{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00017519","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Coder vulnerable to SSH config injection via unsanitized server-supplied values in `coder config-ssh`","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-mcqq-fqgf-rxwm","CVE-2026-55427"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/coder/coder/v2, github.com/coder/coder/v2, github.com/coder/coder/v2, github.com/coder/coder/v2. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-123d7f81de1da811ea482cdc3e998350"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-06T20:53:56.000Z","value":"8.3 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-123d7f81de1da811ea482cdc3e998350"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-123d7f81de1da811ea482cdc3e998350","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mcqq-fqgf-rxwm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-mcqq-fqgf-rxwm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:36:01.427Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-123d7f81de1da811ea482cdc3e998350"],"technology":"github.com/coder/coder/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`coder config-ssh` wrote server-supplied SSH settings (`HostnameSuffix`, `SSHConfigOptions`) into the user's `~/.ssh/config` without sanitizing embedded newlines or restricting directives so a malicious or compromised Coder server could inject arbitrary SSH configuration.\n\n> **Note:** Practical exploitation requires control of the server-supplied values through a malicious or compromised deployment, a man-in-the-middle position or admin access to the `HostnameSuffix` and `SSHConfigOptions` settings.\n\n### Impact\n\nA server administrator or an attacker who controlled the server, could inject a directive such as `ProxyCommand` and achieve arbitrary code execution on any developer workstation that ran `coder config-ssh`. Injected commands ran with the local user's privileges and applied to all SSH connections, not just Coder workspaces.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix validates `HostnameSuffix` and `SSHConfigOptions` against a strict character set that rejects newlines and other control characters.\n\nThe fix was backported to all supported release lines:\n\n| Release line | Patched version |\n|---|---|\n| 2.34 | v2.34.2 |\n| 2.33 | [v2","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.34.0, < 2.34.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-123d7f81de1da811ea482cdc3e998350"],"technology":"github.com/coder/coder/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`coder config-ssh` wrote server-supplied SSH settings (`HostnameSuffix`, `SSHConfigOptions`) into the user's `~/.ssh/config` without sanitizing embedded newlines or restricting directives so a malicious or compromised Coder server could inject arbitrary SSH configuration.\n\n> **Note:** Practical exploitation requires control of the server-supplied values through a malicious or compromised deployment, a man-in-the-middle position or admin access to the `HostnameSuffix` and `SSHConfigOptions` settings.\n\n### Impact\n\nA server administrator or an attacker who controlled the server, could inject a directive such as `ProxyCommand` and achieve arbitrary code execution on any developer workstation that ran `coder config-ssh`. Injected commands ran with the local user's privileges and applied to all SSH connections, not just Coder workspaces.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix validates `HostnameSuffix` and `SSHConfigOptions` against a strict character set that rejects newlines and other control characters.\n\nThe fix was backported to all supported release lines:\n\n| Release line | Patched version |\n|---|---|\n| 2.34 | v2.34.2 |\n| 2.33 | [v2","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.33.0, < 2.33.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-123d7f81de1da811ea482cdc3e998350"],"technology":"github.com/coder/coder/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`coder config-ssh` wrote server-supplied SSH settings (`HostnameSuffix`, `SSHConfigOptions`) into the user's `~/.ssh/config` without sanitizing embedded newlines or restricting directives so a malicious or compromised Coder server could inject arbitrary SSH configuration.\n\n> **Note:** Practical exploitation requires control of the server-supplied values through a malicious or compromised deployment, a man-in-the-middle position or admin access to the `HostnameSuffix` and `SSHConfigOptions` settings.\n\n### Impact\n\nA server administrator or an attacker who controlled the server, could inject a directive such as `ProxyCommand` and achieve arbitrary code execution on any developer workstation that ran `coder config-ssh`. Injected commands ran with the local user's privileges and applied to all SSH connections, not just Coder workspaces.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix validates `HostnameSuffix` and `SSHConfigOptions` against a strict character set that rejects newlines and other control characters.\n\nThe fix was backported to all supported release lines:\n\n| Release line | Patched version |\n|---|---|\n| 2.34 | v2.34.2 |\n| 2.33 | [v2","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.30.0, < 2.32.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-123d7f81de1da811ea482cdc3e998350"],"technology":"github.com/coder/coder/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`coder config-ssh` wrote server-supplied SSH settings (`HostnameSuffix`, `SSHConfigOptions`) into the user's `~/.ssh/config` without sanitizing embedded newlines or restricting directives so a malicious or compromised Coder server could inject arbitrary SSH configuration.\n\n> **Note:** Practical exploitation requires control of the server-supplied values through a malicious or compromised deployment, a man-in-the-middle position or admin access to the `HostnameSuffix` and `SSHConfigOptions` settings.\n\n### Impact\n\nA server administrator or an attacker who controlled the server, could inject a directive such as `ProxyCommand` and achieve arbitrary code execution on any developer workstation that ran `coder config-ssh`. Injected commands ran with the local user's privileges and applied to all SSH connections, not just Coder workspaces.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix validates `HostnameSuffix` and `SSHConfigOptions` against a strict character set that rejects newlines and other control characters.\n\nThe fix was backported to all supported release lines:\n\n| Release line | Patched version |\n|---|---|\n| 2.34 | v2.34.2 |\n| 2.33 | [v2","public_affected_ranges":["< 2.29.17"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-05T19:10:21.403Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-06T20:53:56.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-06T20:53:54.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:36:01.427Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}