{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00016419","kind":"vulnerability","title":"n8n: Account Takeover via Unverified Email Claim in Token Exchange Embed Login","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8342-988q-86cr"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for n8n, n8n. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-6f36803bfad937a15b66e307b7a17e99"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-6f36803bfad937a15b66e307b7a17e99","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8342-988q-86cr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-8342-988q-86cr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:42:43.803Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f36803bfad937a15b66e307b7a17e99"],"technology":"n8n","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\nIn an n8n instance, when a validly-signed incoming token was matched to a local account by its email claim, the service did not check that the trusted key's permitted role ceiling covered that account, nor that the email claim was verified. As a result, anyone able to obtain a token accepted by one of the configured trusted keys, for example a trusted issuer that emitted unverified email addresses, could authenticate as any existing user, gaining full account control.\n\nThis issue only affects instances where the embed login feature is enabled and at least one trusted key source is configured.\n\n## Patches\n\nThe issue has been fixed in n8n version 2.32.1. Users should upgrade to this version or later to remediate the vulnerability.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:\n- Disable the embed login feature by setting `N8N_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_ENABLED=false`.\n- If embed login cannot be disabled, restrict network access to the n8n instance to fully trusted parties only, and audit all configured trusted keys and their `allowedRoles` assignments.\n- Review `auth_identity` records for unexpected `token","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.32.0, < 2.32.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f36803bfad937a15b66e307b7a17e99"],"technology":"n8n","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\nIn an n8n instance, when a validly-signed incoming token was matched to a local account by its email claim, the service did not check that the trusted key's permitted role ceiling covered that account, nor that the email claim was verified. As a result, anyone able to obtain a token accepted by one of the configured trusted keys, for example a trusted issuer that emitted unverified email addresses, could authenticate as any existing user, gaining full account control.\n\nThis issue only affects instances where the embed login feature is enabled and at least one trusted key source is configured.\n\n## Patches\n\nThe issue has been fixed in n8n version 2.32.1. Users should upgrade to this version or later to remediate the vulnerability.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:\n- Disable the embed login feature by setting `N8N_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_ENABLED=false`.\n- If embed login cannot be disabled, restrict network access to the n8n instance to fully trusted parties only, and audit all configured trusted keys and their `allowedRoles` assignments.\n- Review `auth_identity` records for unexpected `token","public_affected_ranges":["< 2.31.5"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:27.942Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:04:56.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-22T22:04:54.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:42:43.803Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}