{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00018260","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Netty has Unbounded Direct Memory Consumption in its RedisDecoder","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-6ghj-frrj-jjj3","CVE-2026-44890"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for io.netty:netty-codec-redis, io.netty:netty-codec-redis. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-01ddf9a5e091892df09ed3cb4fbdc9eb"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-12T19:27:17.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-01ddf9a5e091892df09ed3cb4fbdc9eb"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-01ddf9a5e091892df09ed3cb4fbdc9eb","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6ghj-frrj-jjj3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-6ghj-frrj-jjj3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-06T15:12:54.193Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-01ddf9a5e091892df09ed3cb4fbdc9eb"],"technology":"io.netty:netty-codec-redis","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nAn attacker can cause DoS by sending crafted Redis payloads across multiple connections without `\\r\\n`. This exhausts the server's direct memory pool (OutOfDirectMemoryError), preventing legitimate connections from being processed.\n\n### Details\nio.netty.handler.codec.redis.RedisDecoder decodes the length of bulk strings and array headers using the `decodeLength` method. This method reads bytes from the network until it encounters a `\\n` character. However, it does not enforce any maximum length check while buffering the bytes if the `\\n` character is not found. An attacker can exploit this by sending a continuous stream of digits (e.g., `$1111...`) without ever sending a `\\n`.\n\nTo cause a true Denial of Service, an attacker must open multiple concurrent connections and distribute the unbounded payloads among them.\n\nAccording to the RESP specification (https://redis.io/docs/latest/develop/reference/protocol-spec/), all parts of the protocol are strictly terminated with `\\r\\n`. Furthermore, the length prefix itself is an integer representation that must fit within standard numeric limits (e.g., a 64-bit signed integer). Therefore, a stream of digits exceeding these bounds","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.2.0.Final, <= 4.2.14.Final"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-01ddf9a5e091892df09ed3cb4fbdc9eb"],"technology":"io.netty:netty-codec-redis","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nAn attacker can cause DoS by sending crafted Redis payloads across multiple connections without `\\r\\n`. This exhausts the server's direct memory pool (OutOfDirectMemoryError), preventing legitimate connections from being processed.\n\n### Details\nio.netty.handler.codec.redis.RedisDecoder decodes the length of bulk strings and array headers using the `decodeLength` method. This method reads bytes from the network until it encounters a `\\n` character. However, it does not enforce any maximum length check while buffering the bytes if the `\\n` character is not found. An attacker can exploit this by sending a continuous stream of digits (e.g., `$1111...`) without ever sending a `\\n`.\n\nTo cause a true Denial of Service, an attacker must open multiple concurrent connections and distribute the unbounded payloads among them.\n\nAccording to the RESP specification (https://redis.io/docs/latest/develop/reference/protocol-spec/), all parts of the protocol are strictly terminated with `\\r\\n`. Furthermore, the length prefix itself is an integer representation that must fit within standard numeric limits (e.g., a 64-bit signed integer). Therefore, a stream of digits exceeding these bounds","public_affected_ranges":["<= 4.1.134.Final"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:39.795Z","source_updated_at":"2026-06-12T19:27:17.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-08T19:02:09.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-06T15:12:54.193Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"44495"}