{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00017737","kind":"vulnerability","title":"New API is vulnerable to CSRF through user email binding","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-26v7-h57m-gh9m","CVE-2026-44342"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/QuantumNous/new-api. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-5362e2c2361cb305f957e2f791013158"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-07T13:01:50.000Z","value":"5.3 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-5362e2c2361cb305f957e2f791013158"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5362e2c2361cb305f957e2f791013158","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-26v7-h57m-gh9m","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-26v7-h57m-gh9m","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:34:51.634Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5362e2c2361cb305f957e2f791013158"],"technology":"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe email and WeChat account binding endpoints used GET requests for state-changing account operations. In deployments where session cookies could be sent on cross-site navigations, an attacker could trigger a logged-in user's browser to bind an attacker-controlled email address or OAuth identity.\n\nAffected endpoints included:\n\n- `GET /api/oauth/email/bind`\n- `GET /api/oauth/wechat/bind`\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful attack could change account binding state. For email binding, the attacker could bind an email address they control and then attempt follow-on account recovery flows. The default session cookie configuration uses `SameSite=Strict`, which mitigates common cross-site navigation attacks in modern browsers, so the issue is rated Medium.\n\n## Affected versions\n\nVersions before `v0.12.0-alpha.1` are affected.\n\n## Patches\n\nThis issue is fixed in `v0.12.0-alpha.1`. The fix changes email and WeChat binding routes from GET to POST and reads parameters from a JSON request body instead of query parameters. The same change set also normalizes password reset responses to avoid disclosing whether an email is registered.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading immediately is not possible,","public_affected_ranges":["< 0.12.0-alpha.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-05T19:10:21.459Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-07T13:01:50.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-07T13:01:49.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:34:51.634Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}