{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00017594","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Coder's workspace agent API insecure redirect handling allowed cross-agent file read and write","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-qrwj-vh9x-gw5v"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/coder/coder/v2, github.com/coder/coder/v2, github.com/coder/coder/v2, github.com/coder/coder/v2. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-287090ff66846f8d25ae6accdd9bc7ed"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-06T21:52:32.000Z","value":"8.3 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-287090ff66846f8d25ae6accdd9bc7ed"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-287090ff66846f8d25ae6accdd9bc7ed","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qrwj-vh9x-gw5v","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-qrwj-vh9x-gw5v","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:36:01.427Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-287090ff66846f8d25ae6accdd9bc7ed"],"technology":"github.com/coder/coder/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`agentConn.apiClient()` used the default redirect behavior of `http.Client` while its custom transport dialed the host from the request URL as long as the port was the workspace agent HTTP API port (`4`). Agent tailnet IPs are deterministic from agent UUIDs, so a malicious workspace agent could return a redirect to another agent's tailnet IP and cause the control-plane client to send the follow-up workspace agent API request to the victim agent instead of the intended agent.\n\nRedirects that preserve the method and body, such as HTTP 307 and 308, allow replay of write and process-start requests. HTTP 301, 302 and 303 redirects only convert POST requests to GET requests, so they are sufficient to demonstrate redirected reads but not write or command-execution primitives.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with a running workspace and control of a modified workspace agent can redirect workspace agent API requests made to their agent toward another online workspace agent reachable on the tailnet. If the attacker knows the victim agent UUID, they can derive the victim's tailnet IP and target the victim's file APIs to read or write files as the victim workspace user.\n\nIn aff","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.34.0, < 2.34.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-287090ff66846f8d25ae6accdd9bc7ed"],"technology":"github.com/coder/coder/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`agentConn.apiClient()` used the default redirect behavior of `http.Client` while its custom transport dialed the host from the request URL as long as the port was the workspace agent HTTP API port (`4`). Agent tailnet IPs are deterministic from agent UUIDs, so a malicious workspace agent could return a redirect to another agent's tailnet IP and cause the control-plane client to send the follow-up workspace agent API request to the victim agent instead of the intended agent.\n\nRedirects that preserve the method and body, such as HTTP 307 and 308, allow replay of write and process-start requests. HTTP 301, 302 and 303 redirects only convert POST requests to GET requests, so they are sufficient to demonstrate redirected reads but not write or command-execution primitives.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with a running workspace and control of a modified workspace agent can redirect workspace agent API requests made to their agent toward another online workspace agent reachable on the tailnet. If the attacker knows the victim agent UUID, they can derive the victim's tailnet IP and target the victim's file APIs to read or write files as the victim workspace user.\n\nIn aff","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.33.0, < 2.33.10"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-287090ff66846f8d25ae6accdd9bc7ed"],"technology":"github.com/coder/coder/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`agentConn.apiClient()` used the default redirect behavior of `http.Client` while its custom transport dialed the host from the request URL as long as the port was the workspace agent HTTP API port (`4`). Agent tailnet IPs are deterministic from agent UUIDs, so a malicious workspace agent could return a redirect to another agent's tailnet IP and cause the control-plane client to send the follow-up workspace agent API request to the victim agent instead of the intended agent.\n\nRedirects that preserve the method and body, such as HTTP 307 and 308, allow replay of write and process-start requests. HTTP 301, 302 and 303 redirects only convert POST requests to GET requests, so they are sufficient to demonstrate redirected reads but not write or command-execution primitives.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with a running workspace and control of a modified workspace agent can redirect workspace agent API requests made to their agent toward another online workspace agent reachable on the tailnet. If the attacker knows the victim agent UUID, they can derive the victim's tailnet IP and target the victim's file APIs to read or write files as the victim workspace user.\n\nIn aff","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.30.0, < 2.32.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-287090ff66846f8d25ae6accdd9bc7ed"],"technology":"github.com/coder/coder/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`agentConn.apiClient()` used the default redirect behavior of `http.Client` while its custom transport dialed the host from the request URL as long as the port was the workspace agent HTTP API port (`4`). Agent tailnet IPs are deterministic from agent UUIDs, so a malicious workspace agent could return a redirect to another agent's tailnet IP and cause the control-plane client to send the follow-up workspace agent API request to the victim agent instead of the intended agent.\n\nRedirects that preserve the method and body, such as HTTP 307 and 308, allow replay of write and process-start requests. HTTP 301, 302 and 303 redirects only convert POST requests to GET requests, so they are sufficient to demonstrate redirected reads but not write or command-execution primitives.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with a running workspace and control of a modified workspace agent can redirect workspace agent API requests made to their agent toward another online workspace agent reachable on the tailnet. If the attacker knows the victim agent UUID, they can derive the victim's tailnet IP and target the victim's file APIs to read or write files as the victim workspace user.\n\nIn aff","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.27.0, < 2.29.19"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-05T19:10:21.424Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-06T21:52:32.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-06T21:52:31.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:36:01.427Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}