{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00017477","kind":"vulnerability","title":"pnpm Has an Integrity Check Bypass via Missing Lockfile Integrity Field","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-q6j5-fjx5-2mc3","CVE-2026-50021"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for pnpm, pnpm. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-079d83e7322e2fd41f64a18647061921"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-26T22:53:03.000Z","value":"6.8 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-079d83e7322e2fd41f64a18647061921"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-079d83e7322e2fd41f64a18647061921","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q6j5-fjx5-2mc3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-q6j5-fjx5-2mc3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-05T19:05:04.022Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-079d83e7322e2fd41f64a18647061921"],"technology":"pnpm","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\npnpm's tarball extraction worker skips integrity verification when the `integrity` field is absent from the lockfile resolution. If an attacker can both modify `pnpm-lock.yaml` to remove the `integrity:` field and cause the referenced registry URL to serve altered package content, `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` can install the altered package without an integrity error. npm's `npm ci` enforces integrity by default; pnpm's behavior of silently skipping verification is a pnpm-specific fail-open gap.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\nThe `addTarballToStore` function in `worker/src/start.ts` (lines 189-204) checks `if (integrity)` before verifying the tarball hash. The `TarballResolution` type declares `integrity` as optional (`integrity?: string`). When the lockfile omits the `integrity` field, the guard evaluates to `false`, skipping hash verification entirely. The worker then computes a new hash from the unverified content and stores it as legitimate.\n\n```typescript\n// worker/src/start.ts:189-204\nfunction addTarballToStore ({ buffer, storeDir, integrity, ... }: TarballExtractMessage) {\n  if (integrity) {           // false when integrity is undefined\n    const { algorithm, he","public_affected_ranges":[">= 11.0.0, < 11.4.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-079d83e7322e2fd41f64a18647061921"],"technology":"pnpm","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\npnpm's tarball extraction worker skips integrity verification when the `integrity` field is absent from the lockfile resolution. If an attacker can both modify `pnpm-lock.yaml` to remove the `integrity:` field and cause the referenced registry URL to serve altered package content, `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` can install the altered package without an integrity error. npm's `npm ci` enforces integrity by default; pnpm's behavior of silently skipping verification is a pnpm-specific fail-open gap.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\nThe `addTarballToStore` function in `worker/src/start.ts` (lines 189-204) checks `if (integrity)` before verifying the tarball hash. The `TarballResolution` type declares `integrity` as optional (`integrity?: string`). When the lockfile omits the `integrity` field, the guard evaluates to `false`, skipping hash verification entirely. The worker then computes a new hash from the unverified content and stores it as legitimate.\n\n```typescript\n// worker/src/start.ts:189-204\nfunction addTarballToStore ({ buffer, storeDir, integrity, ... }: TarballExtractMessage) {\n  if (integrity) {           // false when integrity is undefined\n    const { algorithm, he","public_affected_ranges":["< 10.34.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-05T19:10:21.394Z","source_updated_at":"2026-06-26T22:53:03.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-26T22:53:01.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-05T19:05:04.022Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}