{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00017736","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Coder vulnerable to stored HTML injection via workspace agent logs in AgentLogLine component","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-7qw2-f75v-62f7","CVE-2026-55437"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/coder/coder/v2, github.com/coder/coder/v2, github.com/coder/coder/v2, github.com/coder/coder/v2. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0794a7c690c5b90d25b13ec5ff459231"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-06T21:12:58.000Z","value":"5.4 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-534f818929a10b0e7ff2a17d551baeb5"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-05T12:03:04.000Z","value":"0.316%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.24662. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0794a7c690c5b90d25b13ec5ff459231"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-534f818929a10b0e7ff2a17d551baeb5","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7qw2-f75v-62f7","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-7qw2-f75v-62f7","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:36:01.427Z"},{"id":"sr-0794a7c690c5b90d25b13ec5ff459231","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-55437","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-06T07:17:46.386Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-534f818929a10b0e7ff2a17d551baeb5"],"technology":"github.com/coder/coder/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe `AgentLogLine` dashboard component instantiated `ansi-to-html` without `escapeXML: true` and inserted the result via `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` so HTML embedded in workspace agent log lines was rendered as live markup. Server-side sanitization did not neutralize HTML metacharacters.\n\n> **Note:** Exploitation requires a victim to view attacker-controlled agent logs in the dashboard.\n\n### Impact\n\nA user who could run a workspace could emit arbitrary HTML into agent logs; when another user, including an administrator, viewed the workspace page, it rendered in their session. Content Security Policy blocked inline scripts but an attacker could still inject a `meta refresh` redirect, `style` rules for UI redressing or CSS-based exfiltration or external `img` beacons. This required workspace-owner access and a victim viewing the page.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix enables `escapeXML: true` so HTML metacharacters are escaped before DOM insertion.\n\nThe fix was backported to all supported release lines:\n\n| Release line | Patched version |\n|---|---|\n| 2.34 | v2.34.2 |\n| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.34.0, < 2.34.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-534f818929a10b0e7ff2a17d551baeb5"],"technology":"github.com/coder/coder/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe `AgentLogLine` dashboard component instantiated `ansi-to-html` without `escapeXML: true` and inserted the result via `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` so HTML embedded in workspace agent log lines was rendered as live markup. Server-side sanitization did not neutralize HTML metacharacters.\n\n> **Note:** Exploitation requires a victim to view attacker-controlled agent logs in the dashboard.\n\n### Impact\n\nA user who could run a workspace could emit arbitrary HTML into agent logs; when another user, including an administrator, viewed the workspace page, it rendered in their session. Content Security Policy blocked inline scripts but an attacker could still inject a `meta refresh` redirect, `style` rules for UI redressing or CSS-based exfiltration or external `img` beacons. This required workspace-owner access and a victim viewing the page.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix enables `escapeXML: true` so HTML metacharacters are escaped before DOM insertion.\n\nThe fix was backported to all supported release lines:\n\n| Release line | Patched version |\n|---|---|\n| 2.34 | v2.34.2 |\n| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.33.0, < 2.33.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-534f818929a10b0e7ff2a17d551baeb5"],"technology":"github.com/coder/coder/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe `AgentLogLine` dashboard component instantiated `ansi-to-html` without `escapeXML: true` and inserted the result via `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` so HTML embedded in workspace agent log lines was rendered as live markup. Server-side sanitization did not neutralize HTML metacharacters.\n\n> **Note:** Exploitation requires a victim to view attacker-controlled agent logs in the dashboard.\n\n### Impact\n\nA user who could run a workspace could emit arbitrary HTML into agent logs; when another user, including an administrator, viewed the workspace page, it rendered in their session. Content Security Policy blocked inline scripts but an attacker could still inject a `meta refresh` redirect, `style` rules for UI redressing or CSS-based exfiltration or external `img` beacons. This required workspace-owner access and a victim viewing the page.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix enables `escapeXML: true` so HTML metacharacters are escaped before DOM insertion.\n\nThe fix was backported to all supported release lines:\n\n| Release line | Patched version |\n|---|---|\n| 2.34 | v2.34.2 |\n| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.30.0, < 2.32.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-534f818929a10b0e7ff2a17d551baeb5"],"technology":"github.com/coder/coder/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe `AgentLogLine` dashboard component instantiated `ansi-to-html` without `escapeXML: true` and inserted the result via `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` so HTML embedded in workspace agent log lines was rendered as live markup. Server-side sanitization did not neutralize HTML metacharacters.\n\n> **Note:** Exploitation requires a victim to view attacker-controlled agent logs in the dashboard.\n\n### Impact\n\nA user who could run a workspace could emit arbitrary HTML into agent logs; when another user, including an administrator, viewed the workspace page, it rendered in their session. Content Security Policy blocked inline scripts but an attacker could still inject a `meta refresh` redirect, `style` rules for UI redressing or CSS-based exfiltration or external `img` beacons. This required workspace-owner access and a victim viewing the page.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix enables `escapeXML: true` so HTML metacharacters are escaped before DOM insertion.\n\nThe fix was backported to all supported release lines:\n\n| Release line | Patched version |\n|---|---|\n| 2.34 | v2.34.2 |\n| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/","public_affected_ranges":["< 2.29.17"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T15:11:49.406Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-06T21:12:58.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-06T21:12:56.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:36:01.427Z"},{"id":"NVI-00017736","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Coder vulnerable to stored HTML injection via workspace agent logs in AgentLogLine component","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-7qw2-f75v-62f7","CVE-2026-55437"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/coder/coder/v2, github.com/coder/coder/v2, github.com/coder/coder/v2, github.com/coder/coder/v2. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-534f818929a10b0e7ff2a17d551baeb5"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-06T21:12:58.000Z","value":"5.4 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-534f818929a10b0e7ff2a17d551baeb5"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-534f818929a10b0e7ff2a17d551baeb5","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7qw2-f75v-62f7","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-7qw2-f75v-62f7","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:36:01.427Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-534f818929a10b0e7ff2a17d551baeb5"],"technology":"github.com/coder/coder/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe `AgentLogLine` dashboard component instantiated `ansi-to-html` without `escapeXML: true` and inserted the result via `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` so HTML embedded in workspace agent log lines was rendered as live markup. Server-side sanitization did not neutralize HTML metacharacters.\n\n> **Note:** Exploitation requires a victim to view attacker-controlled agent logs in the dashboard.\n\n### Impact\n\nA user who could run a workspace could emit arbitrary HTML into agent logs; when another user, including an administrator, viewed the workspace page, it rendered in their session. Content Security Policy blocked inline scripts but an attacker could still inject a `meta refresh` redirect, `style` rules for UI redressing or CSS-based exfiltration or external `img` beacons. This required workspace-owner access and a victim viewing the page.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix enables `escapeXML: true` so HTML metacharacters are escaped before DOM insertion.\n\nThe fix was backported to all supported release lines:\n\n| Release line | Patched version |\n|---|---|\n| 2.34 | v2.34.2 |\n| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.34.0, < 2.34.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-534f818929a10b0e7ff2a17d551baeb5"],"technology":"github.com/coder/coder/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe `AgentLogLine` dashboard component instantiated `ansi-to-html` without `escapeXML: true` and inserted the result via `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` so HTML embedded in workspace agent log lines was rendered as live markup. Server-side sanitization did not neutralize HTML metacharacters.\n\n> **Note:** Exploitation requires a victim to view attacker-controlled agent logs in the dashboard.\n\n### Impact\n\nA user who could run a workspace could emit arbitrary HTML into agent logs; when another user, including an administrator, viewed the workspace page, it rendered in their session. Content Security Policy blocked inline scripts but an attacker could still inject a `meta refresh` redirect, `style` rules for UI redressing or CSS-based exfiltration or external `img` beacons. This required workspace-owner access and a victim viewing the page.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix enables `escapeXML: true` so HTML metacharacters are escaped before DOM insertion.\n\nThe fix was backported to all supported release lines:\n\n| Release line | Patched version |\n|---|---|\n| 2.34 | v2.34.2 |\n| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.33.0, < 2.33.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-534f818929a10b0e7ff2a17d551baeb5"],"technology":"github.com/coder/coder/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe `AgentLogLine` dashboard component instantiated `ansi-to-html` without `escapeXML: true` and inserted the result via `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` so HTML embedded in workspace agent log lines was rendered as live markup. Server-side sanitization did not neutralize HTML metacharacters.\n\n> **Note:** Exploitation requires a victim to view attacker-controlled agent logs in the dashboard.\n\n### Impact\n\nA user who could run a workspace could emit arbitrary HTML into agent logs; when another user, including an administrator, viewed the workspace page, it rendered in their session. Content Security Policy blocked inline scripts but an attacker could still inject a `meta refresh` redirect, `style` rules for UI redressing or CSS-based exfiltration or external `img` beacons. This required workspace-owner access and a victim viewing the page.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix enables `escapeXML: true` so HTML metacharacters are escaped before DOM insertion.\n\nThe fix was backported to all supported release lines:\n\n| Release line | Patched version |\n|---|---|\n| 2.34 | v2.34.2 |\n| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.30.0, < 2.32.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-534f818929a10b0e7ff2a17d551baeb5"],"technology":"github.com/coder/coder/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe `AgentLogLine` dashboard component instantiated `ansi-to-html` without `escapeXML: true` and inserted the result via `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` so HTML embedded in workspace agent log lines was rendered as live markup. Server-side sanitization did not neutralize HTML metacharacters.\n\n> **Note:** Exploitation requires a victim to view attacker-controlled agent logs in the dashboard.\n\n### Impact\n\nA user who could run a workspace could emit arbitrary HTML into agent logs; when another user, including an administrator, viewed the workspace page, it rendered in their session. Content Security Policy blocked inline scripts but an attacker could still inject a `meta refresh` redirect, `style` rules for UI redressing or CSS-based exfiltration or external `img` beacons. This required workspace-owner access and a victim viewing the page.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix enables `escapeXML: true` so HTML metacharacters are escaped before DOM insertion.\n\nThe fix was backported to all supported release lines:\n\n| Release line | Patched version |\n|---|---|\n| 2.34 | v2.34.2 |\n| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/","public_affected_ranges":["< 2.29.17"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-05T19:10:21.459Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-06T21:12:58.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-06T21:12:56.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:36:01.427Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}