{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00017536","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Budibase: SSRF via OAuth2 token endpoint URL reaches internal hosts and cloud metadata","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-4q6h-8p4v-67vq","CVE-2026-48153"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @budibase/server. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-1631e5051a4f93e5ee9d85416ac78355"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-22T22:45:36.000Z","value":"8.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-1631e5051a4f93e5ee9d85416ac78355"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1631e5051a4f93e5ee9d85416ac78355","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4q6h-8p4v-67vq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-4q6h-8p4v-67vq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-05T19:06:16.668Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1631e5051a4f93e5ee9d85416ac78355"],"technology":"@budibase/server","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`fetchToken` in the OAuth2 SDK makes a POST to a builder-supplied URL with plain node-fetch, skipping the `blacklist.isBlacklisted` check that every other outbound fetch path in the codebase uses. The Joi schema for the OAuth2 URL has no scheme or host restriction. Alice, a builder, points an OAuth2 config at `http://169.254.169.254/...` or `http://127.0.0.1:5984/`; the server connects and returns response-body fragments in the validation result.\n\n## Details\n\n`packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/oauth2/utils.ts:17-65` defines `fetchToken`. Near the end:\n\n```typescript\nconst resp = await fetch(config.url, fetchConfig)\n```\n\n`config.url` is whatever the builder stored. `fetchConfig` has `redirect: \"follow\"` (the default), so a public URL that returns 302 to an internal target is also reachable.\n\nThe route validation at `packages/server/src/api/routes/oauth2.ts:9` accepts any string:\n\n```typescript\nurl: Joi.string().required(),\n```\n\nThe controller passes the URL into `fetchToken` through `crud.ts`. The `/api/oauth2/validate` endpoint (builder role) is the most direct attack path: it lives on `builderRoutes`, takes the URL from the body, fires the fetch, and returns a validati","public_affected_ranges":["< 3.39.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-05T19:10:21.407Z","source_updated_at":"2026-06-22T22:45:36.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-22T22:45:35.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-05T19:06:16.668Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}