{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00018570","kind":"vulnerability","title":"smallbitvec: Integer overflow in safe API leads to heap buffer overflow","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-97wc-2hqc-cjgr","CVE-2026-44983"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for smallbitvec. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-3da396d03cc2fc12bbde0bb203c52d26"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-08T23:35:09.000Z","value":"7.3 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-3da396d03cc2fc12bbde0bb203c52d26"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-3da396d03cc2fc12bbde0bb203c52d26","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-97wc-2hqc-cjgr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-97wc-2hqc-cjgr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-07T00:50:36.189Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3da396d03cc2fc12bbde0bb203c52d26"],"technology":"smallbitvec","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nAn integer overflow in the internal capacity calculation of `smallbitvec` can lead to an undersized heap allocation, resulting in a heap buffer overflow through safe APIs only. This allows memory corruption without requiring `unsafe` code from the caller.\n\n### Details\nThe issue originates from unchecked arithmetic in the internal helper function responsible for computing the required buffer size:\n\n```\n(cap + bits_per_storage() - 1) / bits_per_storage()\n```\n\nWhen `cap` is close to `usize::MAX`, the addition:\n\n```\ncap + bits_per_storage() - 1\n```\n\ncan overflow in release builds and wrap around due to Rust’s default wrapping semantics for integer overflow in optimized builds.\n\nAs a result:\n- `buffer_len(cap)` may return a value significantly smaller than required.\n- The backing storage is allocated with insufficient size.\n- Internal metadata (logical length/capacity) reflects a much larger size than the actual allocation.\n\nSubsequent safe API calls (e.g., `set`, `push`, `reserve`) rely on this corrupted metadata and perform index computations that assume sufficient backing storage. These operations eventually reach unsafe internal code paths (e.g., pointer arithmetic and u","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.1, <= 2.6.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:39.857Z","source_updated_at":"2026-06-08T23:35:09.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-09T00:02:47.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-07T00:50:36.189Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}