{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00017675","kind":"vulnerability","title":"gitoxide: CommandForbiddenInModulesConfiguration Bypass in gix_submodule::File::update() Enables Arbitrary Command Execution via .gitmodules","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-f26g-jm89-4g65","CVE-2026-40034"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for gix. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-41cd10ae21c090da86c6fa6d15639bc4"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-30T17:41:04.000Z","value":"7.8 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-41cd10ae21c090da86c6fa6d15639bc4"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-41cd10ae21c090da86c6fa6d15639bc4","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f26g-jm89-4g65","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-f26g-jm89-4g65","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-05T11:39:31.286Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-41cd10ae21c090da86c6fa6d15639bc4"],"technology":"gix","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`gix_submodule::File::update()` is the API that gates whether an attacker-supplied `.gitmodules` file may set `update = !`. The function is designed to return `Err(CommandForbiddenInModulesConfiguration)` unless the `!command` value came from a trusted local source (`.git/config`). Git CVE CVE-2019-19604 illustrates why this check is necessary.\n\nHowever, the guard is implemented incorrectly: it checks whether any section with the same submodule name exists from a non-`.gitmodules` source; it does not verify that the `update` value came from that section.\n\nOnce a submodule has been initialized (any workflow that writes `submodule..url` to `.git/config`), and the attacker subsequently adds `update = !cmd` to `.gitmodules`, the guard passes while the command value falls through to the attacker-controlled file.\n\nOn an identical repository state, `git submodule update` aborts with `fatal: invalid value for 'submodule.sub.update'`, while `gix::Submodule::update()` returns `Ok(Some(Update::Command(\"touch /tmp/pwned\")))`","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.31.0, < 0.83.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-05T19:10:21.449Z","source_updated_at":"2026-06-30T17:41:04.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-05T19:23:45.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-05T11:39:31.286Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}