{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00016343","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Cloudreve: Path Traversal in WOPI PUT_RELATIVE Allows Arbitrary File Creation in Owner Account","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-49h3-cwhj-4737","CVE-2026-55495"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4, github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v3. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-61e884c6beaf9a9ea72b78ef1f92c2d1"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-24T20:41:16.000Z","value":"4.3 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-698a1ba9fbd59664128aa138ed5ef627"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-08T20:51:43.490Z","value":"4.3 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-61e884c6beaf9a9ea72b78ef1f92c2d1"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-698a1ba9fbd59664128aa138ed5ef627","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-49h3-cwhj-4737","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-49h3-cwhj-4737","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:59:13.529Z"},{"id":"sr-61e884c6beaf9a9ea72b78ef1f92c2d1","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55495","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-55495","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-08T01:48:26.418Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-698a1ba9fbd59664128aa138ed5ef627"],"technology":"github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n \nCloudreve's WOPI `PUT_RELATIVE` handler treats `X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget` as a path, not a filename. It splits the header on `/` and joins the segments onto the source file's directory with `URI.JoinRaw`, which feeds Go's `url.JoinPath`. `url.JoinPath` resolves `.`/`..` segments, so a slash-bearing target such as `a/../../evil.docx` collapses to a location outside the source file's directory. The lower-level upload path then validates only the final, already-cleaned basename (`evil.docx`), which is harmless, and checks ownership against the *resolved ancestor* — which is still the same user's drive.\n \nA WOPI access token is bound to exactly one file (the route enforces `fileId == session.FileID` with a 403 otherwise). `PUT_RELATIVE` escapes that per-file scope: a token issued for one file can create (and, conditionally, overwrite) files elsewhere in the same account.\n\n## Root cause (verified at `26b6b10`)\n \n**1. Token is single-file scoped (the boundary being escaped)** — `middleware` `ViewerSessionValidation`:\n \n```go\nfileId := hashid.FromContext(c)\nif fileId != session.FileID {           // 403 — token is bound to ONE file\n    c.Status(http.StatusForbidden); c.Abort();","public_affected_ranges":["< 4.0.0-20260613023150-7968e50429ef"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-698a1ba9fbd59664128aa138ed5ef627"],"technology":"github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n \nCloudreve's WOPI `PUT_RELATIVE` handler treats `X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget` as a path, not a filename. It splits the header on `/` and joins the segments onto the source file's directory with `URI.JoinRaw`, which feeds Go's `url.JoinPath`. `url.JoinPath` resolves `.`/`..` segments, so a slash-bearing target such as `a/../../evil.docx` collapses to a location outside the source file's directory. The lower-level upload path then validates only the final, already-cleaned basename (`evil.docx`), which is harmless, and checks ownership against the *resolved ancestor* — which is still the same user's drive.\n \nA WOPI access token is bound to exactly one file (the route enforces `fileId == session.FileID` with a 403 otherwise). `PUT_RELATIVE` escapes that per-file scope: a token issued for one file can create (and, conditionally, overwrite) files elsewhere in the same account.\n\n## Root cause (verified at `26b6b10`)\n \n**1. Token is single-file scoped (the boundary being escaped)** — `middleware` `ViewerSessionValidation`:\n \n```go\nfileId := hashid.FromContext(c)\nif fileId != session.FileID {           // 403 — token is bound to ONE file\n    c.Status(http.StatusForbidden); c.Abort();","public_affected_ranges":["<= 3.0.0-20250225100611-da4e44b77af4"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:44.062Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-24T20:41:16.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-24T20:41:16.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:59:13.529Z"},{"id":"NVI-00016343","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Cloudreve: Path Traversal in WOPI PUT_RELATIVE Allows Arbitrary File Creation in Owner Account","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-49h3-cwhj-4737","CVE-2026-55495"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4, github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v3. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-698a1ba9fbd59664128aa138ed5ef627"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-24T20:41:16.000Z","value":"4.3 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-698a1ba9fbd59664128aa138ed5ef627"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-698a1ba9fbd59664128aa138ed5ef627","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-49h3-cwhj-4737","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-49h3-cwhj-4737","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:59:13.529Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-698a1ba9fbd59664128aa138ed5ef627"],"technology":"github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n \nCloudreve's WOPI `PUT_RELATIVE` handler treats `X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget` as a path, not a filename. It splits the header on `/` and joins the segments onto the source file's directory with `URI.JoinRaw`, which feeds Go's `url.JoinPath`. `url.JoinPath` resolves `.`/`..` segments, so a slash-bearing target such as `a/../../evil.docx` collapses to a location outside the source file's directory. The lower-level upload path then validates only the final, already-cleaned basename (`evil.docx`), which is harmless, and checks ownership against the *resolved ancestor* — which is still the same user's drive.\n \nA WOPI access token is bound to exactly one file (the route enforces `fileId == session.FileID` with a 403 otherwise). `PUT_RELATIVE` escapes that per-file scope: a token issued for one file can create (and, conditionally, overwrite) files elsewhere in the same account.\n\n## Root cause (verified at `26b6b10`)\n \n**1. Token is single-file scoped (the boundary being escaped)** — `middleware` `ViewerSessionValidation`:\n \n```go\nfileId := hashid.FromContext(c)\nif fileId != session.FileID {           // 403 — token is bound to ONE file\n    c.Status(http.StatusForbidden); c.Abort();","public_affected_ranges":["< 4.0.0-20260613023150-7968e50429ef"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-698a1ba9fbd59664128aa138ed5ef627"],"technology":"github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n \nCloudreve's WOPI `PUT_RELATIVE` handler treats `X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget` as a path, not a filename. It splits the header on `/` and joins the segments onto the source file's directory with `URI.JoinRaw`, which feeds Go's `url.JoinPath`. `url.JoinPath` resolves `.`/`..` segments, so a slash-bearing target such as `a/../../evil.docx` collapses to a location outside the source file's directory. The lower-level upload path then validates only the final, already-cleaned basename (`evil.docx`), which is harmless, and checks ownership against the *resolved ancestor* — which is still the same user's drive.\n \nA WOPI access token is bound to exactly one file (the route enforces `fileId == session.FileID` with a 403 otherwise). `PUT_RELATIVE` escapes that per-file scope: a token issued for one file can create (and, conditionally, overwrite) files elsewhere in the same account.\n\n## Root cause (verified at `26b6b10`)\n \n**1. Token is single-file scoped (the boundary being escaped)** — `middleware` `ViewerSessionValidation`:\n \n```go\nfileId := hashid.FromContext(c)\nif fileId != session.FileID {           // 403 — token is bound to ONE file\n    c.Status(http.StatusForbidden); c.Abort();","public_affected_ranges":["<= 3.0.0-20250225100611-da4e44b77af4"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:27.934Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-24T20:41:16.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-24T20:41:16.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:59:13.529Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}