{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00017479","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Zebra: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w","CVE-2026-52738"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for zebra-state, zebrad. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-07f76a8b01760c5fcfa54a87e0f57a01"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-07f76a8b01760c5fcfa54a87e0f57a01","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-05T03:47:11.081Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-07f76a8b01760c5fcfa54a87e0f57a01"],"technology":"zebra-state","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Am I affected\n\nYou are affected if:\n\n1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.\n2. Your node processes blocks on any Zcash network.\n\n### Summary\n\nThe finalized transparent address balance writer processes all newly-created outputs (credits) before processing spent outputs (debits) within the same block. A consensus-valid block containing a long chain of same-address transparent self-spends can cause the intermediate per-address balance during the credit pass to exceed `MAX_MONEY`, triggering a panic in the finalized state writer.\n\nBecause the triggering block is consensus-valid (zcashd accepts it), the panic recurs on restart when the node re-encounters the same block. This creates a persistent chain halt that can only be resolved by a software patch.\n\n### Details\n\nThe finalized state writer at `zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs` iterates all transaction outputs in a block and credits them to per-address balances before iterating inputs and debiting spent outputs. When a block contains many transparent self-spends to the same address, the intermediate credit-only balance can exceed the `MAX_MONEY` supply cap even though the final net balance","public_affected_ranges":["<= 6.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-07f76a8b01760c5fcfa54a87e0f57a01"],"technology":"zebrad","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Am I affected\n\nYou are affected if:\n\n1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.\n2. Your node processes blocks on any Zcash network.\n\n### Summary\n\nThe finalized transparent address balance writer processes all newly-created outputs (credits) before processing spent outputs (debits) within the same block. A consensus-valid block containing a long chain of same-address transparent self-spends can cause the intermediate per-address balance during the credit pass to exceed `MAX_MONEY`, triggering a panic in the finalized state writer.\n\nBecause the triggering block is consensus-valid (zcashd accepts it), the panic recurs on restart when the node re-encounters the same block. This creates a persistent chain halt that can only be resolved by a software patch.\n\n### Details\n\nThe finalized state writer at `zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs` iterates all transaction outputs in a block and credits them to per-address balances before iterating inputs and debiting spent outputs. When a block contains many transparent self-spends to the same address, the intermediate credit-only balance can exceed the `MAX_MONEY` supply cap even though the final net balance","public_affected_ranges":["<= 4.4.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-05T19:10:21.394Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-02T19:44:57.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-02T19:44:54.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-05T03:47:11.081Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}