{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00017786","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Zebra has pre-handshake buffer capacity reservation based on attacker-claimed body length","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-h72h-ppcx-998p"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for zebra-network, zebrad. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-649b32231249340f73ab83475982737f"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-02T19:42:06.000Z","value":"3.7 low","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-649b32231249340f73ab83475982737f"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-649b32231249340f73ab83475982737f","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h72h-ppcx-998p","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-h72h-ppcx-998p","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-05T03:47:11.081Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-649b32231249340f73ab83475982737f"],"technology":"zebra-network","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Am I affected\n\nYou are affected if:\n\n1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.\n2. Your node accepts inbound P2P connections (`network.listen_addr` is set, which is the default).\n\n### Summary\n\nThe P2P codec's `Codec::decode()` method calls `src.reserve(body_len + HEADER_LEN)` after parsing a 24-byte protocol header, using the attacker-claimed `body_len` field. This reserves up to `MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LEN` (~2 MiB) of virtual buffer capacity per connection before any body bytes arrive and before the handshake completes.\n\nHowever, `BytesMut::reserve()` sets virtual capacity without committing physical memory pages. The operating system does not allocate physical RAM until bytes are actually written into the buffer. Since the attacker never sends body bytes, the reserved capacity remains uncommitted. Reproduction of the reporter's PoC (256 threads, 30 seconds of sustained connections) showed negligible RSS impact on the Zebra process.\n\nZebra's existing mitigations further constrain the practical attack surface: per-IP connection limits (`max_connections_per_ip = 1`), a per-connection accept rate of approximately one per second, and a 3-second handshake timeout that cleans ","public_affected_ranges":["<= 6.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-649b32231249340f73ab83475982737f"],"technology":"zebrad","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Am I affected\n\nYou are affected if:\n\n1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.\n2. Your node accepts inbound P2P connections (`network.listen_addr` is set, which is the default).\n\n### Summary\n\nThe P2P codec's `Codec::decode()` method calls `src.reserve(body_len + HEADER_LEN)` after parsing a 24-byte protocol header, using the attacker-claimed `body_len` field. This reserves up to `MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LEN` (~2 MiB) of virtual buffer capacity per connection before any body bytes arrive and before the handshake completes.\n\nHowever, `BytesMut::reserve()` sets virtual capacity without committing physical memory pages. The operating system does not allocate physical RAM until bytes are actually written into the buffer. Since the attacker never sends body bytes, the reserved capacity remains uncommitted. Reproduction of the reporter's PoC (256 threads, 30 seconds of sustained connections) showed negligible RSS impact on the Zebra process.\n\nZebra's existing mitigations further constrain the practical attack surface: per-IP connection limits (`max_connections_per_ip = 1`), a per-connection accept rate of approximately one per second, and a 3-second handshake timeout that cleans ","public_affected_ranges":["<= 4.4.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-05T19:10:21.468Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-02T19:42:06.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-02T19:42:05.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-05T03:47:11.081Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}