{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00018470","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Docker: `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` executes container binary on the host","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r","CVE-2026-41567"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/moby/moby/v2, github.com/docker/docker, github.com/moby/moby. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-2a6a3ce85871262126de8a4a623564f0"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-09T11:55:28.000Z","value":"7.2 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-2a6a3ce85871262126de8a4a623564f0"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-2a6a3ce85871262126de8a4a623564f0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-06T20:56:39.448Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2a6a3ce85871262126de8a4a623564f0"],"technology":"github.com/moby/moby/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nWhen a user uploads a compressed archive into a container, a malicious image can execute arbitrary code with daemon (host root) privileges.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen handling `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` requests with compressed archives, the daemon decompresses them using external system binaries. Due to incorrect ordering of operations, these binaries are resolved from the container's filesystem rather than the host's. A container image that includes a trojanized decompression binary can achieve code execution as the daemon process whenever a compressed archive is uploaded to that container.\n\nThe executed binary runs with the daemon's full privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities.\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary code execution as host root, crossing the container-to-host trust boundary.\n\n### Conditions for exploitation\n\n- A user must run a container from a malicious image that contains a trojanized decompression binary.\n- The user must then upload a compressed archive (xz or gzip) into that container, either by piping a compressed archive via `docker cp -` or by calling the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` API directly with compressed content.\n\n### Not affected","public_affected_ranges":["< 2.0.0-beta.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2a6a3ce85871262126de8a4a623564f0"],"technology":"github.com/docker/docker","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nWhen a user uploads a compressed archive into a container, a malicious image can execute arbitrary code with daemon (host root) privileges.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen handling `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` requests with compressed archives, the daemon decompresses them using external system binaries. Due to incorrect ordering of operations, these binaries are resolved from the container's filesystem rather than the host's. A container image that includes a trojanized decompression binary can achieve code execution as the daemon process whenever a compressed archive is uploaded to that container.\n\nThe executed binary runs with the daemon's full privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities.\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary code execution as host root, crossing the container-to-host trust boundary.\n\n### Conditions for exploitation\n\n- A user must run a container from a malicious image that contains a trojanized decompression binary.\n- The user must then upload a compressed archive (xz or gzip) into that container, either by piping a compressed archive via `docker cp -` or by calling the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` API directly with compressed content.\n\n### Not affected","public_affected_ranges":["<= 28.5.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2a6a3ce85871262126de8a4a623564f0"],"technology":"github.com/moby/moby","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nWhen a user uploads a compressed archive into a container, a malicious image can execute arbitrary code with daemon (host root) privileges.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen handling `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` requests with compressed archives, the daemon decompresses them using external system binaries. Due to incorrect ordering of operations, these binaries are resolved from the container's filesystem rather than the host's. A container image that includes a trojanized decompression binary can achieve code execution as the daemon process whenever a compressed archive is uploaded to that container.\n\nThe executed binary runs with the daemon's full privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities.\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary code execution as host root, crossing the container-to-host trust boundary.\n\n### Conditions for exploitation\n\n- A user must run a container from a malicious image that contains a trojanized decompression binary.\n- The user must then upload a compressed archive (xz or gzip) into that container, either by piping a compressed archive via `docker cp -` or by calling the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` API directly with compressed content.\n\n### Not affected","public_affected_ranges":["<= 28.5.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:39.839Z","source_updated_at":"2026-06-09T11:55:28.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-18T17:47:23.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-06T20:56:39.448Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}