{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00018512","kind":"vulnerability","title":"NIOExtras: NIOHTTPRequestDecompressor ratio limit bypass via inflated Content-Length","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-6ph5-fww6-vfwv","CVE-2026-28975"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/apple/swift-nio-extras. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-341cd08ecd88521836e8cf0a0a6ec1f5"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-341cd08ecd88521836e8cf0a0a6ec1f5","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6ph5-fww6-vfwv","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-6ph5-fww6-vfwv","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-06T15:13:13.153Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-341cd08ecd88521836e8cf0a0a6ec1f5"],"technology":"github.com/apple/swift-nio-extras","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nWhen `NIOHTTPRequestDecompressor` is configured with `.ratio(N)`, the decompression limit is enforced using the `Content-Length` header value from the incoming request rather than the actual number of compressed bytes received. Since `Content-Length` is attacker-controlled, a malicious client can supply an inflated value that causes the ratio check to always pass, effectively disabling the configured decompression limit.\n\nThis allows an attacker to send a small, highly-compressed payload (a \"gzip bomb\") with a falsified `Content-Length` header to bypass the ratio-based protection entirely. The server will decompress the payload without limit, consuming unbounded memory and potentially causing denial of service.\n\nFor example, a gzip payload containing highly repetitive data can achieve amplification ratios of several hundred to one. Under `.ratio(10)` such a payload should be rejected, but if the attacker sets `Content-Length` to match the decompressed size, the check evaluates `decompressed > decompressed * 10` which is always false, and the payload is accepted without error.\n\nAcross repeated requests, this allows sustained memory amplification far exceeding the configu","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.34.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:39.846Z","source_updated_at":"2026-06-12T15:08:06.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-12T15:08:04.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-06T15:13:13.153Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}