{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00016293","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Gitea: Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-82f7-87hm-852x","CVE-2026-57894"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for code.gitea.io/gitea. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-631d4310b68ef212165475efd402a9b7"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-21T19:17:22.000Z","value":"8.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-631d4310b68ef212165475efd402a9b7"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-631d4310b68ef212165475efd402a9b7","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-82f7-87hm-852x","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-82f7-87hm-852x","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T22:34:39.734Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-631d4310b68ef212165475efd402a9b7"],"technology":"code.gitea.io/gitea","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"# Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration\n\n## Summary\n\nGitea validates the user-supplied repository migration URL, but the actual clone and later mirror fetch operations are performed by the Git command-line client without disabling HTTP redirects. Git's default `http.followRedirects=initial` follows the first redirect and then uses the redirected URL as the base for later repository object requests.\n\nThis creates a URL-policy bypass, SSRF, and repository exfiltration primitive. A low-privileged authenticated user can submit an allowed public Git URL that redirects the Gitea server to an otherwise blocked or internal Git HTTP(S) endpoint. Local validation confirmed that Git followed a first-hop redirect to `127.0.0.1`, fetched Git objects, and completed the clone; `git -c http.followRedirects=false clone` blocked the same path.\n\nThe main impact is internal Git repository exfiltration into an attacker-controlled Gitea repository. Pull mirrors increase risk because scheduled `git fetch --tags` operations can keep following the redirect and collect future internal commits.\n\nThis is High severity by","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.27.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:27.928Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-21T19:17:22.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-21T19:17:21.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-03T22:34:39.734Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}