{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00018439","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Papra HTTP redirect bypass can lead to SSRF via webhook delivery system","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-5g86-85rp-f9hx","CVE-2026-48051"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @papra/webhooks. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-242d6d431b8eb9a9c49252be2c710a88"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-10T13:39:10.000Z","value":"3.5 low","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-242d6d431b8eb9a9c49252be2c710a88"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-242d6d431b8eb9a9c49252be2c710a88","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5g86-85rp-f9hx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-5g86-85rp-f9hx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-06T15:13:31.161Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-242d6d431b8eb9a9c49252be2c710a88"],"technology":"@papra/webhooks","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nPapra's webhook delivery system contains an SSRF protection bypass that allows any authenticated organisation member to cause the server to make HTTP requests to internal addresses — loopback, link-local, and RFC-1918 ranges. The SSRF protection validates the registered webhook URL but ignores redirect destinations. The HTTP client (`ofetch`) follows 3xx responses automatically, and the redirect target is never checked against the blocklist. An attacker registers a webhook pointing to an attacker-controlled server, which redirects incoming POSTs to any internal address. Exploitation was confirmed by live test against the official Docker image. The fix is a single-line change to the webhook HTTP client.\n\n### Details\n\n**The vulnerable call**\n\nThe webhook HTTP client in `packages/webhooks/src/webhooks.services.ts` (lines 16–19) calls `ofetch.raw()` without specifying a `redirect` option:\n\n```typescript\nconst response = await ofetch.raw(url, {\n  ...options,\n  ignoreResponseError: true,\n  // no `redirect` option — defaults to 'follow' per Fetch API spec\n});\n```\n\n`ofetch` is a thin wrapper around the WHATWG Fetch API. The Fetch specification defines three redirect m","public_affected_ranges":["< 0.3.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:39.836Z","source_updated_at":"2026-06-10T13:39:10.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-10T13:39:10.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-06T15:13:31.161Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}