{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00017705","kind":"vulnerability","title":"MessagePack-CSharp: Unity unsafe blit formatter allocates from unbounded byte length","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-w567-gjr2-hm5j","CVE-2026-48514"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for MessagePack, MessagePack. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-4c2785731c145751e3034309f1c2ca00"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4c2785731c145751e3034309f1c2ca00","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w567-gjr2-hm5j","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-w567-gjr2-hm5j","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-05T19:05:53.922Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4c2785731c145751e3034309f1c2ca00"],"technology":"MessagePack","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`UnsafeBlitFormatterBase.Deserialize` reads an attacker-controlled `byteLength` from an extension payload and allocates an array based on that value before validating it against the extension header length or remaining payload bytes.\n\nThe outer extension header is bounded by available input, but that bound is not used to constrain the inner `byteLength` before allocation. A very small payload can therefore request a very large `T[]` allocation.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications are affected when they deserialize untrusted payloads using Unity blit resolvers such as `UnityBlitResolver` or `UnityBlitWithPrimitiveArrayResolver`.\n\nThis is especially relevant to Unity multiplayer clients or servers that use MessagePack-CSharp for networked values such as vectors, matrices, or primitive arrays. A hostile peer can send an extension payload with a large declared byte length and cause an out-of-memory exception or process termination on memory-constrained platforms.\n\nThe resolver is opt-in, but the vulnerable value is pure wire input and the allocation happens before the formatter verifies that the declared bytes are actually present in the extension body.\n\n## Affected components\n\n- P","public_affected_ranges":["< 2.5.301"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4c2785731c145751e3034309f1c2ca00"],"technology":"MessagePack","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`UnsafeBlitFormatterBase.Deserialize` reads an attacker-controlled `byteLength` from an extension payload and allocates an array based on that value before validating it against the extension header length or remaining payload bytes.\n\nThe outer extension header is bounded by available input, but that bound is not used to constrain the inner `byteLength` before allocation. A very small payload can therefore request a very large `T[]` allocation.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications are affected when they deserialize untrusted payloads using Unity blit resolvers such as `UnityBlitResolver` or `UnityBlitWithPrimitiveArrayResolver`.\n\nThis is especially relevant to Unity multiplayer clients or servers that use MessagePack-CSharp for networked values such as vectors, matrices, or primitive arrays. A hostile peer can send an extension payload with a large declared byte length and cause an out-of-memory exception or process termination on memory-constrained platforms.\n\nThe resolver is opt-in, but the vulnerable value is pure wire input and the allocation happens before the formatter verifies that the declared bytes are actually present in the extension body.\n\n## Affected components\n\n- P","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.0, < 3.1.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-05T19:10:21.454Z","source_updated_at":"2026-06-25T21:25:22.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-25T21:25:21.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-05T19:05:53.922Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}