{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00018411","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Zebra: addr/addrv2 Deserialization Resource Exhaustion","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-xr93-pcq3-pxf8","CVE-2026-40881"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for zebrad, zebra-network. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-1f39d8c4ab9a0c196d12ac9eca070f3d"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1f39d8c4ab9a0c196d12ac9eca070f3d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xr93-pcq3-pxf8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-xr93-pcq3-pxf8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-07T07:02:15.138Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1f39d8c4ab9a0c196d12ac9eca070f3d"],"technology":"zebrad","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"# CVE-2026-40881: addr/addrv2 Deserialization Resource Exhaustion\n\n## Summary\n\nWhen deserializing `addr` or `addrv2` messages, which contain vectors of addresses, Zebra would fully deserialize them up to a maximum length (over 233,000) that was derived from the 2 MiB message size limit. This is much larger than the actual limit of 1,000 messages from the specification. Zebra would eventually check that limit but, at that point, the memory for the larger vector was already allocated. An attacker could cause out-of-memory aborts in Zebra by sending multiple such messages over different connections.\n\n## Severity\n\n**Moderate** - This is a Denial of Service Vulnerability that could allow an attacker to crash a Zebra node.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nAll Zebra versions prior to **version 4.3.1**.\n\n## Description\n\nThe vulnerability exists in the `read_addr/addrv2` functions in `codec.rs`. It deserializes a vector of addresses with the `zcash_deserialize()` trait method, which uses as a upper bound the result of `T::max_allocation()`. For theses types, it was derived from dividing the max message size (2 MiB) by the minimum serialized size of one entry. For AddrV1: 2_097_152 / 30 = 69,904. For ","public_affected_ranges":["< 4.3.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1f39d8c4ab9a0c196d12ac9eca070f3d"],"technology":"zebra-network","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"# CVE-2026-40881: addr/addrv2 Deserialization Resource Exhaustion\n\n## Summary\n\nWhen deserializing `addr` or `addrv2` messages, which contain vectors of addresses, Zebra would fully deserialize them up to a maximum length (over 233,000) that was derived from the 2 MiB message size limit. This is much larger than the actual limit of 1,000 messages from the specification. Zebra would eventually check that limit but, at that point, the memory for the larger vector was already allocated. An attacker could cause out-of-memory aborts in Zebra by sending multiple such messages over different connections.\n\n## Severity\n\n**Moderate** - This is a Denial of Service Vulnerability that could allow an attacker to crash a Zebra node.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nAll Zebra versions prior to **version 4.3.1**.\n\n## Description\n\nThe vulnerability exists in the `read_addr/addrv2` functions in `codec.rs`. It deserializes a vector of addresses with the `zcash_deserialize()` trait method, which uses as a upper bound the result of `T::max_allocation()`. For theses types, it was derived from dividing the max message size (2 MiB) by the minimum serialized size of one entry. For AddrV1: 2_097_152 / 30 = 69,904. For ","public_affected_ranges":["< 5.0.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:39.833Z","source_updated_at":"2026-05-21T18:06:10.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-04-18T00:42:05.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-07T07:02:15.138Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}