{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00017855","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Tina: Broken Access Control: arbitrary bucket-key write/delete in `next-tinacms-s3` (and sibling production media adapters)","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8mq9-5fw2-5rm4","CVE-2026-59992"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for next-tinacms-s3, next-tinacms-dos, next-tinacms-azure, next-tinacms-cloudinary. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-002fe3c253f8d5ffa706d66727fdd859"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-21T18:31:06.000Z","value":"5.4 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-741f8b2b47e794dba29b1c213fd0f8d7"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-06T12:00:23.000Z","value":"0.380%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.32169. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-002fe3c253f8d5ffa706d66727fdd859"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-741f8b2b47e794dba29b1c213fd0f8d7","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8mq9-5fw2-5rm4","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-8mq9-5fw2-5rm4","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:46.713Z"},{"id":"sr-002fe3c253f8d5ffa706d66727fdd859","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-59992","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-07T00:50:47.048Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-741f8b2b47e794dba29b1c213fd0f8d7"],"technology":"next-tinacms-s3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe production media handler shipped by `next-tinacms-s3` (`createMediaHandler` in `packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts`) accepts an attacker-chosen `?key=` query parameter and returns an AWS-signed `PutObject` URL whose `Key` is that value, with no check that the key falls under the operator's configured `mediaRoot`. The same handler's `DELETE` branch reads `objectKey = (req.query.media as string[])[1]` and dispatches a `DeleteObjectCommand` for that exact key, again unbounded by `mediaRoot`. Any caller that passes the operator-supplied `authorized()` predicate — i.e. any logged-in CMS editor in a typical TinaCloud / self-hosted deployment — therefore has write and delete authority over the *entire* S3 bucket the IAM key can reach, even though the package documents `mediaRoot` as the place where editors are scoped. The same shape is present in `next-tinacms-dos`, `next-tinacms-azure`, and `next-tinacms-cloudinary`, so a single design mistake spans every first-party production media backend.\n\n* Project: TinaCMS — first-party production media adapters (consumed by self-hosted Next.js sites and TinaCloud-backed deployments).\n* Source reviewed: `tinacms/tinacms` @ `ma","public_affected_ranges":["< 23.0.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-741f8b2b47e794dba29b1c213fd0f8d7"],"technology":"next-tinacms-dos","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe production media handler shipped by `next-tinacms-s3` (`createMediaHandler` in `packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts`) accepts an attacker-chosen `?key=` query parameter and returns an AWS-signed `PutObject` URL whose `Key` is that value, with no check that the key falls under the operator's configured `mediaRoot`. The same handler's `DELETE` branch reads `objectKey = (req.query.media as string[])[1]` and dispatches a `DeleteObjectCommand` for that exact key, again unbounded by `mediaRoot`. Any caller that passes the operator-supplied `authorized()` predicate — i.e. any logged-in CMS editor in a typical TinaCloud / self-hosted deployment — therefore has write and delete authority over the *entire* S3 bucket the IAM key can reach, even though the package documents `mediaRoot` as the place where editors are scoped. The same shape is present in `next-tinacms-dos`, `next-tinacms-azure`, and `next-tinacms-cloudinary`, so a single design mistake spans every first-party production media backend.\n\n* Project: TinaCMS — first-party production media adapters (consumed by self-hosted Next.js sites and TinaCloud-backed deployments).\n* Source reviewed: `tinacms/tinacms` @ `ma","public_affected_ranges":["< 23.0.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-741f8b2b47e794dba29b1c213fd0f8d7"],"technology":"next-tinacms-azure","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe production media handler shipped by `next-tinacms-s3` (`createMediaHandler` in `packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts`) accepts an attacker-chosen `?key=` query parameter and returns an AWS-signed `PutObject` URL whose `Key` is that value, with no check that the key falls under the operator's configured `mediaRoot`. The same handler's `DELETE` branch reads `objectKey = (req.query.media as string[])[1]` and dispatches a `DeleteObjectCommand` for that exact key, again unbounded by `mediaRoot`. Any caller that passes the operator-supplied `authorized()` predicate — i.e. any logged-in CMS editor in a typical TinaCloud / self-hosted deployment — therefore has write and delete authority over the *entire* S3 bucket the IAM key can reach, even though the package documents `mediaRoot` as the place where editors are scoped. The same shape is present in `next-tinacms-dos`, `next-tinacms-azure`, and `next-tinacms-cloudinary`, so a single design mistake spans every first-party production media backend.\n\n* Project: TinaCMS — first-party production media adapters (consumed by self-hosted Next.js sites and TinaCloud-backed deployments).\n* Source reviewed: `tinacms/tinacms` @ `ma","public_affected_ranges":["< 14.0.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-741f8b2b47e794dba29b1c213fd0f8d7"],"technology":"next-tinacms-cloudinary","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe production media handler shipped by `next-tinacms-s3` (`createMediaHandler` in `packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts`) accepts an attacker-chosen `?key=` query parameter and returns an AWS-signed `PutObject` URL whose `Key` is that value, with no check that the key falls under the operator's configured `mediaRoot`. The same handler's `DELETE` branch reads `objectKey = (req.query.media as string[])[1]` and dispatches a `DeleteObjectCommand` for that exact key, again unbounded by `mediaRoot`. Any caller that passes the operator-supplied `authorized()` predicate — i.e. any logged-in CMS editor in a typical TinaCloud / self-hosted deployment — therefore has write and delete authority over the *entire* S3 bucket the IAM key can reach, even though the package documents `mediaRoot` as the place where editors are scoped. The same shape is present in `next-tinacms-dos`, `next-tinacms-azure`, and `next-tinacms-cloudinary`, so a single design mistake spans every first-party production media backend.\n\n* Project: TinaCMS — first-party production media adapters (consumed by self-hosted Next.js sites and TinaCloud-backed deployments).\n* Source reviewed: `tinacms/tinacms` @ `ma","public_affected_ranges":["< 26.0.4"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T22:29:23.465Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-21T18:31:06.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-19T21:56:30.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:46.713Z"},{"id":"NVI-00017855","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Tina: Broken Access Control: arbitrary bucket-key write/delete in `next-tinacms-s3` (and sibling production media adapters)","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8mq9-5fw2-5rm4","CVE-2026-59992"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for next-tinacms-s3, next-tinacms-dos, next-tinacms-azure, next-tinacms-cloudinary. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-05babcb8b1648ee954bb88197f0820b5"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-21T18:31:06.000Z","value":"5.4 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-741f8b2b47e794dba29b1c213fd0f8d7"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-05T12:03:04.000Z","value":"0.380%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.32163. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-05babcb8b1648ee954bb88197f0820b5"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-741f8b2b47e794dba29b1c213fd0f8d7","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8mq9-5fw2-5rm4","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-8mq9-5fw2-5rm4","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:46.713Z"},{"id":"sr-05babcb8b1648ee954bb88197f0820b5","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-59992","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-06T07:17:46.390Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-741f8b2b47e794dba29b1c213fd0f8d7"],"technology":"next-tinacms-s3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe production media handler shipped by `next-tinacms-s3` (`createMediaHandler` in `packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts`) accepts an attacker-chosen `?key=` query parameter and returns an AWS-signed `PutObject` URL whose `Key` is that value, with no check that the key falls under the operator's configured `mediaRoot`. The same handler's `DELETE` branch reads `objectKey = (req.query.media as string[])[1]` and dispatches a `DeleteObjectCommand` for that exact key, again unbounded by `mediaRoot`. Any caller that passes the operator-supplied `authorized()` predicate — i.e. any logged-in CMS editor in a typical TinaCloud / self-hosted deployment — therefore has write and delete authority over the *entire* S3 bucket the IAM key can reach, even though the package documents `mediaRoot` as the place where editors are scoped. The same shape is present in `next-tinacms-dos`, `next-tinacms-azure`, and `next-tinacms-cloudinary`, so a single design mistake spans every first-party production media backend.\n\n* Project: TinaCMS — first-party production media adapters (consumed by self-hosted Next.js sites and TinaCloud-backed deployments).\n* Source reviewed: `tinacms/tinacms` @ `ma","public_affected_ranges":["< 23.0.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-741f8b2b47e794dba29b1c213fd0f8d7"],"technology":"next-tinacms-dos","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe production media handler shipped by `next-tinacms-s3` (`createMediaHandler` in `packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts`) accepts an attacker-chosen `?key=` query parameter and returns an AWS-signed `PutObject` URL whose `Key` is that value, with no check that the key falls under the operator's configured `mediaRoot`. The same handler's `DELETE` branch reads `objectKey = (req.query.media as string[])[1]` and dispatches a `DeleteObjectCommand` for that exact key, again unbounded by `mediaRoot`. Any caller that passes the operator-supplied `authorized()` predicate — i.e. any logged-in CMS editor in a typical TinaCloud / self-hosted deployment — therefore has write and delete authority over the *entire* S3 bucket the IAM key can reach, even though the package documents `mediaRoot` as the place where editors are scoped. The same shape is present in `next-tinacms-dos`, `next-tinacms-azure`, and `next-tinacms-cloudinary`, so a single design mistake spans every first-party production media backend.\n\n* Project: TinaCMS — first-party production media adapters (consumed by self-hosted Next.js sites and TinaCloud-backed deployments).\n* Source reviewed: `tinacms/tinacms` @ `ma","public_affected_ranges":["< 23.0.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-741f8b2b47e794dba29b1c213fd0f8d7"],"technology":"next-tinacms-azure","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe production media handler shipped by `next-tinacms-s3` (`createMediaHandler` in `packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts`) accepts an attacker-chosen `?key=` query parameter and returns an AWS-signed `PutObject` URL whose `Key` is that value, with no check that the key falls under the operator's configured `mediaRoot`. The same handler's `DELETE` branch reads `objectKey = (req.query.media as string[])[1]` and dispatches a `DeleteObjectCommand` for that exact key, again unbounded by `mediaRoot`. Any caller that passes the operator-supplied `authorized()` predicate — i.e. any logged-in CMS editor in a typical TinaCloud / self-hosted deployment — therefore has write and delete authority over the *entire* S3 bucket the IAM key can reach, even though the package documents `mediaRoot` as the place where editors are scoped. The same shape is present in `next-tinacms-dos`, `next-tinacms-azure`, and `next-tinacms-cloudinary`, so a single design mistake spans every first-party production media backend.\n\n* Project: TinaCMS — first-party production media adapters (consumed by self-hosted Next.js sites and TinaCloud-backed deployments).\n* Source reviewed: `tinacms/tinacms` @ `ma","public_affected_ranges":["< 14.0.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-741f8b2b47e794dba29b1c213fd0f8d7"],"technology":"next-tinacms-cloudinary","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe production media handler shipped by `next-tinacms-s3` (`createMediaHandler` in `packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts`) accepts an attacker-chosen `?key=` query parameter and returns an AWS-signed `PutObject` URL whose `Key` is that value, with no check that the key falls under the operator's configured `mediaRoot`. The same handler's `DELETE` branch reads `objectKey = (req.query.media as string[])[1]` and dispatches a `DeleteObjectCommand` for that exact key, again unbounded by `mediaRoot`. Any caller that passes the operator-supplied `authorized()` predicate — i.e. any logged-in CMS editor in a typical TinaCloud / self-hosted deployment — therefore has write and delete authority over the *entire* S3 bucket the IAM key can reach, even though the package documents `mediaRoot` as the place where editors are scoped. The same shape is present in `next-tinacms-dos`, `next-tinacms-azure`, and `next-tinacms-cloudinary`, so a single design mistake spans every first-party production media backend.\n\n* Project: TinaCMS — first-party production media adapters (consumed by self-hosted Next.js sites and TinaCloud-backed deployments).\n* Source reviewed: `tinacms/tinacms` @ `ma","public_affected_ranges":["< 26.0.4"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:46.832Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-21T18:31:06.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-19T21:56:30.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:46.713Z"},{"id":"NVI-00017855","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Tina: Broken Access Control: arbitrary bucket-key write/delete in `next-tinacms-s3` (and sibling production media adapters)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8mq9-5fw2-5rm4","CVE-2026-59992"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for next-tinacms-s3, next-tinacms-dos, next-tinacms-azure, next-tinacms-cloudinary. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-741f8b2b47e794dba29b1c213fd0f8d7"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-21T18:31:06.000Z","value":"5.4 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-741f8b2b47e794dba29b1c213fd0f8d7"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-741f8b2b47e794dba29b1c213fd0f8d7","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8mq9-5fw2-5rm4","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-8mq9-5fw2-5rm4","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:46.713Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-741f8b2b47e794dba29b1c213fd0f8d7"],"technology":"next-tinacms-s3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe production media handler shipped by `next-tinacms-s3` (`createMediaHandler` in `packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts`) accepts an attacker-chosen `?key=` query parameter and returns an AWS-signed `PutObject` URL whose `Key` is that value, with no check that the key falls under the operator's configured `mediaRoot`. The same handler's `DELETE` branch reads `objectKey = (req.query.media as string[])[1]` and dispatches a `DeleteObjectCommand` for that exact key, again unbounded by `mediaRoot`. Any caller that passes the operator-supplied `authorized()` predicate — i.e. any logged-in CMS editor in a typical TinaCloud / self-hosted deployment — therefore has write and delete authority over the *entire* S3 bucket the IAM key can reach, even though the package documents `mediaRoot` as the place where editors are scoped. The same shape is present in `next-tinacms-dos`, `next-tinacms-azure`, and `next-tinacms-cloudinary`, so a single design mistake spans every first-party production media backend.\n\n* Project: TinaCMS — first-party production media adapters (consumed by self-hosted Next.js sites and TinaCloud-backed deployments).\n* Source reviewed: `tinacms/tinacms` @ `ma","public_affected_ranges":["< 23.0.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-741f8b2b47e794dba29b1c213fd0f8d7"],"technology":"next-tinacms-dos","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe production media handler shipped by `next-tinacms-s3` (`createMediaHandler` in `packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts`) accepts an attacker-chosen `?key=` query parameter and returns an AWS-signed `PutObject` URL whose `Key` is that value, with no check that the key falls under the operator's configured `mediaRoot`. The same handler's `DELETE` branch reads `objectKey = (req.query.media as string[])[1]` and dispatches a `DeleteObjectCommand` for that exact key, again unbounded by `mediaRoot`. Any caller that passes the operator-supplied `authorized()` predicate — i.e. any logged-in CMS editor in a typical TinaCloud / self-hosted deployment — therefore has write and delete authority over the *entire* S3 bucket the IAM key can reach, even though the package documents `mediaRoot` as the place where editors are scoped. The same shape is present in `next-tinacms-dos`, `next-tinacms-azure`, and `next-tinacms-cloudinary`, so a single design mistake spans every first-party production media backend.\n\n* Project: TinaCMS — first-party production media adapters (consumed by self-hosted Next.js sites and TinaCloud-backed deployments).\n* Source reviewed: `tinacms/tinacms` @ `ma","public_affected_ranges":["< 23.0.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-741f8b2b47e794dba29b1c213fd0f8d7"],"technology":"next-tinacms-azure","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe production media handler shipped by `next-tinacms-s3` (`createMediaHandler` in `packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts`) accepts an attacker-chosen `?key=` query parameter and returns an AWS-signed `PutObject` URL whose `Key` is that value, with no check that the key falls under the operator's configured `mediaRoot`. The same handler's `DELETE` branch reads `objectKey = (req.query.media as string[])[1]` and dispatches a `DeleteObjectCommand` for that exact key, again unbounded by `mediaRoot`. Any caller that passes the operator-supplied `authorized()` predicate — i.e. any logged-in CMS editor in a typical TinaCloud / self-hosted deployment — therefore has write and delete authority over the *entire* S3 bucket the IAM key can reach, even though the package documents `mediaRoot` as the place where editors are scoped. The same shape is present in `next-tinacms-dos`, `next-tinacms-azure`, and `next-tinacms-cloudinary`, so a single design mistake spans every first-party production media backend.\n\n* Project: TinaCMS — first-party production media adapters (consumed by self-hosted Next.js sites and TinaCloud-backed deployments).\n* Source reviewed: `tinacms/tinacms` @ `ma","public_affected_ranges":["< 14.0.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-741f8b2b47e794dba29b1c213fd0f8d7"],"technology":"next-tinacms-cloudinary","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe production media handler shipped by `next-tinacms-s3` (`createMediaHandler` in `packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts`) accepts an attacker-chosen `?key=` query parameter and returns an AWS-signed `PutObject` URL whose `Key` is that value, with no check that the key falls under the operator's configured `mediaRoot`. The same handler's `DELETE` branch reads `objectKey = (req.query.media as string[])[1]` and dispatches a `DeleteObjectCommand` for that exact key, again unbounded by `mediaRoot`. Any caller that passes the operator-supplied `authorized()` predicate — i.e. any logged-in CMS editor in a typical TinaCloud / self-hosted deployment — therefore has write and delete authority over the *entire* S3 bucket the IAM key can reach, even though the package documents `mediaRoot` as the place where editors are scoped. The same shape is present in `next-tinacms-dos`, `next-tinacms-azure`, and `next-tinacms-cloudinary`, so a single design mistake spans every first-party production media backend.\n\n* Project: TinaCMS — first-party production media adapters (consumed by self-hosted Next.js sites and TinaCloud-backed deployments).\n* Source reviewed: `tinacms/tinacms` @ `ma","public_affected_ranges":["< 26.0.4"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-05T19:10:21.476Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-21T18:31:06.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-19T21:56:30.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:46.713Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}