{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00018573","kind":"vulnerability","title":"CC-Tweaked has an SSRF Protection Bypass with NAT64","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-5jh9-2h63-pw4q","CVE-2026-47695"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for cc.tweaked:cc-tweaked-1.21-core, cc.tweaked:cc-tweaked-1.20.1-core, cc.tweaked:cc-tweaked-1.20.4-core, cc.tweaked:cc-tweaked-1.20.5-core, cc.tweaked:cc-tweaked-1.20.6-core. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-3e5e83704263c40863269852c7230024"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-3e5e83704263c40863269852c7230024","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5jh9-2h63-pw4q","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-5jh9-2h63-pw4q","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-07T00:53:14.635Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3e5e83704263c40863269852c7230024"],"technology":"cc.tweaked:cc-tweaked-1.21-core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nCC-Tweaked's HTTP API (`http.request`, `http.websocket`) blocks requests to private network ranges to prevent server-side request forgery (SSRF). This protection can be bypassed on IPv6-capable servers using NAT64 well-known prefix addresses (`64:ff9b::/96`). An attacker who can execute Lua code can reach any internal IPv4 service that the filter is intended to block, by addressing it as `http://[64:ff9b::]/` instead of its direct IPv4 address. This affects any CC-Tweaked deployment on a network with NAT64 routing — a configuration that is standard on AWS, GCP, and other cloud platforms when using IPv6-only subnets.\n\n### Details\n\nThe IP filter in `PrivatePattern.matches()` (AddressPredicate.java#L121–L130) blocks private network ranges by calling Java's standard `InetAddress` classification methods:\n\n```java\npublic boolean matches(InetAddress socketAddress) {\n    return socketAddress.isAnyLocalAddress()\n        || socketAddress.isLoopbackAddress()\n        || socketA","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.119.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3e5e83704263c40863269852c7230024"],"technology":"cc.tweaked:cc-tweaked-1.20.1-core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nCC-Tweaked's HTTP API (`http.request`, `http.websocket`) blocks requests to private network ranges to prevent server-side request forgery (SSRF). This protection can be bypassed on IPv6-capable servers using NAT64 well-known prefix addresses (`64:ff9b::/96`). An attacker who can execute Lua code can reach any internal IPv4 service that the filter is intended to block, by addressing it as `http://[64:ff9b::]/` instead of its direct IPv4 address. This affects any CC-Tweaked deployment on a network with NAT64 routing — a configuration that is standard on AWS, GCP, and other cloud platforms when using IPv6-only subnets.\n\n### Details\n\nThe IP filter in `PrivatePattern.matches()` (AddressPredicate.java#L121–L130) blocks private network ranges by calling Java's standard `InetAddress` classification methods:\n\n```java\npublic boolean matches(InetAddress socketAddress) {\n    return socketAddress.isAnyLocalAddress()\n        || socketAddress.isLoopbackAddress()\n        || socketA","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.119.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3e5e83704263c40863269852c7230024"],"technology":"cc.tweaked:cc-tweaked-1.20.4-core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nCC-Tweaked's HTTP API (`http.request`, `http.websocket`) blocks requests to private network ranges to prevent server-side request forgery (SSRF). This protection can be bypassed on IPv6-capable servers using NAT64 well-known prefix addresses (`64:ff9b::/96`). An attacker who can execute Lua code can reach any internal IPv4 service that the filter is intended to block, by addressing it as `http://[64:ff9b::]/` instead of its direct IPv4 address. This affects any CC-Tweaked deployment on a network with NAT64 routing — a configuration that is standard on AWS, GCP, and other cloud platforms when using IPv6-only subnets.\n\n### Details\n\nThe IP filter in `PrivatePattern.matches()` (AddressPredicate.java#L121–L130) blocks private network ranges by calling Java's standard `InetAddress` classification methods:\n\n```java\npublic boolean matches(InetAddress socketAddress) {\n    return socketAddress.isAnyLocalAddress()\n        || socketAddress.isLoopbackAddress()\n        || socketA","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.119.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3e5e83704263c40863269852c7230024"],"technology":"cc.tweaked:cc-tweaked-1.20.5-core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nCC-Tweaked's HTTP API (`http.request`, `http.websocket`) blocks requests to private network ranges to prevent server-side request forgery (SSRF). This protection can be bypassed on IPv6-capable servers using NAT64 well-known prefix addresses (`64:ff9b::/96`). An attacker who can execute Lua code can reach any internal IPv4 service that the filter is intended to block, by addressing it as `http://[64:ff9b::]/` instead of its direct IPv4 address. This affects any CC-Tweaked deployment on a network with NAT64 routing — a configuration that is standard on AWS, GCP, and other cloud platforms when using IPv6-only subnets.\n\n### Details\n\nThe IP filter in `PrivatePattern.matches()` (AddressPredicate.java#L121–L130) blocks private network ranges by calling Java's standard `InetAddress` classification methods:\n\n```java\npublic boolean matches(InetAddress socketAddress) {\n    return socketAddress.isAnyLocalAddress()\n        || socketAddress.isLoopbackAddress()\n        || socketA","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.119.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3e5e83704263c40863269852c7230024"],"technology":"cc.tweaked:cc-tweaked-1.20.6-core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nCC-Tweaked's HTTP API (`http.request`, `http.websocket`) blocks requests to private network ranges to prevent server-side request forgery (SSRF). This protection can be bypassed on IPv6-capable servers using NAT64 well-known prefix addresses (`64:ff9b::/96`). An attacker who can execute Lua code can reach any internal IPv4 service that the filter is intended to block, by addressing it as `http://[64:ff9b::]/` instead of its direct IPv4 address. This affects any CC-Tweaked deployment on a network with NAT64 routing — a configuration that is standard on AWS, GCP, and other cloud platforms when using IPv6-only subnets.\n\n### Details\n\nThe IP filter in `PrivatePattern.matches()` (AddressPredicate.java#L121–L130) blocks private network ranges by calling Java's standard `InetAddress` classification methods:\n\n```java\npublic boolean matches(InetAddress socketAddress) {\n    return socketAddress.isAnyLocalAddress()\n        || socketAddress.isLoopbackAddress()\n        || socketA","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.119.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3e5e83704263c40863269852c7230024"],"technology":"cc.tweaked:cc-tweaked-1.19.3-core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nCC-Tweaked's HTTP API (`http.request`, `http.websocket`) blocks requests to private network ranges to prevent server-side request forgery (SSRF). This protection can be bypassed on IPv6-capable servers using NAT64 well-known prefix addresses (`64:ff9b::/96`). An attacker who can execute Lua code can reach any internal IPv4 service that the filter is intended to block, by addressing it as `http://[64:ff9b::]/` instead of its direct IPv4 address. This affects any CC-Tweaked deployment on a network with NAT64 routing — a configuration that is standard on AWS, GCP, and other cloud platforms when using IPv6-only subnets.\n\n### Details\n\nThe IP filter in `PrivatePattern.matches()` (AddressPredicate.java#L121–L130) blocks private network ranges by calling Java's standard `InetAddress` classification methods:\n\n```java\npublic boolean matches(InetAddress socketAddress) {\n    return socketAddress.isAnyLocalAddress()\n        || socketAddress.isLoopbackAddress()\n        || socketA","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.119.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3e5e83704263c40863269852c7230024"],"technology":"cc.tweaked:cc-tweaked-1.19.4-core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nCC-Tweaked's HTTP API (`http.request`, `http.websocket`) blocks requests to private network ranges to prevent server-side request forgery (SSRF). This protection can be bypassed on IPv6-capable servers using NAT64 well-known prefix addresses (`64:ff9b::/96`). An attacker who can execute Lua code can reach any internal IPv4 service that the filter is intended to block, by addressing it as `http://[64:ff9b::]/` instead of its direct IPv4 address. This affects any CC-Tweaked deployment on a network with NAT64 routing — a configuration that is standard on AWS, GCP, and other cloud platforms when using IPv6-only subnets.\n\n### Details\n\nThe IP filter in `PrivatePattern.matches()` (AddressPredicate.java#L121–L130) blocks private network ranges by calling Java's standard `InetAddress` classification methods:\n\n```java\npublic boolean matches(InetAddress socketAddress) {\n    return socketAddress.isAnyLocalAddress()\n        || socketAddress.isLoopbackAddress()\n        || socketA","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.119.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3e5e83704263c40863269852c7230024"],"technology":"cc.tweaked:cc-tweaked-1.20-core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nCC-Tweaked's HTTP API (`http.request`, `http.websocket`) blocks requests to private network ranges to prevent server-side request forgery (SSRF). This protection can be bypassed on IPv6-capable servers using NAT64 well-known prefix addresses (`64:ff9b::/96`). An attacker who can execute Lua code can reach any internal IPv4 service that the filter is intended to block, by addressing it as `http://[64:ff9b::]/` instead of its direct IPv4 address. This affects any CC-Tweaked deployment on a network with NAT64 routing — a configuration that is standard on AWS, GCP, and other cloud platforms when using IPv6-only subnets.\n\n### Details\n\nThe IP filter in `PrivatePattern.matches()` (AddressPredicate.java#L121–L130) blocks private network ranges by calling Java's standard `InetAddress` classification methods:\n\n```java\npublic boolean matches(InetAddress socketAddress) {\n    return socketAddress.isAnyLocalAddress()\n        || socketAddress.isLoopbackAddress()\n        || socketA","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.119.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:39.857Z","source_updated_at":"2026-05-29T20:21:13.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-29T20:21:12.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-07T00:53:14.635Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}