{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00018434","kind":"vulnerability","title":"ouroboros-ai: Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-47211: untrusted project .env can still reach RCE via omitted execution-routing keys","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-jv2h-4p9v-wf5w"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for ouroboros-ai. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-22d7af34f593ba252238ac2303acd7c5"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-22d7af34f593ba252238ac2303acd7c5","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jv2h-4p9v-wf5w","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-jv2h-4p9v-wf5w","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-06T07:19:16.585Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-22d7af34f593ba252238ac2303acd7c5"],"technology":"ouroboros-ai","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe CVE-2026-47211 fix (0.39.0) added `_UNTRUSTED_ENV_DENYLIST` to stop an untrusted project-directory `.env` from redirecting execution. The denylist was incomplete — several execution-routing keys of the same RCE class were omitted, so a malicious cloned repo can still reach arbitrary command execution by shipping a `.env` (auto-loaded at import, no review step):\n\n- **Backend config-home roots** `CODEX_HOME`, `OPENCODE_CONFIG`, `OPENCODE_CONFIG_DIR`, `XDG_CONFIG_HOME`: a spawned vendor CLI resolves its config from these. `CODEX_HOME=./.evil` + committed `./.evil/config.toml` redirects the nested Codex agent to attacker config — `mcp_servers..command/args` (RCE) and `approval_policy=\"never\"` / `sandbox_mode=\"danger-full-access\"` (silent removal of the human approval gate). (reported by matte1782)\n- **MCP bridge / plugin execution roster** `OUROBOROS_MCP_CONFIG` (the YAML's server `command`/`args` are spawned via stdio_client — RCE), `OUROBOROS_PLUGIN_LOCKFILE`, `OUROBOROS_PLUGIN_TRUST_ROOT` (redirect the installed-plugin roster / trust root so `ooo ` dispatches into attacker code). (reported by hackkim)\n- **SSRF guard toggle** `OUROBOROS_ALLOW_LOCAL_TRANSPOR","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.42.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:39.835Z","source_updated_at":"2026-06-19T15:12:25.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-19T15:12:25.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-06T07:19:16.585Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}