{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00017766","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Coder's unbounded memory allocation in provisioner file upload allows authenticated denial of service","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-f962-qm93-mj4c","CVE-2026-55079"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/coder/coder/v2, github.com/coder/coder/v2, github.com/coder/coder/v2, github.com/coder/coder/v2. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-5edebc7d8827bb86197eec5d6c2475c9"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-06T20:54:42.000Z","value":"4.9 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-5edebc7d8827bb86197eec5d6c2475c9"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5edebc7d8827bb86197eec5d6c2475c9","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f962-qm93-mj4c","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-f962-qm93-mj4c","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:36:01.427Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5edebc7d8827bb86197eec5d6c2475c9"],"technology":"github.com/coder/coder/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`NewDataBuilder` in `provisionersdk/proto/dataupload.go` allocated a byte slice using the client-supplied `FileSize` from a `DataUpload` message without an upper-bound check. Although the DRPC wire limit is 4 MiB, the `FileSize` value itself was unconstrained\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user able to reach the provisioner daemon serve endpoint could send a roughly 50-byte message declaring a huge `FileSize` (for example 1 TiB), triggering an unrecoverable Go out-of-memory abort that terminates `coderd`. This is a single-message denial of service affecting the entire deployment.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix validates `FileSize` against an upper bound (`MaxFileSize = 100 MiB`) before allocation.\n\nThe fix was backported to all supported release lines:\n\n| Release line | Patched version |\n|---|---|\n| 2.34 | v2.34.2 |\n| 2.33 | v2.33.8 |\n| 2.32 | v2.32.7 |\n| 2.29 (ESR) | v2.29.17 |\n\n### Workarounds\n\nRestrict access to the provisioner daemon serve endpoint to truste","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.34.0, < 2.34.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5edebc7d8827bb86197eec5d6c2475c9"],"technology":"github.com/coder/coder/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`NewDataBuilder` in `provisionersdk/proto/dataupload.go` allocated a byte slice using the client-supplied `FileSize` from a `DataUpload` message without an upper-bound check. Although the DRPC wire limit is 4 MiB, the `FileSize` value itself was unconstrained\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user able to reach the provisioner daemon serve endpoint could send a roughly 50-byte message declaring a huge `FileSize` (for example 1 TiB), triggering an unrecoverable Go out-of-memory abort that terminates `coderd`. This is a single-message denial of service affecting the entire deployment.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix validates `FileSize` against an upper bound (`MaxFileSize = 100 MiB`) before allocation.\n\nThe fix was backported to all supported release lines:\n\n| Release line | Patched version |\n|---|---|\n| 2.34 | v2.34.2 |\n| 2.33 | v2.33.8 |\n| 2.32 | v2.32.7 |\n| 2.29 (ESR) | v2.29.17 |\n\n### Workarounds\n\nRestrict access to the provisioner daemon serve endpoint to truste","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.33.0, < 2.33.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5edebc7d8827bb86197eec5d6c2475c9"],"technology":"github.com/coder/coder/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`NewDataBuilder` in `provisionersdk/proto/dataupload.go` allocated a byte slice using the client-supplied `FileSize` from a `DataUpload` message without an upper-bound check. Although the DRPC wire limit is 4 MiB, the `FileSize` value itself was unconstrained\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user able to reach the provisioner daemon serve endpoint could send a roughly 50-byte message declaring a huge `FileSize` (for example 1 TiB), triggering an unrecoverable Go out-of-memory abort that terminates `coderd`. This is a single-message denial of service affecting the entire deployment.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix validates `FileSize` against an upper bound (`MaxFileSize = 100 MiB`) before allocation.\n\nThe fix was backported to all supported release lines:\n\n| Release line | Patched version |\n|---|---|\n| 2.34 | v2.34.2 |\n| 2.33 | v2.33.8 |\n| 2.32 | v2.32.7 |\n| 2.29 (ESR) | v2.29.17 |\n\n### Workarounds\n\nRestrict access to the provisioner daemon serve endpoint to truste","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.30.0, < 2.32.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5edebc7d8827bb86197eec5d6c2475c9"],"technology":"github.com/coder/coder/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`NewDataBuilder` in `provisionersdk/proto/dataupload.go` allocated a byte slice using the client-supplied `FileSize` from a `DataUpload` message without an upper-bound check. Although the DRPC wire limit is 4 MiB, the `FileSize` value itself was unconstrained\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user able to reach the provisioner daemon serve endpoint could send a roughly 50-byte message declaring a huge `FileSize` (for example 1 TiB), triggering an unrecoverable Go out-of-memory abort that terminates `coderd`. This is a single-message denial of service affecting the entire deployment.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix validates `FileSize` against an upper bound (`MaxFileSize = 100 MiB`) before allocation.\n\nThe fix was backported to all supported release lines:\n\n| Release line | Patched version |\n|---|---|\n| 2.34 | v2.34.2 |\n| 2.33 | v2.33.8 |\n| 2.32 | v2.32.7 |\n| 2.29 (ESR) | v2.29.17 |\n\n### Workarounds\n\nRestrict access to the provisioner daemon serve endpoint to truste","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.24.0, < 2.29.17"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-05T19:10:21.465Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-06T20:54:42.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-06T20:54:41.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:36:01.427Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}