{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00018452","kind":"vulnerability","title":"nimiq-primitives: Panic DoS in trie chunk processing via ROOT-keyed item","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-mw3q-r9wh-h2ff","CVE-2026-46545"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for nimiq-primitives. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-26798be6def7d52994d2f253ef6a93bf"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-10T13:41:42.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-26798be6def7d52994d2f253ef6a93bf"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-26798be6def7d52994d2f253ef6a93bf","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mw3q-r9wh-h2ff","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-mw3q-r9wh-h2ff","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-06T15:13:31.161Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-26798be6def7d52994d2f253ef6a93bf"],"technology":"nimiq-primitives","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nA remote, unauthenticated denial-of-service vulnerability in `MerkleRadixTrie::put_chunk` allows any state-sync peer to crash any node performing state synchronization (freshly joining nodes and recovering nodes).\n\nA malicious peer can respond to a `RequestChunk` with a `ResponseChunk::Chunk` whose first `TrieItem.key` is the empty (ROOT) key. The chunk passes sorting, range, and Merkle-proof validation, but when `put_raw` tries to store a value at the root node, it calls `TrieNode::put_value(...).unwrap()`, which returns `Err(RootCantHaveValue)` and panics, aborting the node process. The panic fires on the first malicious chunk the victim commits; no rate limit or authentication gate caps the attack.\n\nImpacted: any node running state sync against untrusted peers — this includes fresh nodes performing initial download and existing nodes recovering from data loss. Honest nodes never construct ROOT-keyed items, so non-syncing operation is unaffected.\n\n### Patches\n\nSee PR.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere is no safe in-process workaround: any peer serving state-sync data can trigger the crash and the code path is not guarded b","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.5.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:39.838Z","source_updated_at":"2026-06-10T13:41:42.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-21T19:50:31.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-06T15:13:31.161Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}