{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00016408","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Sync-in Server has a complete 2FA Bypass via `POST /api/auth/token`","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-92cr-jxw4-5wjg","CVE-2026-58269"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @sync-in/server. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-07822f0d65244807eaef86f44cae6674"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-22T14:46:32.000Z","value":"8.1 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-6e8ad1896bd24fbab189a492dfa8aefb"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-05T12:03:04.000Z","value":"0.274%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.19912. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-07822f0d65244807eaef86f44cae6674"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-6e8ad1896bd24fbab189a492dfa8aefb","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-92cr-jxw4-5wjg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-92cr-jxw4-5wjg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:29:31.527Z"},{"id":"sr-07822f0d65244807eaef86f44cae6674","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-58269","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-06T07:17:46.389Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6e8ad1896bd24fbab189a492dfa8aefb"],"technology":"@sync-in/server","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"**Affected component:** Sync-in Server v2.3.0, `POST /api/auth/token` (`auth.controller.ts:50-55`).\n\n**Required attacker capability:** Valid username and password for a 2FA-enabled account.\n\n## Summary\n\n`POST /api/auth/token` authenticates with username and password only, then calls `getTokens()`, which returns unrestricted Bearer access and refresh JWTs without checking whether the account has TOTP 2FA enabled. An attacker who already knows valid credentials for a 2FA-enabled account can bypass 2FA in a single request.\n\nThe parallel login endpoint (`POST /api/auth/login`) correctly enforces 2FA by calling `setCookies(user, res, true)`, which gates on `user.twoFaEnabled` when server-side TOTP is enabled.\n\n## Details\n\nThe token endpoint at `auth.controller.ts:50-55` uses `AuthLocalGuard` (password-only) and calls `getTokens()` directly:\n```typescript\n// auth.controller.ts:50-55\n@Post(AUTH_ROUTE.TOKEN)\n@AuthTokenSkip()\n@UseGuards(AuthLocalGuard)\ntoken(@GetUser() user: UserModel): Promise {\n  return this.authManager.getTokens(user)\n}\n```\n`getTokens()` at `auth.service.ts:25-39` signs and returns access and refresh JWTs. It never reads `user.twoFaEnabled`:\n```typescri","public_affected_ranges":["<= 2.3.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T15:11:49.405Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-22T14:46:32.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-22T14:46:30.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:29:31.527Z"},{"id":"NVI-00016408","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Sync-in Server has a complete 2FA Bypass via `POST /api/auth/token`","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-92cr-jxw4-5wjg","CVE-2026-58269"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @sync-in/server. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-6e8ad1896bd24fbab189a492dfa8aefb"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-22T14:46:32.000Z","value":"8.1 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-6e8ad1896bd24fbab189a492dfa8aefb"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-6e8ad1896bd24fbab189a492dfa8aefb","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-92cr-jxw4-5wjg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-92cr-jxw4-5wjg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:29:31.527Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6e8ad1896bd24fbab189a492dfa8aefb"],"technology":"@sync-in/server","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"**Affected component:** Sync-in Server v2.3.0, `POST /api/auth/token` (`auth.controller.ts:50-55`).\n\n**Required attacker capability:** Valid username and password for a 2FA-enabled account.\n\n## Summary\n\n`POST /api/auth/token` authenticates with username and password only, then calls `getTokens()`, which returns unrestricted Bearer access and refresh JWTs without checking whether the account has TOTP 2FA enabled. An attacker who already knows valid credentials for a 2FA-enabled account can bypass 2FA in a single request.\n\nThe parallel login endpoint (`POST /api/auth/login`) correctly enforces 2FA by calling `setCookies(user, res, true)`, which gates on `user.twoFaEnabled` when server-side TOTP is enabled.\n\n## Details\n\nThe token endpoint at `auth.controller.ts:50-55` uses `AuthLocalGuard` (password-only) and calls `getTokens()` directly:\n```typescript\n// auth.controller.ts:50-55\n@Post(AUTH_ROUTE.TOKEN)\n@AuthTokenSkip()\n@UseGuards(AuthLocalGuard)\ntoken(@GetUser() user: UserModel): Promise {\n  return this.authManager.getTokens(user)\n}\n```\n`getTokens()` at `auth.service.ts:25-39` signs and returns access and refresh JWTs. It never reads `user.twoFaEnabled`:\n```typescri","public_affected_ranges":["<= 2.3.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:27.941Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-22T14:46:32.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-22T14:46:30.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:29:31.527Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}