{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00017765","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Boxlite: Path Traversal Vulnerability Leads to Arbitrary File Write on the Host","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-f396-4rp4-7v2j","CVE-2026-46703"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for boxlite, boxlite-cli, boxlite, @boxlite-ai/boxlite, github.com/boxlite-ai/boxlite/sdks/go. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-5e596494ec9770ba5d2d352c63e0e360"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-23T09:22:33.000Z","value":"9.6 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-5e596494ec9770ba5d2d352c63e0e360"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5e596494ec9770ba5d2d352c63e0e360","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f396-4rp4-7v2j","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-f396-4rp4-7v2j","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-05T19:06:16.668Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5e596494ec9770ba5d2d352c63e0e360"],"technology":"boxlite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"#### Summary\n\nBoxlite is a sandbox service that allows users to create lightweight virtual machines (Boxes) and run OCI containers within them. Boxlite allows users to specify the OCI image used by containers in the sandbox. However, when processing tar entries in OCI images, Boxlite does not account for the possibility that entries may be symlinks pointing to absolute paths. An attacker can craft a malicious OCI image and distribute it on image hosting platforms such as DockerHub, tricking users into using it. Once a user loads the malicious image, the attacker can write arbitrary content to any path on the host, which can further lead to remote code execution on the host.\n\n\n\n#### Details\n\n1. Entry Point — OCI Layer Tarball Extraction\n\n**File:** `boxlite/src/images/archive/tar.rs` **Function:** `extract_layer_tarball_streaming()` (line 24) **Code:**\n\n```rust\npub fn extract_layer_tarball_streaming(tarball_path: &Path, dest: &Path) -> BoxliteResult {\n    // ...\n    apply_oci_layer(reader, dest)\n}\n```\n\n**Issue:** The function passes the tar reader into `apply_oci_layer`. The tarball comes from a registry blob that has passed SHA256 integrity verification against the manifest dig","public_affected_ranges":["< 0.9.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5e596494ec9770ba5d2d352c63e0e360"],"technology":"boxlite-cli","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"#### Summary\n\nBoxlite is a sandbox service that allows users to create lightweight virtual machines (Boxes) and run OCI containers within them. Boxlite allows users to specify the OCI image used by containers in the sandbox. However, when processing tar entries in OCI images, Boxlite does not account for the possibility that entries may be symlinks pointing to absolute paths. An attacker can craft a malicious OCI image and distribute it on image hosting platforms such as DockerHub, tricking users into using it. Once a user loads the malicious image, the attacker can write arbitrary content to any path on the host, which can further lead to remote code execution on the host.\n\n\n\n#### Details\n\n1. Entry Point — OCI Layer Tarball Extraction\n\n**File:** `boxlite/src/images/archive/tar.rs` **Function:** `extract_layer_tarball_streaming()` (line 24) **Code:**\n\n```rust\npub fn extract_layer_tarball_streaming(tarball_path: &Path, dest: &Path) -> BoxliteResult {\n    // ...\n    apply_oci_layer(reader, dest)\n}\n```\n\n**Issue:** The function passes the tar reader into `apply_oci_layer`. The tarball comes from a registry blob that has passed SHA256 integrity verification against the manifest dig","public_affected_ranges":["< 0.9.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5e596494ec9770ba5d2d352c63e0e360"],"technology":"@boxlite-ai/boxlite","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"#### Summary\n\nBoxlite is a sandbox service that allows users to create lightweight virtual machines (Boxes) and run OCI containers within them. Boxlite allows users to specify the OCI image used by containers in the sandbox. However, when processing tar entries in OCI images, Boxlite does not account for the possibility that entries may be symlinks pointing to absolute paths. An attacker can craft a malicious OCI image and distribute it on image hosting platforms such as DockerHub, tricking users into using it. Once a user loads the malicious image, the attacker can write arbitrary content to any path on the host, which can further lead to remote code execution on the host.\n\n\n\n#### Details\n\n1. Entry Point — OCI Layer Tarball Extraction\n\n**File:** `boxlite/src/images/archive/tar.rs` **Function:** `extract_layer_tarball_streaming()` (line 24) **Code:**\n\n```rust\npub fn extract_layer_tarball_streaming(tarball_path: &Path, dest: &Path) -> BoxliteResult {\n    // ...\n    apply_oci_layer(reader, dest)\n}\n```\n\n**Issue:** The function passes the tar reader into `apply_oci_layer`. The tarball comes from a registry blob that has passed SHA256 integrity verification against the manifest dig","public_affected_ranges":["< 0.9.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5e596494ec9770ba5d2d352c63e0e360"],"technology":"github.com/boxlite-ai/boxlite/sdks/go","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"#### Summary\n\nBoxlite is a sandbox service that allows users to create lightweight virtual machines (Boxes) and run OCI containers within them. Boxlite allows users to specify the OCI image used by containers in the sandbox. However, when processing tar entries in OCI images, Boxlite does not account for the possibility that entries may be symlinks pointing to absolute paths. An attacker can craft a malicious OCI image and distribute it on image hosting platforms such as DockerHub, tricking users into using it. Once a user loads the malicious image, the attacker can write arbitrary content to any path on the host, which can further lead to remote code execution on the host.\n\n\n\n#### Details\n\n1. Entry Point — OCI Layer Tarball Extraction\n\n**File:** `boxlite/src/images/archive/tar.rs` **Function:** `extract_layer_tarball_streaming()` (line 24) **Code:**\n\n```rust\npub fn extract_layer_tarball_streaming(tarball_path: &Path, dest: &Path) -> BoxliteResult {\n    // ...\n    apply_oci_layer(reader, dest)\n}\n```\n\n**Issue:** The function passes the tar reader into `apply_oci_layer`. The tarball comes from a registry blob that has passed SHA256 integrity verification against the manifest dig","public_affected_ranges":["< 0.9.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-05T19:10:21.465Z","source_updated_at":"2026-06-23T09:22:33.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-21T21:54:15.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-05T19:06:16.668Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}