{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00016414","kind":"vulnerability","title":"OpenChoreo: Unauthenticated build/workflow trigger via git-provider confusion (webhook signature bypass)","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-c5f6-2rm9-2w8g","CVE-2026-73840"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo, github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo, github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-2e7dc47971c0a0d2cf550a72e318e981"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-02T23:45:15.000Z","value":"5.3 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-6ef73308c1f3ab529806e9f5d703e2a0"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-08T20:56:50.520Z","value":"5.3 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-2e7dc47971c0a0d2cf550a72e318e981"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-6ef73308c1f3ab529806e9f5d703e2a0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c5f6-2rm9-2w8g","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-c5f6-2rm9-2w8g","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:29.477Z"},{"id":"sr-2e7dc47971c0a0d2cf550a72e318e981","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73840","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-73840","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-08T19:45:24.870Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6ef73308c1f3ab529806e9f5d703e2a0"],"technology":"github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\nThe OpenChoreo autobuild webhook endpoint (`POST /api/v1alpha1/autobuild`) selected the git provider used to authenticate an incoming webhook from a client-supplied request header rather than from the target component's configuration, and its Bitbucket provider accepted requests without a valid signature. A caller could set the `X-Event-Key` header to be treated as a Bitbucket webhook, bypassing the HMAC secret that otherwise protects GitHub and GitLab webhooks, and trigger a component build without authenticating.\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker who can reach the autobuild webhook endpoint and knows the repository URL and branch configured for an auto-build component can trigger a build for that component without authenticating — including components configured for GitHub or GitLab, since the provider used or verification is chosen by the caller rather than by the component's configuration. The\ntriggered build runs against a commit SHA supplied by the attacker, and the component lookup is not scoped to a tenant or namespace, so any auto-build component across the cluster matching the given repository and branch is affected. This can result in unauthorized builds — and, where aut","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.0.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6ef73308c1f3ab529806e9f5d703e2a0"],"technology":"github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\nThe OpenChoreo autobuild webhook endpoint (`POST /api/v1alpha1/autobuild`) selected the git provider used to authenticate an incoming webhook from a client-supplied request header rather than from the target component's configuration, and its Bitbucket provider accepted requests without a valid signature. A caller could set the `X-Event-Key` header to be treated as a Bitbucket webhook, bypassing the HMAC secret that otherwise protects GitHub and GitLab webhooks, and trigger a component build without authenticating.\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker who can reach the autobuild webhook endpoint and knows the repository URL and branch configured for an auto-build component can trigger a build for that component without authenticating — including components configured for GitHub or GitLab, since the provider used or verification is chosen by the caller rather than by the component's configuration. The\ntriggered build runs against a commit SHA supplied by the attacker, and the component lookup is not scoped to a tenant or namespace, so any auto-build component across the cluster matching the given repository and branch is affected. This can result in unauthorized builds — and, where aut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.1.0, < 1.1.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6ef73308c1f3ab529806e9f5d703e2a0"],"technology":"github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\nThe OpenChoreo autobuild webhook endpoint (`POST /api/v1alpha1/autobuild`) selected the git provider used to authenticate an incoming webhook from a client-supplied request header rather than from the target component's configuration, and its Bitbucket provider accepted requests without a valid signature. A caller could set the `X-Event-Key` header to be treated as a Bitbucket webhook, bypassing the HMAC secret that otherwise protects GitHub and GitLab webhooks, and trigger a component build without authenticating.\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker who can reach the autobuild webhook endpoint and knows the repository URL and branch configured for an auto-build component can trigger a build for that component without authenticating — including components configured for GitHub or GitLab, since the provider used or verification is chosen by the caller rather than by the component's configuration. The\ntriggered build runs against a commit SHA supplied by the attacker, and the component lookup is not scoped to a tenant or namespace, so any auto-build component across the cluster matching the given repository and branch is affected. This can result in unauthorized builds — and, where aut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.2.0-rc.1, < 1.2.0-rc.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:44.045Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-02T23:45:15.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-02T23:45:14.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:29.477Z"},{"id":"NVI-00016414","kind":"vulnerability","title":"OpenChoreo: Unauthenticated build/workflow trigger via git-provider confusion (webhook signature bypass)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-c5f6-2rm9-2w8g","CVE-2026-73840"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo, github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo, github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-6ef73308c1f3ab529806e9f5d703e2a0"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-02T23:45:15.000Z","value":"5.3 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-6ef73308c1f3ab529806e9f5d703e2a0"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-6ef73308c1f3ab529806e9f5d703e2a0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c5f6-2rm9-2w8g","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-c5f6-2rm9-2w8g","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:29.477Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6ef73308c1f3ab529806e9f5d703e2a0"],"technology":"github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\nThe OpenChoreo autobuild webhook endpoint (`POST /api/v1alpha1/autobuild`) selected the git provider used to authenticate an incoming webhook from a client-supplied request header rather than from the target component's configuration, and its Bitbucket provider accepted requests without a valid signature. A caller could set the `X-Event-Key` header to be treated as a Bitbucket webhook, bypassing the HMAC secret that otherwise protects GitHub and GitLab webhooks, and trigger a component build without authenticating.\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker who can reach the autobuild webhook endpoint and knows the repository URL and branch configured for an auto-build component can trigger a build for that component without authenticating — including components configured for GitHub or GitLab, since the provider used or verification is chosen by the caller rather than by the component's configuration. The\ntriggered build runs against a commit SHA supplied by the attacker, and the component lookup is not scoped to a tenant or namespace, so any auto-build component across the cluster matching the given repository and branch is affected. This can result in unauthorized builds — and, where aut","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.0.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6ef73308c1f3ab529806e9f5d703e2a0"],"technology":"github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\nThe OpenChoreo autobuild webhook endpoint (`POST /api/v1alpha1/autobuild`) selected the git provider used to authenticate an incoming webhook from a client-supplied request header rather than from the target component's configuration, and its Bitbucket provider accepted requests without a valid signature. A caller could set the `X-Event-Key` header to be treated as a Bitbucket webhook, bypassing the HMAC secret that otherwise protects GitHub and GitLab webhooks, and trigger a component build without authenticating.\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker who can reach the autobuild webhook endpoint and knows the repository URL and branch configured for an auto-build component can trigger a build for that component without authenticating — including components configured for GitHub or GitLab, since the provider used or verification is chosen by the caller rather than by the component's configuration. The\ntriggered build runs against a commit SHA supplied by the attacker, and the component lookup is not scoped to a tenant or namespace, so any auto-build component across the cluster matching the given repository and branch is affected. This can result in unauthorized builds — and, where aut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.1.0, < 1.1.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6ef73308c1f3ab529806e9f5d703e2a0"],"technology":"github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\nThe OpenChoreo autobuild webhook endpoint (`POST /api/v1alpha1/autobuild`) selected the git provider used to authenticate an incoming webhook from a client-supplied request header rather than from the target component's configuration, and its Bitbucket provider accepted requests without a valid signature. A caller could set the `X-Event-Key` header to be treated as a Bitbucket webhook, bypassing the HMAC secret that otherwise protects GitHub and GitLab webhooks, and trigger a component build without authenticating.\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker who can reach the autobuild webhook endpoint and knows the repository URL and branch configured for an auto-build component can trigger a build for that component without authenticating — including components configured for GitHub or GitLab, since the provider used or verification is chosen by the caller rather than by the component's configuration. The\ntriggered build runs against a commit SHA supplied by the attacker, and the component lookup is not scoped to a tenant or namespace, so any auto-build component across the cluster matching the given repository and branch is affected. This can result in unauthorized builds — and, where aut","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.2.0-rc.1, < 1.2.0-rc.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:27.942Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-02T23:45:15.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-02T23:45:14.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:29.477Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}