{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00017704","kind":"vulnerability","title":"OpenRun: Redirect URL validation bypass using  //host  paths leads to Open Redirect","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-h5g6-xmh4-hc37","CVE-2026-55252"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/openrundev/openrun. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-4c2732e0bc1baf19ab7efd3dfe380311"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4c2732e0bc1baf19ab7efd3dfe380311","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h5g6-xmh4-hc37","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-h5g6-xmh4-hc37","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:34:40.400Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4c2732e0bc1baf19ab7efd3dfe380311"],"technology":"github.com/openrundev/openrun","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nThe restrictions on redirect URLs in `openrun` can be bypassed by attackers, leading to open redirect attacks.\n\n### Details\n\nIn the current project, the referrer header value is used for subsequent redirects, so there is currently a validation for this redirect value. The current validation logic requires that the host and schema of the redirect URL be the same as the current website's URL, and finally, the path part is used for redirection. This check seems robust, but it can still be bypassed by attackers.\n\n\n\nHere's the problem: Assuming the current website is `http://127.0.0.1:25222/`, if the attacker passes in a redirect URL of `http://127.0.0.1:25222//fushuling.com`, its host and schema are obviously the same as the current website, thus bypassing the verification. However, the issue lies in the final redirect URL, which is the path part of the URL, i.e., `//fushuling.com`. \n\nBrowsers automatically complete the HTTP header for URLs starting with `//`, ultimately successfully bypassing the restriction and redirecting to ","public_affected_ranges":["< 0.17.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-05T19:10:21.454Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-09T23:19:40.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-09T23:19:39.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:34:40.400Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}