{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00018588","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Netty's Default QUIC token handler accepts any client-supplied token","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-cmm3-54f8-px4j","CVE-2026-44894"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for io.netty:netty-codec-classes-quic. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-40a5654aea6cb57209030c83ec987f27"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-12T19:29:18.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-40a5654aea6cb57209030c83ec987f27"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-40a5654aea6cb57209030c83ec987f27","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cmm3-54f8-px4j","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-cmm3-54f8-px4j","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-06T15:12:54.193Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-40a5654aea6cb57209030c83ec987f27"],"technology":"io.netty:netty-codec-classes-quic","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"NoQuicTokenHandler is the tokenHandler used when the application does not set one. Its writeToken() returns false (server will not send Retry — acceptable), but validateToken() unconditionally `return 0`. In QuicheQuicServerCodec.handlePacket(), a non-negative return from validateToken() is interpreted as 'token is valid, ODCID starts at offset 0', causing the server to call quiche_accept as if the client's address had been validated by a Retry round-trip. Per RFC 9000 §8.1, a validated address lifts the 3× anti-amplification send limit. Thus any attacker who includes ANY non-empty token bytes in an Initial packet — with a spoofed victim source IP — causes the Netty server to treat the victim as validated and reflect full-size handshake flights (certificates, etc.) toward it without the 3× cap. The correct 'no token handler' semantics would be to return -1 (invalid) so the normal un-validated path and amplification limit apply.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.2.0.Final, <= 4.2.14.Final"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:39.858Z","source_updated_at":"2026-06-12T19:29:18.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-08T22:59:43.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-06T15:12:54.193Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}