{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00018287","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Netty: QUIC stateless reset token material exposed through header-visible connection IDs","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-cq4q-cv5g-r8q5","CVE-2026-50009"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for io.netty:netty-codec-classes-quic. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-061e48c08eeb62549bcb702a8bb9822e"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-15T20:44:22.000Z","value":"4.8 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-061e48c08eeb62549bcb702a8bb9822e"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-061e48c08eeb62549bcb702a8bb9822e","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cq4q-cv5g-r8q5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-cq4q-cv5g-r8q5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-06T07:20:20.042Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-061e48c08eeb62549bcb702a8bb9822e"],"technology":"io.netty:netty-codec-classes-quic","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nNetty QUIC exposes the stateless reset token on the network path when using the default HMAC-based connection-ID and stateless-reset-token generators. The reset token for the server's current source connection ID can be derived from bytes that appear as the connection ID in QUIC headers after a source-CID rotation. An on-path attacker observing the headers can use the token to perform a Denial of Service by sending a spoofed Stateless Reset packet.\n\n### Details\nThe sign-based connection ID generator (HmacSignQuicConnectionIdGenerator) and reset token generator (HmacSignQuicResetTokenGenerator) both evaluate HMAC-SHA256 with the same JVM-wide static key (io.netty.handler.codec.quic.Hmac).\n\nDuring source CID rotation (QuicheQuicChannel.newSourceConnectionIds), the current server source CID C is used as input to produce the next CID N. The stateless reset token for C is defined over HMAC(K, C), specifically the first 16 bytes. The next CID N is the first L bytes of the same digest, where L = |C|.\n\nWhenever L ≥ 16, the first 16 bytes of N are exactly the stateless reset token for C. Because N is carried in QUIC headers as a connection ID, an observer can read the headers an","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.2.0.Final, <= 4.2.14.Final"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:39.801Z","source_updated_at":"2026-06-15T20:44:22.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-15T20:44:20.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-06T07:20:20.042Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}