technology":"@angular/service-worker","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/service-worker` package compromises the integrity of request-policy enforcement during request reconstruction. When the Angular Service Worker intercepts network requests for matched assets, it reconstructs a new `Request` object using an internal helper function. \n\nDuring this reconstruction process, the helper function strips the strict, client-defined request redirect policy configuration (such as `redirect: 'error'`), falling back to the browser's default `'follow'` strategy.\n\nIf the target web application makes client-side requests with a strict policy (e.g., expecting a network error instead of automatically following redirects), the service worker will bypass this instruction and automatically follow HTTP 3xx redirects to other destinations. This acts as an unintended proxy/intermediary (\"Confused Deputy\") and can result in cookie/credential exposure or same-origin session-restricted data leakage if public dynamic routes redirect to sensitive routes.\n\n### Impact\nWeb applications registering the `@angular/service-worker` package are vulnerable to this redirect-policy bypass if they make safe client-side fetch calls (such as `{ redirect: 'error' }`) t","public_affected_ranges":[">= 20.0.0-next.0, < 20.3.22"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4db19ffd976f91b7e0964770bafc2c69"],"technology":"@angular/service-worker","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/service-worker` package compromises the integrity of request-policy enforcement during request reconstruction. When the Angular Service Worker intercepts network requests for matched assets, it reconstructs a new `Request` object using an internal helper function. \n\nDuring this reconstruction process, the helper function strips the strict, client-defined request redirect policy configuration (such as `redirect: 'error'`), falling back to the browser's default `'follow'` strategy.\n\nIf the target web application makes client-side requests with a strict policy (e.g., expecting a network error instead of automatically following redirects), the service worker will bypass this instruction and automatically follow HTTP 3xx redirects to other destinations. This acts as an unintended proxy/intermediary (\"Confused Deputy\") and can result in cookie/credential exposure or same-origin session-restricted data leakage if public dynamic routes redirect to sensitive routes.\n\n### Impact\nWeb applications registering the `@angular/service-worker` package are vulnerable to this redirect-policy bypass if they make safe client-side fetch calls (such as `{ redirect: 'error' }`) t","public_affected_ranges":[">= 19.0.0-next.0, < 19.2.23"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4db19ffd976f91b7e0964770bafc2c69"],"technology":"@angular/service-worker","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/service-worker` package compromises the integrity of request-policy enforcement during request reconstruction. When the Angular Service Worker intercepts network requests for matched assets, it reconstructs a new `Request` object using an internal helper function. \n\nDuring this reconstruction process, the helper function strips the strict, client-defined request redirect policy configuration (such as `redirect: 'error'`), falling back to the browser's default `'follow'` strategy.\n\nIf the target web application makes client-side requests with a strict policy (e.g., expecting a network error instead of automatically following redirects), the service worker will bypass this instruction and automatically follow HTTP 3xx redirects to other destinations. This acts as an unintended proxy/intermediary (\"Confused Deputy\") and can result in cookie/credential exposure or same-origin session-restricted data leakage if public dynamic routes redirect to sensitive routes.\n\n### Impact\nWeb applications registering the `@angular/service-worker` package are vulnerable to this redirect-policy bypass if they make safe client-side fetch calls (such as `{ redirect: 'error' }`) t","public_affected_ranges":["<= 18.2.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4db19ffd976f91b7e0964770bafc2c69"],"technology":"@angular/service-worker","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/service-worker` package compromises the integrity of request-policy enforcement during request reconstruction. When the Angular Service Worker intercepts network requests for matched assets, it reconstructs a new `Request` object using an internal helper function. \n\nDuring this reconstruction process, the helper function strips the strict, client-defined request redirect policy configuration (such as `redirect: 'error'`), falling back to the browser's default `'follow'` strategy.\n\nIf the target web application makes client-side requests with a strict policy (e.g., expecting a network error instead of automatically following redirects), the service worker will bypass this instruction and automatically follow HTTP 3xx redirects to other destinations. This acts as an unintended proxy/intermediary (\"Confused Deputy\") and can result in cookie/credential exposure or same-origin session-restricted data leakage if public dynamic routes redirect to sensitive routes.\n\n### Impact\nWeb applications registering the `@angular/service-worker` package are vulnerable to this redirect-policy bypass if they make safe client-side fetch calls (such as `{ redirect: 'error' }`) t","public_affected_ranges":[">= 21.0.0-next.0, < 21.2.15"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:44.022Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-15T22:05:04.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-15T16:44:21.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-04T09:59:43.724Z"},{"id":"NVI-00016227","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Angular Service Worker Policy-Bypass & Credential-Stripping Vulnerabilities","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-gv2q-mqqv-365m","CVE-2026-50169"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @angular/service-worker, @angular/service-worker, @angular/service-worker, @angular/service-worker, @angular/service-worker. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-4db19ffd976f91b7e0964770bafc2c69"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-15T22:05:04.000Z","value":"6.1 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-4db19ffd976f91b7e0964770bafc2c69"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4db19ffd976f91b7e0964770bafc2c69","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gv2q-mqqv-365m","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-gv2q-mqqv-365m","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T09:59:43.724Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4db19ffd976f91b7e0964770bafc2c69"],"technology":"@angular/service-worker","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/service-worker` package compromises the integrity of request-policy enforcement during request reconstruction. When the Angular Service Worker intercepts network requests for matched assets, it reconstructs a new `Request` object using an internal helper function. \n\nDuring this reconstruction process, the helper function strips the strict, client-defined request redirect policy configuration (such as `redirect: 'error'`), falling back to the browser's default `'follow'` strategy.\n\nIf the target web application makes client-side requests with a strict policy (e.g., expecting a network error instead of automatically following redirects), the service worker will bypass this instruction and automatically follow HTTP 3xx redirects to other destinations. This acts as an unintended proxy/intermediary (\"Confused Deputy\") and can result in cookie/credential exposure or same-origin session-restricted data leakage if public dynamic routes redirect to sensitive routes.\n\n### Impact\nWeb applications registering the `@angular/service-worker` package are vulnerable to this redirect-policy bypass if they make safe client-side fetch calls (such as `{ redirect: 'error' }`) t","public_affected_ranges":[">= 22.0.0-next.0, < 22.0.0-rc.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4db19ffd976f91b7e0964770bafc2c69"],"technology":"@angular/service-worker","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/service-worker` package compromises the integrity of request-policy enforcement during request reconstruction. When the Angular Service Worker intercepts network requests for matched assets, it reconstructs a new `Request` object using an internal helper function. \n\nDuring this reconstruction process, the helper function strips the strict, client-defined request redirect policy configuration (such as `redirect: 'error'`), falling back to the browser's default `'follow'` strategy.\n\nIf the target web application makes client-side requests with a strict policy (e.g., expecting a network error instead of automatically following redirects), the service worker will bypass this instruction and automatically follow HTTP 3xx redirects to other destinations. This acts as an unintended proxy/intermediary (\"Confused Deputy\") and can result in cookie/credential exposure or same-origin session-restricted data leakage if public dynamic routes redirect to sensitive routes.\n\n### Impact\nWeb applications registering the `@angular/service-worker` package are vulnerable to this redirect-policy bypass if they make safe client-side fetch calls (such as `{ redirect: 'error' }`) t","public_affected_ranges":[">= 20.0.0-next.0, < 20.3.22"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4db19ffd976f91b7e0964770bafc2c69"],"technology":"@angular/service-worker","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/service-worker` package compromises the integrity of request-policy enforcement during request reconstruction. When the Angular Service Worker intercepts network requests for matched assets, it reconstructs a new `Request` object using an internal helper function. \n\nDuring this reconstruction process, the helper function strips the strict, client-defined request redirect policy configuration (such as `redirect: 'error'`), falling back to the browser's default `'follow'` strategy.\n\nIf the target web application makes client-side requests with a strict policy (e.g., expecting a network error instead of automatically following redirects), the service worker will bypass this instruction and automatically follow HTTP 3xx redirects to other destinations. This acts as an unintended proxy/intermediary (\"Confused Deputy\") and can result in cookie/credential exposure or same-origin session-restricted data leakage if public dynamic routes redirect to sensitive routes.\n\n### Impact\nWeb applications registering the `@angular/service-worker` package are vulnerable to this redirect-policy bypass if they make safe client-side fetch calls (such as `{ redirect: 'error' }`) t","public_affected_ranges":[">= 19.0.0-next.0, < 19.2.23"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4db19ffd976f91b7e0964770bafc2c69"],"technology":"@angular/service-worker","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/service-worker` package compromises the integrity of request-policy enforcement during request reconstruction. When the Angular Service Worker intercepts network requests for matched assets, it reconstructs a new `Request` object using an internal helper function. \n\nDuring this reconstruction process, the helper function strips the strict, client-defined request redirect policy configuration (such as `redirect: 'error'`), falling back to the browser's default `'follow'` strategy.\n\nIf the target web application makes client-side requests with a strict policy (e.g., expecting a network error instead of automatically following redirects), the service worker will bypass this instruction and automatically follow HTTP 3xx redirects to other destinations. This acts as an unintended proxy/intermediary (\"Confused Deputy\") and can result in cookie/credential exposure or same-origin session-restricted data leakage if public dynamic routes redirect to sensitive routes.\n\n### Impact\nWeb applications registering the `@angular/service-worker` package are vulnerable to this redirect-policy bypass if they make safe client-side fetch calls (such as `{ redirect: 'error' }`) t","public_affected_ranges":["<= 18.2.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4db19ffd976f91b7e0964770bafc2c69"],"technology":"@angular/service-worker","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"An issue in the `@angular/service-worker` package compromises the integrity of request-policy enforcement during request reconstruction. When the Angular Service Worker intercepts network requests for matched assets, it reconstructs a new `Request` object using an internal helper function. \n\nDuring this reconstruction process, the helper function strips the strict, client-defined request redirect policy configuration (such as `redirect: 'error'`), falling back to the browser's default `'follow'` strategy.\n\nIf the target web application makes client-side requests with a strict policy (e.g., expecting a network error instead of automatically following redirects), the service worker will bypass this instruction and automatically follow HTTP 3xx redirects to other destinations. This acts as an unintended proxy/intermediary (\"Confused Deputy\") and can result in cookie/credential exposure or same-origin session-restricted data leakage if public dynamic routes redirect to sensitive routes.\n\n### Impact\nWeb applications registering the `@angular/service-worker` package are vulnerable to this redirect-policy bypass if they make safe client-side fetch calls (such as `{ redirect: 'error' }`) t","public_affected_ranges":[">= 21.0.0-next.0, < 21.2.15"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:27.920Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-15T22:05:04.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-15T16:44:21.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-04T09:59:43.724Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}