{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00018462","kind":"vulnerability","title":"nono: Sandbox escape on Linux via D-Bus: `systemd-run --user`","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-27vp-2mmc-vmh3","CVE-2026-47128"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for nono-cli. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-28c79854c33aeabbdc339c4d2279bf0a"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-05-28T19:55:41.000Z","value":"6.1 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-28c79854c33aeabbdc339c4d2279bf0a"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-28c79854c33aeabbdc339c4d2279bf0a","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-27vp-2mmc-vmh3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-27vp-2mmc-vmh3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-07T00:53:22.747Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28c79854c33aeabbdc339c4d2279bf0a"],"technology":"nono-cli","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe nono Landlock/seccomp policies allow access to local Unix domain sockets (concrete and abstract). This allows an easy sandbox escape by talking to the per-user systemd dbus socket.\n\nThreat scenario: Running Aider, Claude Code, OpenCode or similar tools with \"allow bash\" policy so that it can invoke arbitrary host tools like `make`, `gcc`, etc. to write code.\n\n### Reproducer\n\nHere, instead of running a tool like `opencode` or `claude` one can just invoke `systemd-run`, but this is something an agent could be tricked into doing:\n\n```bash\n$ cd ~/src/myproject\n$ nono run -s --allow-cwd --profile claude-code -- \\\n      systemd-run --user -q --wait --collect \\\n      /bin/sh -c \"echo oops > ~/Documents/escaped.txt\"\n$ cat /var/home/test/Documents/escaped.txt\noops\n$\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nComplete sandbox escape. The unsandboxed sibling process can write anywhere the user can write, spawn arbitrary processes with network access, etc.\n\n### Maintainer Context\n\nThis issue allows a process running inside the sandbox to escape confinement by interacting with local user-scoped IPC mechanisms and regain the authority already held by the invoking user or service account.\n\nThe issue impac","public_affected_ranges":["< 0.55.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:39.839Z","source_updated_at":"2026-05-28T19:55:41.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-28T19:55:40.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-07T00:53:22.747Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}